As I’ve noted in the past, the Commitments of Traders (COT) information is nothing other than a sentiment indicator. Moreover, for some markets, including gold, silver, copper, the major currencies and Treasury bonds, the COT reports are by far the best indicators of sentiment. This is because they reflect how the broad category known as speculators is betting. Sentiment surveys, on the other hand, focus on a relatively small sample and are, by definition, based on what people say rather than what they are doing. That’s why for some markets, including the ones mentioned above, I put far more emphasis on the COT data than on sentiment surveys.

In this post I’ll summarise the COT situations for five markets with the help of charts from “Gold Charts ‘R’ Us“. I’ll be focusing on the net positioning of speculators in the futures markets, although useful information can also be gleaned from gross positioning and open interest.

Note that what I refer to as the total speculative net position takes into account the net positions of large speculators (non-commercials) and small traders (the ‘non-reportables’) and is the inverse of the commercial net position. The blue bars in the middle sections of the charts that follow indicate the commercial net position, so the inverse of each of these bars is considered to be the total speculative net position.

I’ll start with gold.

Gold’s COT situation was almost unchanged over the latest week. Ignoring everything except sentiment (as indicated by the COT data), gold is in a similar position now to where it was in early-July and early-December of last year. This suggests the potential for a 2-month rally to the $1350-$1400 range, but not much more than that.

Silver’s COT situation has been a source of controversy over the past four months. Some analysts argued that it was extremely bullish, whereas I argued (for example: HERE) that at no point over this period was the COT situation conducive to a significant silver rally. I’m therefore not surprised that there hasn’t been a significant silver rally.

Four weeks ago silver’s COT situation became slightly bearish, but it has since improved and I now view it as neither a tail-wind nor a head-wind for the silver price. However, silver will rally if gold rallies. It’s that simple.

Four weeks ago the speculative net-long position in Comex copper futures became extreme. This didn’t guarantee that a large price decline was in store, but it pointed to substantial downside risk in the price.

Copper’s COT situation is now similar to what it was near short-term price bottoms in July and December of last year, so there’s a decent chance of a multi-week price rebound.

Of the major currencies, the Swiss franc (SF) has the most bullish COT situation. The COT information certainly doesn’t preclude one more decline in the SF to a new low for the year, but it suggests that the SF will trade significantly higher within the next three months.

I expect that long-dated US Treasury securities will trade at much lower prices (much higher yields) within the next 2 years, but during April-May of this year I began to anticipate a multi-month price rebound (yield pullback) in this market. This was mainly due to sentiment as indicated by the COT situation. Of particular relevance, the total speculative net-short position in 10-year T-Note futures had risen to an all-time high.

Despite a price rebound from the May low, the speculative net-short position in 10-year T-Note futures remains near the all-time high reached in late-May. Therefore, it’s a good bet that the T-Note/T-Bond price rebound is not close to being complete.

I update gold’s true fundamentals* every week in commentaries and charts at the TSI web site, but my most recent blog post on the topic was on 30th April. At that time the fundamental backdrop was gold-bearish, but there has since been a change.

My Gold True Fundamentals Model (GTFM) turned bearish in mid-January 2018 and was still bearish at the end of the week before last (22nd June). There were fluctuations along the way, but at no time between mid-January and late-June was the fundamental backdrop supportive of the gold price. However, at the end of last week (29th June) the GTFM turned bullish. The deciding factor was a small, but significant, widening of credit spreads.

Here is a chart comparing the GTFM (in blue) with the US$ gold price (in red).

The upshot is that for the first time in more than 5 months the gold market has a ‘fundamental’ tail-wind, which is a prerequisite for a substantial rally. For reasons that I’ve mentioned in TSI commentaries I’m expecting a tradable 2-month rally from a July low rather than a substantial rally, but my expectations will change if the evidence changes.

*Note that I use the word “true” to distinguish the actual fundamental drivers of the gold price from the drivers that are regularly cited by gold-market analysts and commentators. According to many pontificators on the gold market, gold’s fundamentals include the volume of metal flowing into the inventories of gold ETFs, China’s gold imports, the volume of gold being transferred out of the Shanghai Futures Exchange inventory, the amount of “registered” gold at the COMEX, India’s monsoon and wedding seasons, jewellery demand, the amount of gold being bought/sold by various central banks, changes in mine production and scrap supply, and wild guesses regarding JP Morgan’s exposure to gold. These aren’t true fundamental price drivers. At best, they are distractions.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

The article titled “Silver’s Critical Role In Electrification May Fuel Its Rise” contains some interesting comments about the silver market, but with one minor exception the information presented in this article has no bearing on silver’s risk/reward as a speculation or investment. The minor exception is the high (by historical standards) gold/silver ratio, which suggests that the silver price is likely to rise relative to the gold price over the next few years. However, none of the information about silver ‘fundamentals’ presented in the article is relevant to the silver price.

It isn’t relevant for the same reasons that most of the information presented by the ‘experts’ about gold fundamentals is also not relevant: It treats the annual output of the mining sector as if it were the total supply (annual mine production is a small fraction of the total supply) and it confuses flows from one part of the market to another with changes in total demand (every ‘flow’ involves an increase in demand on the part of the buyer and an exactly offsetting decrease in demand on the part of the seller). Furthermore, it isn’t relevant for another reason that can be illuminated by asking the question: within the past 80 years, when was there a major silver rally in the absence of a gold rally?

The answer is that over the past 80 years there hasn’t been a single major silver rally in the absence of a gold rally. The best rally in silver without a concurrent rally in gold was the 6-month price spike that began in Q3-1997. This rally resulted from an attempt to manipulate the price upward on the back of Warren Buffett’s silver accumulation; it did not result from any of the ‘fundamental’ drivers cited by commentators trying to make the case that silver can rally strongly without gold.

The historical record persuasively argues that large silver rallies don’t happen in the absence of large gold rallies. This tells us that either economic/financial-system confidence drives the silver market in the same way that it drives the gold market or that the big trends in silver simply follow the big trends in gold.

The bottom line is that there does not appear to be a good reason to expect the silver price to move substantially higher independently of the gold price.

[This post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary]

Conventional wisdom is that an inversion of the yield curve (short-term interest rates moving above long-term interest rates) signals that a recession is coming, but this is only true to the extent that a recession is always coming. A reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening is a far more useful signal.

What a yield curve inversion actually means is that the interest-rate situation has become extreme, but there is no telling how extreme it will become before the eventual breaking point is reached. Furthermore, although there was a yield-curve inversion prior to at least the past seven US recessions, Japan’s most recent recessions were not preceded by inverted yield curves and there is no guarantee that short-term interest rates will rise by enough relative to long-term interest rates to cause the yield curve to become inverted prior to the next US recession. In fact, a good argument can be made that due to the extraordinary monetary policy of the past several years the start of the next US recession will NOT be preceded by a yield curve inversion.

Previous US yield curve inversions have happened up to 18 months prior to the start of a recession, and as mentioned above it’s possible that there will be no yield curve inversion before the next recession. Therefore, we wouldn’t want to be depending on a yield curve inversion for a timely warning about the next recession or financial crisis. However, the yield curve can provide us with a much better, albeit still imperfect, recession/crisis warning in the form of a confirmed trend reversal from flattening to steepening. This was discussed in numerous TSI commentaries over the years and was also covered in a blog post last December.

There are two reasons that a reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening is a more useful recession/crisis warning signal. First, it is timelier. Second, it should work regardless of whether or not the yield curve becomes inverted.

Now, from a practical speculation standpoint it is not essential to understand WHY the yield curve reverses from flattening to steepening ahead of major economic problems bubbling to the surface. It is enough to know that it does. However, if you understand why the curve has reversed direction ahead of previous recessions you will understand why it either should or might not reverse direction in a timely manner in the future. After all, if extraordinary monetary policy could prevent the yield curve from becoming inverted ahead of the next recession then perhaps it also could prevent the yield curve from reversing course the way it has in the past.

With regard to understanding the why, the first point to grasp is that the boom phase of the cycle is characterised by borrowing short-term to lend/invest long-term. This puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates, meaning that it causes the yield curve to flatten. Also, when the boom is mature and is approaching its end there will be a scramble for additional short-term financing to a) complete projects that were started when monetary conditions were easier and b) address cash shortages that have arisen due to completed projects not delivering the predicted cash flows. This puts further upward pressure on short-term rates relative to long-term rates, and could, although won’t necessarily, cause the yield curve to become inverted.

Next, as the boom nears its end the quantity of loan defaults will begin to rise and the opportunities to profit from short-term leverage will become scarcer. Everything will still seem fine to casual observers, central bankers, the average economist and the vast majority of commentators on the financial markets, but it will now be apparent to a critical mass of astute operators (investors, speculators and financiers) that many of the investments that were incentivised by years of easy money were ill-conceived. These operators will begin shifting towards ‘liquidity’ and away from risk.

The aforementioned increasing desire for the combination of safety and liquidity leads to greater demand for cash and gold. But more importantly as far as this discussion is concerned, it boosts the demand for short-term Treasury debt relative to long-term Treasury debt (thus putting downward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates). The reason is that the shorter the term of the Treasury debt, the lower the risk of an adverse price movement. For example, if you lend $10B to the US government via the purchase of 3-month T-Bills then in three months’ time you will have something worth $10B, but if you lend $10B to the US government via the purchase of 10-year T-Notes then in three months’ time you could have something that is worth significantly more or less than $10B.

As an aside, what an investor focused on boosting liquidity really wants is cash, but if he has billions of dollars then cash is not a viable option. This is because the cash would have to be deposited in a bank, which means that the investor would be lending the money to a bank and taking the risk of a massive loss due to bank failure. Lending to the US government is a much safer choice.

In summary, it’s mainly the desire for greater liquidity and safety that begins to emerge at the tail-end of a boom that causes the yield curve to stop flattening and start steepening. As demonstrated by the events of the past few years the central bank has substantial power to postpone the end of a boom, but eventually a breaking point will be reached and when it is the yield curve’s trend will change from flattening to steepening.