[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary posted at www.speculative-investor.com last week]

The senior US stock indices have trended upward with only minor pullbacks since April, leaving them very overbought by most measures and at their highest valuations in history. Furthermore, the Russell2000 Small-Cap Index is testing long-term resistance. At the same time, the economy is weakening under the weight of tariffs, regime uncertainty and many years of malinvestment, pointing to either slower earnings growth ahead or earnings contractions if the long-delayed recession finally arrives. Consequently, the current market situation seems precarious.

It is precarious, which is why our own accounts are now about 50% in cash. This is up from 30% in April-2025 and is the highest cash percentage we have had in many years. However, over the past 18 months we have steered clear of bearish speculations in our own accounts and with regard to TSI recommendations/positions (we have not added a stock-market-focussed put option to the TSI List since March-2024).

As an aside, we came close to adding an IWM (Russell2000 ETF) put option to the TSI List in July of this year, but for the option to be added the IWM price had to test resistance at US$230 before reversing downward. It ended up reversing downward from significantly below this resistance and then rebounded off support, prompting us to write (in the 11th August Weekly Update): “…note that a rise by IWM to resistance at $230 now would constitute an upside breakout and would NOT create a buying opportunity for IWM puts.” A week later we went on to explain: “…the small-cap-focussed Russell2000 ETF (IWM) finally attacked resistance at US$230 last week. The resistance has held for now, but the fact that IWM pulled back to support before attacking resistance makes it more likely that the resistance will be breached.” The resistance eventually was breached and a rise to the next important resistance at US$245 soon followed.

Our interest in equity-index-related bearish speculations diminished greatly after we fully understood the reality that with passive investing strategies having come to dominate the market, the traditional mix of equity market fundamentals such as corporate earnings and valuation had all but ceased to matter. In fact, valuation now works in the opposite way, in that the greater the relative overvaluation of a particular stock the larger the proportion of ‘passive’ money that will be allocated to the stock, driving its valuation even higher.

The situation is precarious, because at some point the system that is putting a relentless bid under the market and especially under the stocks with relatively large market capitalisations will go into reverse. At that point and with valuations in the stratosphere, there will be no value-oriented investors to ‘buy the dip’ and most people will be surprised at how far and how fast the market falls.

The system won’t go into reverse because valuations have become too high, because, as explained above, high valuations are not an impediment to demand if most of the demand is ‘passive’. It will go into reverse because the net flow of money into passive funds stops or simply becomes insufficient. This could happen due to the “boomer” generation withdrawing money from their retirement accounts or it could be the result of much higher unemployment (a recession).

Unfortunately, there is no way of predicting when the major reversal point will arrive. At this time we suspect that the overall bullish trend will continue until the end of this year (with a significant intervening correction), but it could continue for much longer than that. In the meantime, we plan to continue doing what we have been doing, which is 1) adjust our overall cash percentage based on short-term risk considerations and 2) find ways to profit on the long side that don’t involve turning a blind eye to the values of underlying businesses. Fortunately, there have been excellent opportunities in the commodity realm over the past 12 months and we expect that there will be many additional opportunities in this realm over the next couple of years.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary at www.speculative-investor.com]

Since 1970, which roughly was when the current monetary system involving no official link to gold was born, the USD/CHF exchange rate (the US$ relative to the Swiss franc) has experienced a repeating pattern of 8-10 years down followed by 6-8 years up. We rarely discuss this cycle at TSI, because it only becomes relevant when the window for a cyclical turning point is entered, which only happens every 6-10 years. We are discussing it today because a turning-point window has been entered.

The cyclical pattern outlined above began with an 8-year downward trend in the US$ (relative to the Swiss franc) during 1970-1978. This decline was followed by an upward trend that culminated in 1985 and then a 10-year decline to a major bottom in 1995. The following weekly chart picks up the story in 1991, which means that it captures the final few years of the 1985-1995 cyclical decline and everything thereafter.

The chart shows that the most recent cyclical decline kicked off at the start of 2017, so it is not a coincidence that the last time we discussed this long-term cycle at TSI was in 2017. An 8-10-year decline from the 2017 high would result in the next major low for the USD being set during 2025-2027. Hence our comment above that a turning-point window has been entered.

It’s worth pointing out that knowledge of the above-described cycle generally isn’t useful for practical trading purposes, because the countertrend moves during both cyclical uptrends and cyclical downtrends can be substantial. However, it is useful to know that previous cyclical downward trends, which culminated in 1978, 1995 and 2011, had large declines during their final 12 months. If this aspect of the long-term pattern repeats, then a large decline in the USD still lies ahead.

So, where does this leave us?

Our view at the start of this year was that the USD was about to embark of a 1-2-year decline to complete a cyclical downward trend. We subsequently refined this view and over the past several months have written that we expected a cycle low to be set late this year at not far below the early-July low. While we continue to expect that this year’s low will be not far below the early-July low, we no longer expect this year’s low to be the ultimate cycle low. Here are the three reasons in order of ascending importance:

1) As mentioned above, previous long-term declines in the USD have involved large declines during their final 12 months. Unless the USD loses about 10% of its value against the CHF within the next three months, the decline during the 12 months leading up to this year’s low will be minor in comparison.

2) Major USD lows have occurred at 16-17-year intervals (Q3-1978, Q2-1995, Q3-2011). The same interval projects 2027-2028 for the next major low.

3) Total US equity market capitalisation as a percentage of global equity market capitalisation reached a peak of almost 70% early this year. Refer to the following chart for the details. There is evidence in capital flow data and in the following chart that a reversal has occurred. Furthermore, the trade-related policies of the Trump Administration will tend to reduce capital in-flows at the same time as they restrict goods in-flows to the US, and US equity valuations are extremely high in both absolute and relative terms. A result is likely to be a multi-year period of weakness in US equities relative to global equities, which, in turn, would mean a multi-year period during which our US$ True Fundamentals Model (UTFM) spends most of its time in bearish or neutral territory.

Chart source: Lord Abbett

Further to the above, we expect that the USD will make an intermediate-term low before the end of this year, but the overall cyclical decline is now expected to extend into 2027. A cycle low in 2027 still would be within the window projected by the 6-8 years up followed by 8-10 years down repeating pattern. It also would mesh with the 16-17-year cycle of major USD lows and our expectations regarding currency market fundamentals.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary published at www.speculative-investor.com]

The Trump-Putin summit in Alaska ended with no peace deal, which was not a surprise*. However, we suspect that an agreement to end the fighting will happen within the next few months, because there are strong incentives for all parties to bring the destruction to an end. For Putin and Russia’s political elite, the incentives are economic and are becoming stronger as time goes on.

In our 29th January 2025 commentary we discussed the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the Russian economy. Here’s how we described the situation:

“Due to the government’s control of the commercial banking system, there won’t be a [financial/debt] crisis. However, the cumulative costs of waging the war in Ukraine will lead to long-term weakness. In effect, a lot of resources are being drawn from the broad economy and then destroyed as part of the war effort, reducing the total amount of wealth.

The war-related wastage of resources (destruction of wealth) is not evident in the financial statements of the Russian government due to the ‘sleight of hand’ that has been used to keep a large part of the war financing off the government’s books. The sleight-of-hand involves directing the commercial banks to provide whatever financing is required by the manufacturers of armaments…[which] has led to a massive expansion of corporate credit in Russia.

A consequence is that although the government’s balance sheet still looks healthy, the effects of the war-related spending are evident in the inflation rate. The official inflation rate is around 9%, but the fact that the central bank considers a short-term interest rate target of 21% to be appropriate suggests that the actual inflation rate is 15%-20% or higher.

The government’s control of the banking system will prevent a crisis, but Putin certainly has strong economic incentives to bring the war in Ukraine to an end.”

Since then, the war has continued to grind on, with Russia’s invading forces making slow but steady progress. The cost has been high (it has been estimated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that the war will cost the Kremlin about US$170B this year), and making matters worse for the Russian government is that its oil-related tax revenue dropped by about one-third from July of last year to July of this year. This is not because sanctions are working, but because the oil price is now about 25% lower in US$ terms while the Russian Ruble has gained about 10% against the US$.

The following chart shows that the Ruble has strengthened significantly against the US$ since the start of this year (the line on this chart declines when the Ruble strengthens) and is now roughly where it was in early-2022, immediately prior to the start of the war with Ukraine.

As a result of the on-going wealth destruction, the adverse effects of the war on Russia’s economy are becoming increasingly apparent. This is why we say that Putin has an incentive to strike a peace deal that is becoming stronger with the passage of time. In short, the longer the war drags on, the worse will be the outcome for Russia’s economy. However, a peace deal will require the acknowledgement, on the part of NATO/Ukraine, that Ukraine will never be part of NATO and that about 20% of Ukraine is now Russian territory.

*It also wasn’t a surprise that Trump portrayed the meeting as a significant step towards peace. Further to a comment we made a week ago, this could enable him to back away from his “secondary sanctions” threat and substantially reduce tariffs on India.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published last week at www.speculative-investor.com]

Temporarily at least, we have some semblance of clarity on the international trade front, with a trade deal covering most imports being announced at the start of this week between the US government and the EU. Like the earlier one between the governments of the US and Japan, this deal involves huge and fictitious dollar amounts of promised investments and spending. In this case, the fictitious amounts are US$750B of EU purchases of US energy over three years and US$600B of EU investment in the US.

The investment/spending amounts that have been linked to the deals are made-up numbers that bear no resemblance to reality, because:

1) The parties making the agreements are not the ones that would be doing the investing/spending. For example, the EU is not a legal entity that invests in the US or purchases energy from the US.

2) In order for an investment to be made in the US, an investor would have to believe that the investment will achieve an adequate return. Therefore, the amount that will be invested will be determined as it always has been determined: by the forecast return on the investment, taking risk into account.

3) The only way that the EU could greatly increase the amount of energy it buys from the US would be to change energy trade routes. To be more specific, a lot of the energy (oil, LNG and coal) that is being shipped from the US to destinations other than the EU would have to be re-routed to the EU, and a substantial portion of the EU’s current energy imports would have to be re-routed to other countries. This would result in substantial extra costs being incurred for the benefit of no one other than the energy shipping industry. Perhaps that is why the stock price of Flex LNG (FLNG) was very strong during the first two days of this week and has broken out to the upside.

As an aside, it generally is the case that when one country or region takes actions that hampers trade, trade doesn’t stop; it moves. This concept was highlighted in the UPS earnings call on Tuesday of this week. In this call UPS first noted that during May-June there was a 34.8% drop in the average daily volume in the company’s China-US trade lane, and then noted: “…in the second quarter, we saw volume in our China-to-the-rest-of-the-world trade lanes increase by 22.4%, and we nearly doubled our capacity between India and Europe to meet the growing export demand on that trade lane.”

4) In the way it handled the attempts by Nippon Steel to buy US Steel, the US government has demonstrated that it does not want additional foreign investment in the US.

The reality is that although the recent trade deals have included huge numbers that supposedly reflect additional foreign investment in the US, these deals will not result in any investments that would not have occurred anyway. The touted numbers are solely for public relations purposes.

The recent deals have added some clarity, but the overall level of trade-related uncertainty remains high.

One reason is that there is a 12th August deadline for the US and China governments to do one of the following: a) come to a new agreement on trade terms involving tariff rates and export restrictions, b) extend the terms of a temporary arrangement that was agreed in mid-May, or c) return to the ridiculous tariff rates and restrictions that applied prior to the mid-May agreement. A 90-day extension of the current terms is widely expected.

Another reason for a continuing high level of trade-related uncertainty is that Trump has shortened the time for Russia to strike a peace deal with Ukraine or face secondary sanctions (these would be sanctions on countries that import Russian products). The new deadline mentioned earlier this week is about 10 days from now. This will be interesting, because a) there won’t be a peace deal prior to this deadline, b) China is the main importer of Russian products and c) India gets about 45% of its oil from Russia. The US can’t punish China for importing Russian products, because via its control of REE supply China’s government has the ultimate weapon in the trade war. However, the US could punish India with secondary tariffs, but what would this achieve?

The fact is that all the oil currently produced in the world gets bought by someone, so the only way that India could stop consuming Russian oil would be to take oil that currently is being consumed elsewhere, causing a supply shortage elsewhere that would have to be filled with…Russian oil. There simply is no way to prevent the global consumption of Russian oil and any attempts to do so would have minimal effects on Russia but could cause major problems in other countries/regions.