[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published last week at https://speculative-investor.com/]
After the war against Iran broke out in late-February, we thought that the oil market was under-estimating the scale of the oil supply problem and that a price of US$150-$200/barrel would likely be seen in the US futures market if the war continued for more than a few weeks. However, by the first half of April — with the war still very much in progress — we thought that the crisis essentially was over and that oil’s price spike to the US$120s in early-March would turn out to be its peak for the year. This was based on the price pattern and the progress of the war. As the oil price subsequently made progressively lower highs and the futures curve flattened, we became more convinced that the early-March peak was, indeed, the intermediate-term variety, while any remaining doubt was removed as soon as the US-Iran MOU was put in place. Some oil market analysts, though, maintained their $200/barrel price forecasts throughout the downward price trend and are still talking-up the short-term risk of a price rise of that magnitude. Why have these forecasts been so wrong and why, in all likelihood, will they continue to be wrong?
After the start of the war, several actions were taken that helped ‘fill the void’ created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (SOH). On the supply side, most of these actions were obvious and accounted for in price forecasts. Examples include Saudi Arabia re-routing oil from its east coast to its west coast via pipeline and oil being released from strategic reserves. The mistakes were on the demand side and the biggest of these was to not account for China reducing its oil imports by more than 5M barrels/day.
We started writing about the large reduction in China’s oil imports in early May, which also is when related articles started to appear in the press. But if this information was starting to appear in the mainstream media during the first half of May, it’s reasonable to assume that large traders in the oil market had been aware of it and had acted on it much sooner. In more general terms, when you discover information in the mainstream financial press (Financial Times, Wall St Journal, Bloomberg, etc.), you should assume that the information already is reflected in market prices.
Another mistake worth highlighting is associated with global oil inventories. We keep reading about plummeting inventories and storage tanks rapidly emptying, which creates the impression that the world will soon run out of oil. The reality, though, is that commercial oil inventories are not materially different today than they were at the start of this year. To further explain, there have been large inventory drawdowns, but only in the inventories (strategic reserves) managed by governments. This means that there will be no need to replenish the inventories in a hurry.
An important related point is that the reduction in the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) accounts for about 75% of this year’s reduction in global strategic petroleum reserves. This is important because the US does not need a strategic reserve, so the US government could take as long as it wanted to replenish the SPR or simply choose not to replenish it.
Therefore, what’s being touted as a dangerously low inventory situation is a non-issue.
All of which brings us to a critical point: At any given time, the most accurate assessment of the current supply of oil relative to the demand for oil is provided by the slope of the oil futures curve, that is, how contract prices change as delivery months become more distant. The slope of the futures curve tells you the extent to which the market is well supplied, while the change in the slope over time tells you whether the supply situation is becoming tighter or looser. For example, there were times between early-March and early-April when the price of the nearest oil futures contract traded more than $40/barrel above the price of oil for delivery nine months later, indicating a severe shortage of physical oil, but the difference between these contracts has since trended lower and is now only about $3. This suggests that although the oil supply situation is still tight, the extent of the tightness has reduced dramatically. Moreover, it continues to move in the direction of increasing abundance.
Summing up, when it comes to assessing current oil supply relative to demand, the futures curve is vastly superior to any analyst.











