[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published last week at www.speculative-investor.com]

Temporarily at least, we have some semblance of clarity on the international trade front, with a trade deal covering most imports being announced at the start of this week between the US government and the EU. Like the earlier one between the governments of the US and Japan, this deal involves huge and fictitious dollar amounts of promised investments and spending. In this case, the fictitious amounts are US$750B of EU purchases of US energy over three years and US$600B of EU investment in the US.

The investment/spending amounts that have been linked to the deals are made-up numbers that bear no resemblance to reality, because:

1) The parties making the agreements are not the ones that would be doing the investing/spending. For example, the EU is not a legal entity that invests in the US or purchases energy from the US.

2) In order for an investment to be made in the US, an investor would have to believe that the investment will achieve an adequate return. Therefore, the amount that will be invested will be determined as it always has been determined: by the forecast return on the investment, taking risk into account.

3) The only way that the EU could greatly increase the amount of energy it buys from the US would be to change energy trade routes. To be more specific, a lot of the energy (oil, LNG and coal) that is being shipped from the US to destinations other than the EU would have to be re-routed to the EU, and a substantial portion of the EU’s current energy imports would have to be re-routed to other countries. This would result in substantial extra costs being incurred for the benefit of no one other than the energy shipping industry. Perhaps that is why the stock price of Flex LNG (FLNG) was very strong during the first two days of this week and has broken out to the upside.

As an aside, it generally is the case that when one country or region takes actions that hampers trade, trade doesn’t stop; it moves. This concept was highlighted in the UPS earnings call on Tuesday of this week. In this call UPS first noted that during May-June there was a 34.8% drop in the average daily volume in the company’s China-US trade lane, and then noted: “…in the second quarter, we saw volume in our China-to-the-rest-of-the-world trade lanes increase by 22.4%, and we nearly doubled our capacity between India and Europe to meet the growing export demand on that trade lane.”

4) In the way it handled the attempts by Nippon Steel to buy US Steel, the US government has demonstrated that it does not want additional foreign investment in the US.

The reality is that although the recent trade deals have included huge numbers that supposedly reflect additional foreign investment in the US, these deals will not result in any investments that would not have occurred anyway. The touted numbers are solely for public relations purposes.

The recent deals have added some clarity, but the overall level of trade-related uncertainty remains high.

One reason is that there is a 12th August deadline for the US and China governments to do one of the following: a) come to a new agreement on trade terms involving tariff rates and export restrictions, b) extend the terms of a temporary arrangement that was agreed in mid-May, or c) return to the ridiculous tariff rates and restrictions that applied prior to the mid-May agreement. A 90-day extension of the current terms is widely expected.

Another reason for a continuing high level of trade-related uncertainty is that Trump has shortened the time for Russia to strike a peace deal with Ukraine or face secondary sanctions (these would be sanctions on countries that import Russian products). The new deadline mentioned earlier this week is about 10 days from now. This will be interesting, because a) there won’t be a peace deal prior to this deadline, b) China is the main importer of Russian products and c) India gets about 45% of its oil from Russia. The US can’t punish China for importing Russian products, because via its control of REE supply China’s government has the ultimate weapon in the trade war. However, the US could punish India with secondary tariffs, but what would this achieve?

The fact is that all the oil currently produced in the world gets bought by someone, so the only way that India could stop consuming Russian oil would be to take oil that currently is being consumed elsewhere, causing a supply shortage elsewhere that would have to be filled with…Russian oil. There simply is no way to prevent the global consumption of Russian oil and any attempts to do so would have minimal effects on Russia but could cause major problems in other countries/regions.

[This blog post is a slightly modified excerpt (including updated charts) from a commentary published during the week before last at www.speculative-investor.com]

US President Trump threatened on 14th July that if a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement didn’t happen within 50 days, then very high secondary tariffs would be imposed on Russia’s trading partners. As explained below, this is an empty threat.

China is Russia’s most important trading partner, so this is a threat to again impose extremely high tariffs on US imports from China. Now, the probability of a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement within the next 50 days is low and the probability that China will stop trading with Russia in response to this threat is zero, so the likely outcome 50 days from now is that Trump will be forced to either carry out his threat or back down. If he doesn’t back down and makes good on his threat, we know what will happen because we watched the same scenario play out within the past few months.

The unilateral imposition of higher tariffs on Chinese imports to the US would cause China’s government to stop exporting Rare Earth Elements (REEs) and other critical metals to the US. Within a couple of months this would bring the US auto industry as well as US-based production of batteries, turbines, a lot of military equipment and anything that uses an electric motor to a virtual standstill, prompting the US government to strike a deal that substantially reduced the tariffs.

It turns out that the ultimate weapon in the ‘trade war’ is the Chinese government’s control of global REE supply, because the economic impact of stopping exports of these minerals is low for China and extremely high for the US and many other developed nations. This was proved over the past few months and will be proved again if the US government imposes hefty additional tariffs on China after 50 days.

Moreover, due to growing demand associated with high-tech applications, the extent to which REEs are critical will increase as time goes by. This is why we have had a strong focus on REEs over the past five years and why we expect REE mines and processing facilities outside China to become far more valuable over the years ahead.

One of the unintended consequences of Trump’s trade war has been to highlight the risk presented by the Chinese government’s influence on REE supply. This prompted the stock market to start pricing-in the increasingly urgent need to diversify in this area, which has involved some rapid valuation changes. For example, the stock prices of Energy Fuels (UUUU) and Neo Performance Materials (NEO.TO), two of the TSI stock selections that provide exposure to REEs, have more than doubled from their lows of the past four months.

A chart of UUUU is included below. The recent frenetic price action suggests that we are nearing the end of the first leg of a cyclical bull market.

However, there haven’t yet been large increases in the prices of the underlying commodities.

Regarding the prices of the underlying commodities, the following chart shows the performance of Neodymium (Nd), one of the most widely used REEs. The chart reveals that although there has been a steady upward trend in the Nd price since March of 2024, the price remains very low relative to where it traded during the bulk of 2021-2023. Nd is a “light” REE and is not one of the REEs over which China’s government has a stranglehold on supply (heavy REEs such as Dysprosium (Dy) and Terbium (Tb) are more vulnerable to Chinese export restrictions), but as far as we can tell its price performance is representative.

The risk that the stock market has gone part of the way towards discounting is that REE prices are about to accelerate upward as the users of these metals around the world scramble to secure supply. In other words, the risk is that for REE prices we are at the equivalent of mid-2020.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary at www.speculative-investor.com]

To our surprise, the US economy has not entered a recession over the past two years. This is not because a recession has been avoided altogether but because the current economic cycle has been elongated.

We use the commodity/gold ratio (the Spot Commodity Index (GNX) or the CRB Index (CRB) divided by the US$ gold price) to define booms and busts, with booms being multi-year periods during which the ratio trends upward and busts being multi-year periods during which the ratio trends downward. The vertical lines drawn on the following GNX/gold chart mark the trend changes (shifts from boom to bust or vice versa) that have occurred since 2000.

It’s not essential that the bust phase of the cycle contains a recession, but it’s rare for a bust to end until a recession has occurred. Usually, the sequence is:

1) The commodity/gold ratio begins trending downward, marking the start of the economic bust phase.

2) The economic weakness eventually becomes sufficiently pervasive and severe to qualify as a recession.

3) Near the end of the recession the commodity/gold ratio reverses upward, thus signalling the start of a boom.

It is not unusual for the stock market to continue trending upward after the bust begins, but in the past the stock market always has peaked prior to a recession getting underway. For example, an economic bust began in October-2018 but the SPX continued to make new highs until early-2020. For another example, during the first half of the 1970s the stock market continued to trend upward for about three years after the start of a bust.

By the way, due to the change in the structure of the US stock market it’s possible that the next cyclical peak in the SPX will occur AFTER the start of a recession. This is because, thanks to the domination of passive investing, the stock market no longer forecasts cyclical trends in corporate earnings, interest rates or economic growth; it simply responds to passive money flows.

In the current cycle the commodity/gold ratio has been trending downward since the first half of 2022, meaning that the US economy now has been in the bust phase of the cycle for about three years without entering recession. This is unprecedented within the context of the past 30 years, but it is comparable to what happened during the 1970s.

A much longer-term view of the commodity/gold ratio is provided by the monthly chart displayed below. This chart uses the CRB prior to 1993 and the GNX thereafter.

There were two long bust phases during the 1970s, the first starting in Q1-1970 and the second starting in Q3-1976. The time from the start of the first bust to the start of a recession (November-1973) was about 3.5 years, and the time from the start of the second bust to the start of a recession (January-1980) also was about 3.5 years. Late this year will be about 3.5 years from the start of the current bust.

Consequently, although the current economic cycle has been elongated to an unusual extent relative to the cycles of the past few decades, it currently is in line with the cycles of the previous period during which inflation generally was viewed as the major economic issue.

[This blog most is a slightly modified excerpt from a commentary published at www.speculative-investor.com about three weeks ago]

We consistently have been predicting lower price inflation for almost three years now, but we also have been predicting that the downward inflation trend would be followed by another major inflation wave. It’s likely that the next major inflation wave will begin this year and continue for at least two years. It’s also likely that it will be driven more by government actions than by the creation of new money (monetary inflation). We’ll now explain why.

Despite the famous Milton Friedman comment to the contrary, price inflation (a rise in the cost of living for the average person) is not always a monetary phenomenon. It also can be a government phenomenon. The reason, in a nutshell, is that government interventionism and deficit-spending can distort the economy in a way that reduces productivity, leading to lower production and therefore to higher prices even in the absence of monetary inflation. In very simple terms, government actions can result in the same amount of money chasing less goods and services, causing prices to be higher on average.

Going deeper and focussing on the US, by its deeds and words it is reasonable to conclude that the US government will be 1) increasing its already-massive deficits over the years ahead, 2) driving up the costs of manufacturing in the US through tariffs on imported materials, and 3) using tariffs as a negotiating tool, thus ensuring that many business leaders remain uncertain about the costs that they will face in the future. There also is a risk that the US government will take actions that discourage foreign investment in the US.

An effect of the above-mentioned government actions will be reduced investment in productive enterprises. We note, for instance, that unless the additional debt issued by the government to finance its increased deficit spending is monetised by the Fed, it will crowd out investment in private businesses (the productive part of the economy). Furthermore, as well as driving up manufacturing costs, tariffs imposed on commodity imports probably will lead to shortages of some important commodities. While this could prompt efforts to increase local supply, due to the time, energy and materials it takes to bring new mines into production this additional building activity would, for at least a few years, have the effect of applying additional upward pressure to commodity prices and popular measures of inflation.

With the government putting upward pressure on many prices by making the economy less efficient, the Fed will not be able to justify the sort of monetary interventions it conducted during 1998-2021. The following chart shows that during this earlier period the year-over-year growth rate of the Core PCE (the Fed’s favourite inflation gauge) never went above 2.7% and spent most of its time in the 1%-2% range, effectively giving the Fed cover to ‘print’ as much new money as it deemed necessary to support the stock market and stimulate economic activity. That cover will not exist over the years ahead.

In addition, with it being obvious to almost everyone that the Fed contributed in a big way to the inflation problem of 2021-2023, from now on the Fed will tread far more carefully with regard to inflationary measures.

Consequently, we expect that for at least the next couple of years the Fed will be unwilling to mitigate the crowding-out effect of the government’s expanding indebtedness.

On a related matter, periodically in the past there would be a ‘deflation scare’ — a set of circumstances during which the Fed and other central banks effectively had carte blanche to ramp up the supply of money. Due to government-created shortages and price distortions, it’s unlikely that there will be a deflation scare within the next few years.

Summing up, the world has changed. For more than two decades every economic downturn or financial crisis was met with a new round of aggressive money creation, each of which set in motion a boom that ended in the bursting of an investment bubble, a deflation scare and another round of aggressive money creation. That won’t happen in the future, because government actions will maintain sufficient upward pressure on the prices of commodities, goods and services to limit the central bank’s ability to inflate the money supply.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published about two weeks ago at www.speculative-investor.com]

In the latest Weekly Update we wrote that government actions would maintain sufficient upward pressure on the prices of commodities, goods and services to limit the central bank’s ability to inflate the money supply. What we meant is that for the foreseeable future there would not be the “deflation scares” that periodically led to large-scale money creation (QE) by the central bank during 2008-2021. However, we expect that the money supply will continue to grow.

In the US, prior to 2008 there was plenty of monetary inflation but no QE programs. Prior to 2008 the monetary inflation was driven by the commercial banks, which create new money (bank deposits) when they make loans and purchase securities.

The following monthly chart shows the year-over-year growth rate of US True Money Supply (TMS), with a vertical red line drawn to mark the start of the Fed’s first QE program in September-2008. Clearly, there were many waves of monetary inflation prior to the introduction of QE, all of which were due to deposit creation by commercial banks. We expect that there will be waves of monetary inflation in the future, again due to deposit creation by commercial banks. Commercial banks have the legal ability to create money out of nothing, so naturally that’s what they will do in the future just like they did in the past.

A problem will arise when the economy becomes very weak and commercial banks stop expanding credit due to a contraction in the pool of qualified private borrowers. We suspect that this problem will be mitigated by incentivising or forcing the commercial banks to purchase more government debt, which they would do by creating new money that the government would inject into the economy via its spending. What we don’t expect is large-scale asset monetisation (QE) by the Fed in response to future economic weakness, because “price inflation” statistics won’t provide the necessary cover.

Anyway, the point we wanted to make is that there probably will be ‘ample’ monetary inflation in the future, it’s just that the money creation won’t be driven directly by the Fed. Due to the popular inflation indices spending most of their time well above the Fed’s target, monetary inflation will become the purview of the commercial banks — just like it was prior to 2008.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary at www.speculative-investor.com]

In last week’s Interim Update we noted the speculation in uranium-related equities and listed seven reasons to expect a sufficient increase in the demand for uranium over the years ahead to cause the price of this commodity to move much higher. We then concluded: “Due to [these reasons] and that it would take several years to develop new sources of uranium supply, we don’t think it is unreasonable to expect the uranium price to double or even triple within the next three years. However, there’s a limit to how much higher the prices of uranium equities will be able to move without the support of an upward-trending uranium price. At the moment, what’s needed is a move above the May-2025 high (near US$73) to underpin the speculation.” Well, thanks to a 9% surge in the uranium price on Monday 16th June, the move above the May-2025 high has happened. Refer to the following daily chart for the details.

The uranium price is determined by the supply of and the demand for the physical commodity, so daily price moves such as the one that occurred on Monday of this week are rare. Monday’s unusual price increase was the result of this news:

The Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (U.U.TO), a daily chart of which is displayed below, announced on Monday 16th June that it is raising US$200M (initially the amount was $100M, but the financing was upsized to $200M due to strong investor demand) by issuing new trust units. Also, it announced that the “net proceeds per Unit to be received by the Trust will be not less than 100% of the most recently calculated net asset value of the Trust per Unit prior to the determination of the pricing of the Offering.”

This news was bullish for the uranium price, because the proceeds of the offering will be used to purchase physical uranium, thus reducing the supply of uranium available to meet the requirements of the nuclear power industry.

U.U is in a unique position in that the more new units it issues the higher its own net asset value (NAV) is likely to become, given that the money it raises is used to take uranium out of the market. However, it only makes sense for the Fund to issue new units when its market value is close to or above its NAV. At one point in early-April it was trading at a discount to NAV of around 20%, but the subsequent elimination of this discount opened the door to the current offering.

What happened on Monday of this week possibly will occur again and again, because every time U.U’s market price rises to its NAV or above it will make sense for the Fund to issue more units to buy more uranium, thus driving its own NAV upward.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary posted last week at www.speculative-investor.com]

After a market has been trending strongly for a few months or longer, a piece of extremely bullish news (in the case of an upward trend) or bearish news (in the case of a downward trend) can be the catalyst that sets in motion a multi-day or multi-week blow-off move that at least temporarily marks the end of the trend. This appears to have been the case during April-2025 with the upward trend of the gold/SPX ratio (the US$ gold price relative to the S&P500 Index) and the corresponding downward trend of the SPX/gold ratio.

We remarked in the 21st April Weekly Update that the SPX’s sell-off in gold terms was much more severe than its sell-off in nominal currency terms, paving the way for the SPX to rebound in terms of gold as well as in nominal dollar terms over the ensuing weeks. It turned out that extremes for the SPX/gold ratio and the gold/SPX ratio were set on 21st April.

With reference to the following daily chart of the gold/SPX ratio, the news that appears to have set in motion a 2-3-week upside blow-off was Trump’s press conference regarding “reciprocal tariffs” after the close of trading on 2nd April. At this press conference Trump held up the now-infamous board showing the tariff rates that would be imposed on imports from every country. It quickly became apparent that these rates were based on a nonsensical formula and a nonsensical premise (the notion that if the US has a trade deficit with a country, then the US is being ‘ripped off’ by that country). This shattered any illusions that the Trump Administration was proceeding in a well-thought-out manner, prompting a panic out of US assets and a surge in the demand for gold.

As a result of the panic precipitated by the “reciprocal tariffs” announcement, the gold price gained about 20% relative to the SPX in only 12 trading days. Although this price move could be viewed as reasonable given what was happening in the world, it was so dramatic in one direction that it set the stage for a significant move in the opposite direction.

We expect that the gold/SPX ratio eventually will move a long way above its 21st April high, but this high probably will hold for at least 3 months and could hold for up to 6 months.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published at www.speculative-investor.com last week]

We wrote in the latest Weekly Update that the Moody’s downgrade of US sovereign debt probably wouldn’t have any effect beyond a knee-jerk reaction, because the downgrade wasn’t significant new information. Prompted by the big deal that was made in the press over this virtual non-event, we thought that it was worth outlining what does and does not matter for the long end of the US Treasury market. We’ll start by listing some of the things that do NOT matter.

First, the so-called “debt wall” does not matter. When you look at a chart showing the amount of US government debt that will have to be refinanced every month or every quarter for the next several years, there always will appear to be a ‘wall’ of debt that has to be refinanced over the coming 12 months. This simply is a function of the fact that 25%-35% of the total debt constitutes T-Bills (debt securities that mature within a year). It is not significantly different today than it was at any time over the past 10 years and it most likely won’t be significantly different at any time over the next few years. On a related matter, almost everyone with a substantial T-Bills holding automatically rolls the position when the old bills mature, so it’s not like the US government constantly is having to find new buyers for its debt.

Second, the Fed staying tighter for longer does not matter, or at least is not bearish, for the long end of the Treasury market, because the Fed staying tighter for longer reduces both the actual and the perceived risk of “inflation”. In fact, at a time when inflation fears are elevated due to what has happened in recent years, it could be more of a plus than a minus.

Third, large-scale selling of Treasury securities by foreign governments is not a serious threat. Foreign governments (via their central banks) buy and sell US government debt securities primarily to manipulate the exchange rates of their own currencies. This involves selling US treasuries when the US$ is strong, with the aim of propping-up the local currency, and buying US treasuries when the US$ is weak, with the aim of preventing the local currency from becoming excessively strong. We see no reason to expect that the trade war initiated by the US will change this method of managing FX reserves.

We’ll now mention some of the things that do matter, that is, some of the legitimate concerns if you happen to own long-dated treasuries.

The main concern is the fiscal deficit. This is not only because a large fiscal deficit results in a large increase in the supply of new government debt securities, but also because a large fiscal deficit generally will lead to higher “inflation” by diverting savings from the relatively efficient private sector to the relatively wasteful public sector. The worst-case scenario is a fiscal deficit that is both large and increasing as a percentage of the economy.

With reference to the following chart, if we ignore the Covid-related extremes of 2020-2021 we can see that the US federal deficit is large and steadily increasing as a percentage of nominal GDP (the downward trend on the chart reflects a rising deficit/GDP ratio). Moreover, the budget bill that currently is making its way through the US parliament would all but guarantee the continuation of the adverse trend, because this bill front-loads tax cuts and back-loads spending cuts. This is a good reason to expect lower T-Bond prices and higher T-Bond yields over the years ahead.

Another valid concern is the inflationary effects of tariffs. The tariffs that Trump seems determined to impose could lead to an upward ‘blip’ in the popular measures of inflation within the next several months, but the more important longer-term effect is that they will reduce the dollar’s purchasing power by making the economy less efficient. This is a secondary reason to expect higher bond yields over the years ahead.

A third valid concern doesn’t apply right now, but it’s likely that when coincident and lagging economic data clearly signal “recession” the Fed will again take actions designed to rapidly boost the money supply. There’s a high probability that this will happen at a time when the government’s deficit is growing rapidly due to the combination of declining tax revenue and rising costs associated with government support and stimulus programs, leading to an inflation surge.

Summing up, some of the reasons to be bearish on the T-Bond that often get mentioned are not valid, but there are some very good reasons to be bearish, at least beyond the short-term. In particular, currently there appears to be no political will to end the deficit spending or even to cap the deficit’s growth rate, which means that any limits will have to be imposed by the bond market. This would be done via higher bond yields.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published at www.speculative-investor.com last week]

The US CPI numbers reported on Tuesday 13th May extended the downward trend that began in mid-2022. As illustrated by the following chart, the year-over-year growth rate of the US CPI has just made a new cycle low. The Core CPI’s growth rate is significantly higher and was reported to be unchanged at 2.8%, but its annualised growth rate over the past three months is only 2.1%. Therefore, the Core CPI also is moving in the right direction. However, the implications and the outlook are not clear.

The last time the CPI’s growth rate was as low as it was in April of this year was February-2021, at which time the Fed was inflating the money supply aggressively via its QE program and maintaining a target interest rate of around zero. Now, the Fed is still draining money via QT and expects to keep its targeted interest rate at 4.25%-4.50% in the short-term. Why?

The principal problem is that the Fed has no way of knowing what its monetary policy should be, because the correct interest rates and monetary conditions are those that would exist in the absence of the Fed. The Fed is the equivalent of a giant spanner that has been thrown permanently into the monetary works. The best that anyone reasonably can hope for is that the damage it does is counteracted partly by private industry.

A secondary issue is that having exacerbated the inflation problem by being so blatantly late in stopping its monetary easing and starting its monetary tightening during 2020-2022, the Fed is now being overly cautious with regard to any actions that would ease monetary conditions.

A related secondary issue is that the constantly shifting tariff situation is causing uncertainty at the Fed just like it is causing uncertainty everywhere else. The news that the US and China governments have agreed to slash tariffs by 115% — from 145% to 30% in the case of the US and from 125% to 10% in the case of China — is positive, but at this stage the reduced rates are for 90 days only and still leave the average tariff rate for US imports at around 18%, which is the highest since 1934.

The tariffs will be more negative for economic growth than positive for inflation, but they could cause an upward ‘blip’ in the official inflation numbers over the next few months if the economy doesn’t tank in the meantime. The decisionmakers at the Fed are concerned about this possibility and therefore are reticent at the moment to make any moves in the easing direction.

Due to the uncertainty regarding the effects of tariffs, it’s possible that the US economy will have to become very obviously weak before the Fed makes its next decisive move to loosen monetary conditions. If so, this will magnify the severity of the recession that probably has started or will start soon, although the Fed’s slowness to loosen won’t be the primary cause of the recession. The recession will be the result of several years of malinvestment, with a final push coming from the “policy uncertainty” of the past few months.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary published at www.speculative-investor.com]

We expect that a 1-2 year or perhaps even longer upward trend in commodity prices will begin this year. Although we will refer to this upward trend as a bull market, strictly speaking it shouldn’t be labelled as such. This is because there actually is no such thing as a commodity bull market, meaning a bull market in a broad index of commodities such as the GSCI Spot Commodity Index (GNX) or the CRB Index. There are only gold bull markets that eventually expand to encompass most commodities. In other words, what we are anticipating is an expansion of the gold bull market to encompass most other commodities.

Gold bull markets begin and are sustained by monetary and governance factors. In short, there is a decline in confidence in the official money and/or the banking system and/or the government that causes an increase in the demand for gold, meaning an increase in the desire to hold gold bullion. These bull markets have nothing to do with gold supply, since for all intents and purposes the supply of gold is constant over a normal investment timeframe*.

Eventually, the issues that have been discounted by the gold market lead to higher prices for many other commodities, but, for all commodities other than gold and to a lesser extent silver, supply can be a major price driver. In fact, the non-monetary commodities that have the most severe supply restrictions tend to be the ones that rise in price the most after monetary/governance factors set in motion a broad upward trend.

Every cycle is different in some way and this time around one of the major differences has been the extent to which price trends have been elongated by the concerted attempts, during 2023-2024, to counteract the Fed’s monetary tightening by pre-emptive recession-like deficit spending on the part of the US government and actions by both the Fed and the Treasury that sustained ‘liquidity’ in the financial markets. These actions postponed the start of a US recession by 1-2 years and also, we think, substantially widened the gap between the start of a gold bull market and the start of a broad upward trend in commodity prices (a gold bull market began in Q4-2022 and a general commodity bull market is yet to begin).

Just as the performance of the gold price telegraphed weakness in the US dollar, it is telegraphing a large, broad upward trend in commodity prices. Furthermore, the upward price trend will be exacerbated by artificial shortages caused by Trump’s trade war. Like the Covid lockdowns, the tariffs and the uncertainty regarding future tariffs have disrupted and will continue to disrupt supply chains.

We expect that a broad upward trend in commodity prices will begin after it becomes sufficiently clear that the US economy is in recession to prompt monetary and fiscal measures designed to stimulate economic activity. This is likely to happen before the end of this year and could happen as soon as the next three months.

*Almost all the gold that has ever been mined remains available to satisfy demand today, with the global mining industry adding only about 1% to this existing stockpile every year.