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Some economists/analysts argue that the government creates wealth in the private sector via deficit-spending. From an accounting perspective they are right, in that when the government borrows and then spends X$ the private sector is left with the same amount of dollars plus an asset in the form of government debt securities worth X$. This implies that every dollar of government deficit-spending immediately adds a dollar to the private sector’s wealth, regardless of whether or not the spending contributes to the pool of real resources. This is counterintuitive. After all, given that every government is very good at deficit spending, there would be no poverty in the world if it really were possible for the government to create wealth in the private sector simply by putting itself further into debt. So, what’s the problem with the aforementioned accounting?

There are multiple problems, the first of which I’ll explain via a hypothetical case. Fred Smith is operating a basic Ponzi scheme. He is issuing $1,000 bonds that have a very attractive yield and using money from new investors to pay the interest on existing bonds and to finance a lavish lifestyle for himself. Using the same accounting that was used above to ‘explain’ how government deficit-spending creates wealth, every time Fred issues a new bond and spends the proceeds the total amount of wealth in the economy ex-Fred increases by $1,000.

The government is like Fred. For all intents and purposes, the government is running a Ponzi scheme because a) the interest and principal payments to existing investors are financed by issuing new debt, and b) there is no intent to ever pay-off the debt (the total debt increases every year). As was the case in the Fred example, every time the government issues a new bond and spends the proceeds the total amount of wealth in the economy ex-government increases by the amount paid for the bond.

Just as it would not make sense to view a dollar invested in Fred’s Ponzi scheme as having the equivalent effect on actual wealth as a dollar invested productively, it does not make sense to equate investment in government bonds with investment in productive assets.

That’s not the only problem, because if government bonds are purchased with existing money then an increase in government indebtedness must result in reduced investment in private sector debt or equity. In this case, therefore, government deficit-spending ‘crowds out’ private-sector investment, which is a problem in that politically-motivated spending by the government is likely to contribute less to the total pool of real wealth than economically-motivated spending by the private sector.

But what if government debt is purchased by the central bank or commercial banks with newly-created money, as occurs when the central bank implements a Quantitative Easing (QE) program? In this case there is no ‘crowding out’ of private sector investment.

According to MMT (Modern Monetary Theory) proponents as well as most Keynesians and Monetarists, the money supply increase that occurs when government debt is purchased using newly-created money is not a problem until/unless it leads to a large rise in the “general price level” as indicated by statistics such as the CPI. However, a rise in the general price level is not the only problem that can be caused by creating money out of nothing. It’s not even the main problem. The main problem is the distortions to interest rates and other price signals that the new money brings about. These distortions can lead to mal-investment on a grand scale.

In conclusion, sometimes a concept can be counterintuitive primarily because it is wrong. In accounting terms it can seem as if the government can ‘magically’ create wealth via deficit-spending, but only if you treat investment in government debt as equivalent to investment in productive endeavours and ignore the fact that creating money out of nothing tends to cause mal-investment.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary published at speculative-investor.com]

The US money-supply data for March-2023, which were published on Tuesday of this week, reveal that the monetary inflation rate has continued its ‘swan dive’. As illustrated below, the year-over-year growth rate of US True Money Supply (TMS) is now around negative 10%, that is, at the end of March-2023 the US money supply was about 10% smaller than it was a year earlier. The last time there was a double-digit annual percentage contraction in the US money supply was the early-1930s.

The Fed has signalled that it will maintain downward pressure on the money supply via its QT program, so a further decline in the monetary inflation rate is likely unless commercial banks lend enough new money into existence to counteract the Fed. So, what are the chances of the commercial banks generating enough new credit in the short-term to counteract the Fed?

Given the stresses that recently have emerged in the banking system combined with the trend towards tighter commercial bank lending standards that was well underway before last month’s banking panic and the plunge in the rate of bank credit growth illustrated by the following chart, the chances are slim to none. That is, a further monetary contraction appears to be in store.

Just to recap, in 2020 the Fed flooded the US economy and financial markets with dollars in an effort to make it seem as if the government could impose major restrictions on economic activity for several months without causing widespread hardship. Then, throughout 2021 the Fed acted as if the monetary deluge of 2020 would have only minor inflationary effects, mainly because major effects were yet to appear in backward-looking statistics such as the CPI. During the first half of 2022 the Fed finally realised that its prior actions had caused a major inflation problem, and in response it embarked on an aggressive monetary tightening program. However, by the time the Fed started tightening, the monetary inflation rate already had collapsed from a high of almost 40% to around 7% and the rate of CPI growth was within three months of its cycle peak.

Now we have the Fed still in tightening mode even though a) the US economy has just experienced the largest money-supply shrinkage since the Great Depression and b) the CPI growth rate is about 10 months into a cyclical decline. Why? Mainly because the backward-looking CPI hasn’t yet fallen far enough to reach the Fed’s arbitrary target.

At some point during the second half of this year the Fed will realise that its monetary tightening has gone too far, and at around the same time it will start coming under political pressure to create the illusion of prosperity in the lead-up to the November-2024 Presidential Election. It then undoubtedly will begin to lean in the opposite direction, again with its eyes firmly fixed on the rear-view mirror (backward-looking data). This will set the scene for the next great inflation wave.

The Federal Reserve is like a loose cannon on the deck of a ship in a storm. It is crashing into things and generally wreaking havoc, although unlike an actual loose cannon it pretends to be the opposite of what it is. It pretends to be a force for financial and economic stability.

The problem is the institution itself rather than the current leadership. The current leadership is inept and dangerous due a lack of understanding of what’s happening in the world, a lack of understanding of how its own actions affect long-term progress, and a strong belief that it knows what’s best. However, giving an individual or a committee the power to manipulate the money supply and interest rates would be problematic even if those doing the manipulating were competent.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published at TSI on 9th April]

The following chart shows that the yield on the 10-year Treasury Inflation-Protected Security (TIPS), a proxy for the real long-term US interest rate, has oscillated within a horizontal range over the past seven months. These interest rate swings may not appear to be significant, but they have had significant effects on the financial markets in general and the gold market in particular.

With regard to the effects on the gold market of the recent swings in the 10-year TIPS yield, we note that:

1. The multi-year high recorded by the 10-year TIPS yield on 3rd November of last year coincided with the end of a multi-year downward correction in the US$ gold price.

2. The short-term low in the 10-year TIPS yield on 1st February of this year coincided with a short-term peak in the US$ gold price.

3. The short-term high in the 10-year TIPS yield on 8th March coincided with the end of a short-term correction in the US$ gold price.

4. The US$ gold price rocketed upward from 8th March through to the end of last week as the 10-year TIPS yield moved back to the bottom of its range.

With the 10-year TIPS yield now at the bottom of its 7-month range, the most likely direction of the next multi-week move is upward. However, at some point there will be a sustained breakout from this range, with major consequences for the financial markets.

If the eventual breakout in the 10-year TIPS yield is to the upside, it will be bearish for everything except the US dollar. This is a low-probability scenario because it would require the Fed to either continue its monetary tightening in the face of severe economic weakness or take no action when presented with obvious evidence of deflation.

If the eventual breakout in the 10-year TIPS yield is to the downside, the consequences for asset and commodity prices will depend on whether the primary driver of the breakout is a falling nominal yield or rising inflation expectations (the real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the EXPECTED inflation rate). A downside breakout in the real interest rate that was driven by a falling nominal yield would be bullish for gold and probably also would be bullish for the US$ relative to other major currencies, while being bearish for most commodities and equities. This is because it likely would result from severe economic weakness. A downside breakout in the real interest rate that was driven by rising inflation expectations would be bullish for gold, but more bullish for cyclical commodities (e.g. the industrial metals) and equities. It would be bearish for the US$.

We expect that at some point within the next four months the 10-year TIPS yield will make a sustained break below the bottom of its range, primarily due to falling nominal interest rates. It could happen as soon as this month, but July-August is a more likely timeframe. It mainly depends on how quickly the economy deteriorates.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary published last week]

The US 10yr-2yr yield spread, a proxy for the US yield curve, has rebounded sharply over the past couple of weeks (refer to the following daily chart), from more than 100 basis points below zero to ‘only’ about 50 basis points below zero. Is this the start of a steepening trend for the US yield curve?

There is one good reason to believe that the recent upturn shown on the above chart did NOT mark the start of a new trend. The reason is the relationship between the monetary inflation rate (the blue line) and the 10yr-2yr yield spread (the red line) illustrated on the chart displayed below. This chart shows that the yield spread tends to follow the monetary inflation rate and that the monetary inflation rate was still in a downward trend at the end of February-2023.

Further to the above chart, a yield curve inversion is caused by a large decline in the monetary inflation rate and a major shift in the yield curve to a new steepening trend is caused by a major upward reversal in the monetary inflation rate. Currently there is no sign of an upward reversal in the monetary inflation rate.

As an aside, the 10yr-2yr spread is just one indicator of the yield curve. The 10yr-3mth spread (see chart below) is equally important and made a new inversion extreme on Monday of this week. In other words, there is no evidence of a shift towards steepening in the 10yr-3mth spread.

Perhaps it will be different this time and a yield curve shift to a steepening trend will precede a money-supply growth rate reversal, but we wouldn’t bet on it. As long as monetary conditions as indicated by the monetary inflation rate are still tightening, there will be upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates. This is because short-term interest rates will be kept relatively high by the increasingly urgent desire for short-term financing, while long-term zero-risk interest rates will reflect the expected eventual effects on prices and economic activity of today’s tight monetary conditions.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published at TSI last week]

The senior central banks (the Fed and the ECB) hiked their interest rate targets over the past several days and have stated that more rate hikes will be needed to quell the inflation that they, themselves, created*. However, the pressure to stop hiking and to start cutting is building and probably will continue to do so over the next few months. This is important for most financial markets and is especially important for the gold market.

A problem facing the central banks is that they can ‘ring fence’ the banking industry, especially in the US where the major banks are in good financial shape, but they cannot protect the entire financial system without turning from monetary tightening to monetary loosening. Of particular relevance, whereas the banking system is mostly transparent (from the perspective of central banks) and can be supported by targeted measures such as the new Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP), many transactions in the so-called “Shadow Banking System” involve counterparties that are not subject to bank regulations and occur outside the central banks’ field of view. The best example is the Repo (Repurchase Agreement) market, which should not be confused with the Fed’s Reverse Repo facility.

Whereas the Fed’s Reverse Repo facility is well defined in terms of size (currently about US$2.3 trillion) and participants, and is of course within the Fed’s control, the Repo market is even bigger (we are talking multi-trillions of dollars of transactions per day) and involves hedge funds and corporations as well as various financial institutions (banks, MMFs, primary dealers, brokers, pension funds, etc.). A Repo is simply a transaction in which one firm sells securities (typically Treasuries) to another firm and agrees to buy the securities back at a slightly higher price in the future (typically the next day). The difference between the sell price and the buy price is known as the “repo rate”, which effectively is an interest rate. Normally the repo rate is very close to the Fed Funds Rate.

The Fed was forced to intervene in the Repo market in September-2019 to address a liquidity crunch that caused short-term interest rates to spike well above the Fed’s target, and again in 2020 in reaction to a sudden cash shortage caused by the COVID lockdowns. It did this by expanding its balance sheet and creating money out of nothing — a moderate amount of money in reaction to the September-2019 cash crunch and a massive amount of money in reaction to the lockdowns. Most of the time, however, the Repo market just chugs along in the background like the plumbing system that distributes water around a large commercial building.

In a nutshell, the problem for the senior central banks is that while the commercial banking system can be prevented from blowing up while monetary tightening continues, the monetary tightening eventually will lead to blow-ups among other financial operators that are big enough to disrupt the workings of the financial system. The specific major blow-ups usually can’t be identified ahead of time, but if the tightening continues they will happen (actually, there already has been more than enough tightening to set the scene for such events). And when they happen they will not only stop the central banks from doing additional rate hikes, they probably will result in emergency rate cuts and balance-sheet expansions.

The above comments are in the gold section because this is the stuff that really matters for gold. Gold is not the anti-dollar, as it is sometimes labelled. It is also not a hedge against inflation, although like many other ‘hard’ assets it has retained its value over the very long-term. Instead, it is reasonable to think of gold as the anti-bank or the anti-financial-system. As a result, gold’s price is driven by confidence in the financial system and the main official supporters of the financial system (the government and the central bank), which can be quantified to a meaningful extent using certain ratios and interest-rate spreads. Falling confidence leads to a higher valuation for gold, rising confidence leads to a lower valuation for gold.

*That’s not exactly what they are saying, in that they are not accepting blame for the inflation problem. They are saying that more rate hikes are needed to quell the inflation that has arisen due to exogenous and unforeseeable forces.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary published on 12th March 2023]

The financial markets have been fighting the Fed since October of last year and especially since the start of this year, in two ways. The first involves bidding-up stock prices in anticipation of a ‘Fed pivot’, which we have described as a self-defeating strategy. The second involves factoring lower interest rates into bond prices, which we thought made sense. What is the current state of play in the battle between the markets and the Fed?

Just to recap, we wrote in many previous commentaries that stock market bulls would get the monetary policy reversal on which they were betting only AFTER the SPX plunged to new bear-market lows and the economic data had become weak enough to remove all doubt that a recession was underway. In other words, a very weak stock market was one of the prerequisites for the policy reversal. That, in essence, is why bidding-up prices in anticipation of a policy reversal was/is viewed as a self-defeating strategy. Also worth reiterating is that previous equity bear markets were not close to complete when the Fed made its first rate cut. This implies that if we are still months away from the Fed’s first rate cut then we could be a year away from the final bear market low.

Regarding the other aspect of the Fed fighting, we have written that interest rates probably would move much lower over the course of 2023 due to an economic recession, an extension of the downward trend in inflation expectations and a collapse in the year-over-year CPI growth rate. This meant that from our perspective the financial markets were right to be factoring lower interest rates into Treasury securities with durations of two years or more. However, in the 16th January 2023 Weekly Update we cautioned: “…the recent eagerness of traders to push-up asset prices in anticipation of easier monetary policy has, ironically, extended the likely duration of the Fed’s monetary tightening. Therefore, while the markets probably are right to discount lower interest rates over the coming year, ‘fighting the Fed’ has created a high risk of interest rates rising over the next 1-3 months.”

Partly due to equity traders attempting to ‘front run’ the Fed, the monetary tightening has been extended and interest rates rose markedly from mid-January through to the first half of last week. The 10-year and 30-year Treasury yields have remained below their October-2022 cycle highs, but the 2-year Treasury yield, which had signalled a downward reversal late last year, made new highs over the past fortnight.

The following chart shows the surge in the 2-year Treasury yield from a multi-month low in mid-January to a new cycle high during the first half of last week. It also shows that there was a sharp decline during the second half of last week. Will the latest downward reversal stick?

We suspect that it will. It’s likely that 10-year and 30-year Treasury yields have reversed downward after making lower highs, and that the 2-year Treasury yield has made a sustainable downward reversal from a slightly higher high for the cycle. This is the case because other markets are signalling the start of a shift away from risk.

There’s a good chance that within the next few months stock market bulls will get the Fed pivot they have been betting on. However, they probably will get it with the SPX at 3000 or lower.

[Below is an excerpt from a commentary posted at TSI on 19th February. Subsequently there have been no significant changes in the data, so the conclusion remains the same.]

Cutting to the chase, the short answer to the above question is no. Here is the longer answer:

Banks becoming suspicious of each other is one of the early signs that a banking crisis is brewing. This suspicion is indicated by a rise in the average interest rate that banks charge each other for short-term financing relative to the interest rate paid by the US federal government for financing of similar duration. For example, under normal (non-crisis) conditions the spread between 3-month LIBOR, a widely used interbank interest rate, and the yield on a 3-month Treasury Bill oscillates between 0% and 0.50%, but when some banks start becoming concerned about the financial strength of other banks the spread breaks above 0.50%.

The following daily chart shows the performance of the aforementioned interest rate spread since early-2006. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 sticks out on this chart and was signalled by an initial surge above 0.50% during the second quarter of 2007. During the period covered by this chart the only other move to well above the top of the normal range occurred during the March-2020 COVID crash, but it was very short-lived as the Fed acted immediately to ensure that the economic shutdowns perpetrated by governments did not create problems for the commercial banks. Also worth noting is that there were minor signs of banking-system stress in Q4-2011, Q3-2016, Q1-2018 and the first half of 2022 that did not develop into crises.

Importantly, the chart shows that the current spread is close to zero, which means that the interbank market is as calm (lacking in suspicion) as it ever gets.

Another interest rate spread worth monitoring is the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) minus the yield on the 1-month Treasury Bill. The SOFR is the interest rate that banks and hedge funds pay to borrow overnight money in the US Repo (Repurchase Agreement) market. It has a much shorter history than the LIBOR, but it is gaining in popularity. Like the LIBOR-Treasury spread discussed above, a substantial and sustained rise in the SOFR-Treasury spread would indicate increasing suspicion/stress in the banking system.

The following chart shows that the SOFR-Treasury spread has been far more volatile during the past 12 months than it was during the bulk of 2020-2021, but that it has oscillated around zero and currently is slightly below zero (a level indicating a general lack of concern).

Note that the huge upward spike in the SOFR-Treasury spread in 2019 was due to the “Repo Crisis” in September of that year. The Fed circumvented this crisis very quickly via emergency liquidity injections.

Unusual increases in the above interest rate spreads would warn that a banking crisis was brewing. Also, prior to a banking crisis there would be persistent and pronounced weakness in bank equities relative to the broad stock market.

The lower section of the following chart shows that there was significant weakness in the Bank Index (BKX) relative to the broad stock market (represented by the SPX) during February-March of last year, but that the BKX/SPX ratio is in a short-term upward trend and is at roughly the same level today as it was in early-April of last year.

Banking crises don’t come out of nowhere. Enough people inside and outside the banking industry see them coming and take steps to protect themselves or profit from the fallout that early warning signs emerge. Currently there are no such signs.

[This blog post in an excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

It is clear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has escalated into a major war. It is also clear that the conflict has evolved into a NATO proxy war against Russia. We don’t know how it will end and the extent to which the shooting will expand beyond Ukraine’s borders, but it’s very likely to result in the near-complete destruction of Ukraine. This almost certainly means that during the years following some form of peace agreement, there will be an effort to rebuild Ukraine funded by…you.

At the moment there’s no point attempting to analyse the ramifications of the Ukraine rebuilding in detail, because there’s no way of knowing when the war will end. It could end within the next two months or it could drag on for another two years. The issues we want to address in brief today are that the rebuilding effort will 1) be colossal (probably trillions of dollars), 2) cause a large and sudden increase in the demand for industrial commodities, and 3) be funded mainly by the citizens of the countries that provided military assistance to Ukraine. The entire episode will be a Keynesian stimulus program writ large. You destroy an entire country and then pay to bring it back to the way it was, creating a veritable tidal wave of “aggregate demand” in the process.

Regarding how the rebuilding will be funded, the key is that under the current monetary system anything that is paid for by the government initially will appear to be free. For example, since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war the US government has spent or committed to spend about US$105B to assist in Ukraine’s defence. This spending, which equates to about $800 per US household, has widespread support within the electorate, but how much support would it have if every household had received a bill for $800 for “military assistance to Ukraine”? Undoubtedly a lot less.

The reason that the Ukraine assistance and many other large government spending programs are either supported or ignored by the general public is that from the perspective of most people there is no cost. Nobody gets a bill or immediately has to pay higher taxes to cover the spending. Instead, the government just adds more debt to the ever-growing pile. Furthermore, sometimes the debt is purchased by the central bank with money created out of nothing, in which case there isn’t even a need for private investors to part with any money to fund the government deficit-spending.

Almost regardless of how high the cost of supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, it will be minor compared to the cost that eventually will be incurred in the rebuilding of Ukraine. However, for the reason outlined above, the huge cost initially won’t appear to be a major problem because it won’t adversely affect the personal finances of most people. There simply will be an addition to the existing pile of government debt. It won’t be until a year or two later, when the large demand for scarce resources resulting from the debt-financed rebuilding has caused interest rates and the cost of living to sky-rocket, that the adverse effects will be apparent to the general public.

Industrial metals such as copper, zinc, and nickel, and specialty metals such as lithium and the rare-earths, are among the resources that should have the greatest increases in demand relative to supply once the Ukraine rebuilding gets underway. This is because shortages of these commodities are already in the works due to the “energy transition” to which the political world is committed. An implication is that having investments linked to the production of these commodities will be a way for people to profit from or protect themselves against the “inflation” that will be unleashed after the fighting stops and governments set about trying to repair what they destroyed.

That reconstruction will follow the destruction is something to be aware of. Urgent action is not required, however, because at this time there are no signs that the destruction is about to end.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary published on 22nd January 2023]

It goes without saying that the early stage of every large rally contains a break above resistance and the early stage of every large decline contains a break below support. However, most upside breakouts are not followed by large rallies and most downside breakouts are not followed by large declines. More interestingly, it is not uncommon for the best rallies to begin shortly after breaks BELOW obvious support and for the largest declines to begin shortly after breaks ABOVE obvious resistance. The reason is that breaching obvious resistance/support shakes out many weak-handed speculators and in doing so can create a sentiment platform capable of launching a substantial move in the opposite direction.

There are countless examples of the phenomenon described above, including gold’s performance over the past several months. Last September-October the US$ gold price breached important and obvious support defined by the lows of the preceding two years, but the breach of support did not have bearish implications. Instead, it marked the END of a 2-year bearish trend and in all likelihood ushered in a cyclical bull market.

We are revisiting this topic today because the S&P500 Index (SPX) is positioned such that it could soon generate a misleading signal in the form of a break above obvious resistance.

The potential upside breakout is associated with the downward trend-line drawn on the following daily SPX chart. Every chart-watcher and his dog are paying close attention to this trend-line and many of them undoubtedly would interpret a move above it as evidence that the bear market is over. However, the historical record suggests that the bear market won’t end until many months after the monetary trend becomes favourable, which probably means no sooner than the final quarter of this year.

There are fundamental differences between the present day and any previous period, but in price-action terms the current equity bear market has, to date, been similar to the equity bear market of 2000-2002. Both bear markets followed spectacular bubbles that were focused on tech stocks, involved stair-step declines rather than liquidity-driven collapses, and contained signs of internal strength after the initial multi-month declines.

Interestingly, during the course of the 2000-2002 bear market the SPX broke above a downward trend-line that is not unlike the trend-line drawn on the above chart. As illustrated below, about a week after the ‘bullish’ upside breakout in March-2002 the SPX commenced its largest decline of the bear market.

We don’t know that the SPX will break above its downward trend-line in the near future, although it stands a good chance of doing so. The point we want to stress today is that if the trend-line is breached it will not imply that the bear market is over or even that there will be significant gains over the weeks immediately ahead. On the contrary, an upside breakout could lead quickly to the best opportunity to date to enter bearish speculations.

[This blog post is a modified excerpt from a commentary published at TSI in April of 2022. The main changes are updates to the chart and the numbers.]

The US monetary tightening commenced in February of 2021– the month that the US monetary inflation rate peaked at the extraordinary level of 40%. The monetary inflation rate has since collapsed to around 0% and if the Fed has its way will fall even further over the months ahead. Why is this important?

The overarching reason it’s important is that changes in the monetary inflation rate, that is, changes in the rate at which new money is created out of nothing, drive the economy’s boom-bust cycle. More specifically, large increases in the monetary inflation rate result in periods during which the economy is superficially strong and optimism abounds (the boom phase), while subsequent reductions in the monetary inflation rate lay bare the ill-conceived boom-time investments and usher in the bust phase.

Associated with the major trends in the monetary inflation rate that drive the boom-bust cycle are major trends in the yield curve.

A discussion of the relationship between the monetary inflation rate and the yield curve, including a full explanation of why an inversion of the yield curve has preceded all US recessions of the past sixty years, can be found HERE. The bottom line is that trends in the monetary inflation rate drive trends in the yield curve, with a yield curve inversion being caused by a decline in the monetary inflation rate from a high level to a low level. That is, both a flattening of the yield curve to the point where it becomes inverted and a shift in the economy from boom to bust are eventual effects of a downward trend in the monetary inflation rate.

The strong positive correlation between the US monetary inflation rate and the US yield curve is illustrated by the following monthly chart. On this chart the yield curve is represented by the monthly average of the 10year-2year yield-spread and is shown in red. The monetary inflation rate is the year-over-year percentage change in True Money Supply (TMS) and is shown in blue.

One difference between the current cycle and previous cycles is that monetary conditions in the current cycle became sufficiently tight to drive parts of the yield curve into inverted territory when the Fed was just STARTING a monetary tightening campaign.

Does the Fed have any idea what it is doing?

Before answering the above question it is worth reiterating that the Fed is a Keynesian institution. Within the Keynesian framework the economy can be viewed as a bathtub filled with an amorphous liquid called “aggregate demand”, and it is the job of the central bank and the government to add or remove liquid to keep the level of the tub in a range deemed desirable. In the real world, however, there are millions of individuals making production, consumption and investment decisions for myriads of reasons. Consequently, in the real world there is no such thing as the Keynesian “aggregate demand” and it is ridiculous to view the economy as a bathtub that can be filled/emptied by policymakers to optimise performance.

Returning to the above question, the Fed seems to believe that it can make up for the recklessness of its actions during 2020-2021 by becoming excessively ‘tight’ during 2022-2023. At least, that’s the only plausible explanation for why it started reducing its balance sheet by up to US$95B per month, thus removing up to $95B of money from the economy every month, after the monetary inflation rate had already dropped far enough to bring on the bust phase of the cycle.

Also, the Fed seems to believe that it can address rapidly rising prices resulting from supply shortages by engineering a further tightening of monetary conditions, as if reducing the availability of money will remove the constraints on supply caused by COVID-related policies and anti-Russia sanctions.

The reality is that after an inflation problem has been created via a large increase in the money supply, removing money from the economy cannot help. Actually, it will lead to additional distortions of relative price signals and thus greater economic weakness. What’s desirable is money-supply stability.

So, the answer to the question is no. Even taking into account the limitations imposed by the fatally flawed Keynesian framework in which it operates, the Fed appears to have no idea what it is doing.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

Market interest rates always lead Fed-controlled interest rates at important turning points. Therefore, when trying to figure out whether interest rates have peaked or troughed, don’t look at what the Fed is saying; look at what the markets are saying.

The above statement is illustrated by the following chart comparison of the Fed Funds Rate (the green line), an overnight interest rate totally controlled by the Fed, and the 2-year T-Note Yield (the blue line), a short-term interest rate that is influenced by the Fed but ultimately determined by the market. The chart shows that at cyclical trend changes since the mid-1990s, the 2-year T-Note yield always changed direction in advance of — usually well in advance of — the Fed Funds Rate (FFR). For example, focusing on the downward trend changes we see from the chart that a) the 2-year yield reversed downward in Q4-2018 and the FFR followed in mid-2019, b) the 2-year yield reversed downward in mid-2006 and the FFR followed in mid-2007, and c) the 2-year yield reversed downward in Q2-2000 and the FFR followed in Q4-2000. When the 2-year T-Note yield reversed downward in 2018, 2006 and 2000, the Fed had no idea that within 6-12 months it would be slashing the FFR.

Right now, J. Powell thinks that the Fed is going to hike its targeted interest rates 2-3 more times and then hold them at 5% or more until well into 2024. However, that’s nothing like what the Fed will do if the stock market, the GDP growth numbers, the CPI and the employment data do what we expect over the next few quarters.

Our view is that the US stock market and economy are about to tank due to the decline in the monetary inflation rate that has already occurred, causing market interest rates to fall across the yield curve. Furthermore, the longer it takes for the Fed to wake up to what’s going on, the worse it will be for both the stock market and the economy and the more rapid will be the decline in market interest rates.

The Fed is asleep, but the market has begun to discount the “inflation” collapse and the negative economic news to come. Evidence is the pullback in the 2-year T-Note yield from its high in early-November to below its 50-week MA (the blue line on the following chart). This is the first sustained break below the 50-week MA since the upward trend was established in 2021. A break below the 90-week MA (the black line on the chart) would be a definitive signal that the 2-year yield’s cyclical trend has changed from up to down.

Based on the leads and lags of the past three decades, if the early-November high for the 2-year yield proves to be the ultimate high for the cycle, which it very likely will, then the Fed has made its last rate hike and will be cutting rates by the final quarter of next year. Our guess is that the Fed’s first rate-cut will occur during the second or third quarter of 2023.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published at TSI on 4th December]

At least one of two things should happen to warn that an official US recession is about to begin. One is a decline in the ISM Manufacturing New Orders Index (NOI) to below 48 and the other is a reversal of the yield curve’s trend from flattening/inverting to steepening. For all intents and purposes the first signal triggered in July-2022 when the NOI dropped to 48, whereas the second signal probably won’t trigger until the first half of next year.

The following monthly chart shows that the NOI dropped to a cycle low of 47.1 in September-2022, ticked up in October and returned to its cycle low in November, leaving the message unchanged. The NOI is signalling that a recession has started or will start soon.

The following chart also shows that the NOI dropped below 40 during the recession period of the early-2000s and dropped below 30 during the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis and the 2020 COVID lockdowns. We expect that it will drop below 30 next year.

The first of the two daily charts displayed below shows that the 10yr-2yr yield spread, our favourite yield curve indicator, plunged well into negative (inverted) territory during July and remains there. The second chart shows that the 10yr-3mth yield spread, which apparently is the Fed’s favourite yield curve indicator, finally followed suit over the past two months and is now as far into inverted territory as the 10yr-2yr spread.

One of our consistent messages over the past few months has been that a more extreme inversion of the US yield curve would occur before there was a major reversal to steepening. There were two reasons for this. First, the monetary inflation rate (the primary driver of the yield curve) was set to remain in a downward trend until at least early-2023. Second, it was likely that declining inflation expectations would put downward pressure on yields at the long end while the Fed’s rate-hiking campaign supported yields at the short end. For these reasons, we wrote over the past few months that by early 2023 both the 10yr-2yr and 10yr-3mth spreads could be 100 basis points into negative (inverted) territory.

As recently as two months ago our speculation that the 10yr-2yr and 10yr-3mth spreads would become inverted to the tune of 100 basis points (1.00%) by early-2023 looked extreme, especially since the 10yr-3mth spread was still above zero at the time. With both of these spreads now having become inverted by around 80 basis points, that’s no longer the case.

We doubt that the aforementioned yield spreads will move significantly more than 100 basis points into negative territory, because we expect that during the first quarter of next year economic reality (extreme weakness in the economic statistics and the stock market) will hit the Fed like a ton of bricks. This should bring all monetary tightening efforts to an abrupt end, causing interest rates at the short end to start falling faster than interest rates at the long end, that is, causing the yield curve to begin a major steepening trend.

Our conclusion over the past four months has been that the US economy had commenced a recession or would do so in the near future. Due to recent up-ticks in some coincident and lagging economic indicators, we now think that the first quarter of 2023 is the most likely time for the official recession commencement.