The ECB’s monetary machinations

October 3, 2014

The ECB recently launched a two-pronged attack aimed at boosting bank lending to the private sector. These ‘prongs’ are the TLTRO (Targeted Longer Term Refinancing Operation), which got underway on 18th September, and the ABS (Asset Backed Security) and Covered Bond Purchase Program, which will soon get underway. Will these schemes be successful?

That depends on what constitutes success. The schemes cannot possibly foster economic progress, because creating money and credit out of nothing distorts price signals, redistributes wealth from savers to speculators and generally makes the economy less efficient. So, if success is defined as bringing about a stronger economy then failure is guaranteed. However, if success is defined as increasing the size of the ECB’s balance sheet by 1 trillion euros and adding 1 trillion euros to the money supply, then the schemes will probably, but not necessarily, be successful.

The challenge faced by the ECB as it tries to prod the commercial banks into lending more money to the private sector is the dearth of lending opportunities open to the banks. Due to the after-effects of the credit bubble that blew-up in 2008 and the ensuing years during which wealth was siphoned out of the real economy to prevent the holders of government bonds from suffering any losses (part of what we referred to back in 2010 as “the no bondholder left behind policy”), the euro-zone’s pool of willing and qualified private-sector borrowers has experienced severe shrinkage.

The new ABS purchase program is supposed to encourage the commercial banks to be more aggressive in their search for lending opportunities, in that the ECB is effectively saying “if you securitise it, we will buy it”. In other words, the ECB is effectively saying to the banks: “If you make new loans and bundle the loans into a security that can be sold, then you will definitely have a buyer for the security at an attractive price. You will therefore be able to shift the risk from your balance sheet to our balance sheet.” The extent to which the commercial banks will take advantage of this ‘generous’ offer is unknown.

The new ABS purchase program appears to have a better chance than the TLTRO of promoting increased bank lending to the private sector. The reason is that the ABS program enables banks to shift the risk of loan default to someone else (to the ECB and ultimately to tax-payers throughout the euro-zone), whereas the TLTRO is supposed to encourage banks to add risk to their own balance sheets. The TLTRO could still work, though, because the senior managements of banks are often guided by the same type of short-term thinking as most politicians. Just like the average politician is focused on doing/saying whatever it takes to win the next election, the average bank CEO is focused on doing whatever it takes to make the next quarterly and annual earnings reports look good.

Some analysts and commentators are concerned that the ECB’s new money-and-credit creation schemes won’t do enough to bring about the “inflation” that — according to their crackpot theories — the euro-zone needs. Therefore, they believe that the ECB should resort to Fed-style QE (outright large-scale monetisation of government bonds). This prompts me to address the question: Why hasn’t the ECB resorted to Fed-style QE? After all, it is blatantly obvious that Mario Draghi is as ignorant about economics as his Federal Reserve counterpart.

It’s first worth noting that the ECB does not appear to be facing a legal obstacle to the sort of QE programs implemented by the Fed. The ECB is legally prohibited from buying government bonds directly from any euro-zone government, but it is able to buy government bonds in the secondary market. In this respect it is in the same boat as the Fed. Like the ECB, the Fed is legally prohibited from buying US Treasury bonds directly from the US government, but it can buy as many Treasury bonds as it wants from Primary Dealers.

Rather than being legally constrained, the ECB appears to be politically constrained. Whereas some euro-zone governments and national central banks would be in favour of a full-blown QE program, other euro-zone governments and central banks, most notably the German government and the Bundesbank, would be very much against it. That’s why the ECB is coming up with half-measures. At this stage Draghi & Co. can’t get approval for the large-scale monetisation of government bonds, but they can get approval for a monetisation program that will supposedly result in additional credit to private businesses.

Lastly, if the ECB is determined to add 1 trillion euros to its balance sheet and the money supply over the coming 12 months then it will almost certainly find a way of doing so. If the ABS purchase program and the TLTRO don’t do the trick, then some other method will be concocted.

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Does the debt/GDP ratio drive the gold price?

September 29, 2014

The article linked HERE answers yes to the above question. The correct answer is no.

The above-linked article presents the following graph as evidence that the debt/GDP ratio (US federal government debt divided by US GDP, in this case) does, indeed, drive the US$ gold price. However, this is a classic example of cherry-picking the timescale of the data to demonstrate a relationship that isn’t apparent over other timescales. It is also a classic example of confusing correlation with causation. Many things went up in price during the 2002-2014 period covered by this graph. Should we assume that all of these price rises were caused by the increase in the US government-debt/GDP ratio?

By the way, graphs like this were far more visually appealing — although no more valid — three years ago, because the positive correlation ended in 2011. Since 2011, the debt/GDP ratio has continued its relentless advance while the gold price has trended downward. A similar graph that was popular for a while showed a strong positive correlation between the gold price and the US monetary base from the early-2000s through to 2011-2012, which created the impression that the gold price would continue to rise as long as the US monetary base continued to do the same. Again, though, this impression was the result of confusing correlation and causation.

Here’s a chart showing the relationship between the gold price and the US debt/GDP ratio over a much longer period. This chart’s message is that there is no consistent relationship between these two quantities. For example, the huge gold bull market of the 1970s occurred while the debt/GDP ratio was low with a slight downward bias and actually ended at around the time that the debt/GDP ratio embarked on a major upward trend. In fact, from the early-1970s through to the mid-1990s there appeared to be an INVERSE relationship between the gold price and the debt/GDP ratio, but this is just a coincidence. It doesn’t imply that gold was hurt by a rising debt/GDP ratio and helped by a falling debt/GDP ratio; it implies that the debt/GDP ratio isn’t a primary driver of gold’s price tend. For another example, the gold price and the debt/GDP ratio rose in parallel during 2001-2006, but the rise in the debt/GDP ratio during this period was slow and was not generally considered to be a reason for concern. Therefore, it wasn’t the driver of gold’s upward trend.

The theory that the US government debt/GDP ratio is an important driver of the US$ gold price seems to be solely based on the 3-year period from late-2008 through to late-2011, when the two rocketed upward together.

The reality is that a rising US debt/GDP ratio can be a valid part of a bullish gold story, but only to the extent that it helps to bring about lower real interest rates and/or a steeper yield curve and/or a weaker US dollar and/or rising credit spreads. It isn’t directly bullish for gold, which is why a long-term comparison of the US$ gold price and the US debt/GDP ratio shows no consistent relationship. The same can be said about a rising US monetary base.

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Sentiment and momentum extremes

September 26, 2014

A number of markets are currently at sentiment and momentum extremes. Generally, the Dollar Index is very extended to the upside in terms of both sentiment and momentum, whereas the markets that benefit from a weaker US$ are very extended to the downside in terms of both sentiment and momentum. With regard to the markets that are stretched to the downside, here are some of the most extreme cases based on Market Vane bullish percentages and daily RSIs (Relative Strength Indexes) over the first four days of this week. Note that a market is considered to be ‘oversold’ when its daily RSI(14) drops to 30, while a daily RSI reading of 20 or lower is a rarely-reached extreme.

1) The following extreme daily RSI(14) readings were recorded during the past four days:

– 19.2 for the Continuous Commodity Index (CCI)

– 14.3 for the TSXV Venture Exchange Composite Index (CDNX), a proxy for junior Canadian resource stocks

– 14.5 for platinum

– 15.4 for silver

– 16.4 for the silver/gold ratio

– 16.2 for the Yen (note: the daily RSIs for the euro and the Pound went below 20 earlier this month, but are now a little higher)

2) The following extremely low Market Vane bullish percentages were recorded over the past four days:

– 22% for silver (the lowest level in more than 10 years and possibly a multi-decade low)

– 20% for corn

– 14% for wheat (one of lowest levels ever, in any market)

Negative sentiment and momentum extremes do not necessarily mean that a price low is imminent. The meaning is that there will be a lot of potential energy to drive a rally after the price trend reverses.

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The coming US monetary tightening

September 23, 2014

Over the past 12 months I’ve written extensively at TSI about the myths surrounding US bank reserves and the relationship between bank lending and bank reserves. For example, I’ve explained that bank reserves cannot be loaned into the economy and that in the real world — as opposed to the world described in economics textbooks — banks do NOT expand credit by ‘piggybacking’ on their reserves. As part of these bank-reserve writings I addressed the reasoning behind the Fed’s decision to start paying interest on reserves, reaching the conclusion that the decision had been taken to enable the Fed Funds Rate (FFR) to be hiked in the future without contracting the supplies of reserves and money. Last week there was confirmation from the horse’s mouth that my conclusion was correct, as well as some other interesting information on how an eventual tightening of US monetary policy will proceed.

As implied above, the Fed confirmed last week that when it finally gets around to moving the FFR upward, it will do so primarily by adjusting the interest rate it pays on excess reserve balances. If not for the existence of this relatively new policy tool, the only way that the FFR could be hiked would be via the traditional method involving reductions in the supplies of reserves and money. Moreover, considering the immense quantity of excess reserves now in the banking system, there would need to be a large reduction in the supply of reserves just to achieve a 0.25% increase in the FFR. Trying to shift the FFR upward via the traditional method would therefore quickly ignite a financial crisis.

The other interesting information conveyed by the Fed last week is that the size of its balance sheet will be reduced by ceasing to reinvest repayments of principal on the securities it holds. For example, if the Fed currently owns a bond with 3 years remaining duration, then — assuming that it has embarked on a policy normalisation route — it will not reinvest the proceeds when the bond’s principal is repaid in three years’ time. Instead, the principal repayment will bring about a reduction in the Fed’s balance sheet and a reduction in the money supply.

This means that the Fed plans to reduce the size of its balance sheet — and tighten monetary policy — at a snail’s pace.

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