The Mythical Silver Shortage

September 24, 2015

This post is an excerpt from a recent TSI commentary.

Excited talk of a silver shortage has made its annual reappearance. This talk is always based on anecdotal evidence of silver coins or small bars being difficult to obtain in some parts of the world via retail coin dealers. It never has anything to do with the overall supply situation.

Shortages of silver and gold in certain manufactured forms favoured by the public will periodically arise, often because of a sudden and unanticipated (by the mints) increase in the public’s demand for these items. Furthermore, the increase in the public’s demand is often a reaction to a sharp price decline, the reason being that in the immediate aftermath of a sharp price decline the metals will look cheap regardless of whether they are actually cheap based on the fundamental drivers of value.

These periodic shortages of bullion in some of the manufactured forms favoured by the public are not important considerations when assessing future price potential. The main reason is that the total volume of metal purchased by the public in such forms is a veritable drop in the market ocean. For example, the total worldwide volume of silver in coin form purchased by the public in a YEAR is less than the amount of silver that changes hands via the LBMA in an average trading DAY.

If gold continues to rally over the weeks ahead then silver will also rally. By the same token, if gold doesn’t rally over the weeks ahead then neither will silver. In other words, regardless of any anecdotal evidence of silver shortages at coin shops, silver’s short-term price trend will be determined by gold’s short-term price trend. Furthermore, if the gold price rises then the silver price will probably rise by a greater percentage, the reason being that the silver/gold ratio is close to a multi-decade low (implying: silver is very cheap relative to gold).

A final point worth making on this topic is that the claims of silver or gold shortages that periodically spring-up are not only misguided, they are dangerous. This relates to the fact that the most popular argument against gold and silver recapturing their monetary roles is that there isn’t enough of the stuff to go around. The gold and silver enthusiasts who cry “major shortage!” whenever it temporarily becomes difficult to buy coins from the local shop are therefore effectively supporting the case AGAINST the future use of gold and silver as money. You see, a critical characteristic of money is that obtaining it is always solely a question of price.

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Charts of interest

September 23, 2015

Comments on the following charts will be emailed to TSI subscribers.

1) Gold

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2) The HUI

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3) The Dollar Index

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4) The S&P500 Index (SPX)

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Updated thoughts on BitGold/Goldmoney

September 21, 2015

I last wrote about BitGold (XAU.V), which is now called Goldmoney, most recently in a blog post on 26th May. In the linked post I expanded on my view that the company had a great product from the perspective of customers, but a very over-priced stock. I concluded that at some unknowable future time the “it’s a great product with smart management therefore the stock should be bought at any price” bubble of enthusiasm would collide with the “it will always be a low-margin business and therefore deserves a low valuation” brick wall of reality. Although the stock price has since dropped about 20%, the valuation of the stock still appears to be extremely high considering the profit-generating potential of the underlying business. It is therefore fair to say that the bubble of enthusiasm hasn’t yet collided with the brick wall of reality.

Every month, Goldmoney reports what it calls “Key Performance Indicators” (KPIs) of its business. These KPIs seem impressive at first glance and seem to justify the stock’s market capitalisation. For example, the company reported that at the end of August it had C$1.5B of customer assets under management (AUM), an amount that is several times greater than its current market cap of C$235M (55M shares at C$4.27/share). However, unlike a mutual fund that charges a fee based on AUM, Goldmoney charges nothing to store its customers’ assets (gold bullion). This means that the larger the amount of Goldmoney’s AUM, the greater the net COST to the owners of the business (Goldmoney’s shareholders).

This is an important point. Based on Goldmoney’s current fee structure, it will always lose money on customers who use the service primarily for store-of-value purposes. Under the current monetary system this is where PayPal has a big advantage over Goldmoney. Nobody views their PayPal account as a long-term store of value, but many of Goldmoney’s customers view the service as a convenient way to store their physical gold. They don’t want to spend their gold, they want to save it.

Another KPI that looks impressive at first glance is “Transaction Volume”. For example, the company reported total transaction volume of C$47M for August. However, not all transactions attract fees and for the ones that do the fee is 1%. This means that the revenue to Goldmoney will always be less than 1% of the total transaction volume.

What’s important in assessing the stock’s valuation is the revenue to Goldmoney relative to its costs. This information is not presented in the company’s monthly KPI reports, but it is presented in the quarterly financial statements. Unfortunately, the latest quarterly statements aren’t useful because a major acquisition happened after the 30th June cutoff date. The next quarterly statements will be more informative, but we probably won’t get a good indication of Goldmoney’s real financial performance and earning potential until the December-quarter results are published early next year.

At this stage I don’t have enough information to value Goldmoney, although I suspect that ‘reasonable value’ is a long way below the current price. I’ll post some updated thoughts when I have a clearer view of what the stock is worth, which might not be until February next year. In the meantime I’ll stay away. I have no desire to own the stock and, despite the apparent valuation-related downside risk, no desire to short the stock.

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The S&P500 is coiling ahead of the Fed’s decision

September 16, 2015

I’ve placed a small bet (via put options) that the senior US stock indices will drop to test their 24th August lows by mid-October. At the same time I acknowledge the potential for a sharp move to the upside over the next 2-3 days in anticipation of and in reaction to the Fed’s 17th September interest-rate decision. That’s why my bearish bet is small.

The chart pattern of the S&P500 Index (SPX) suggests that there will be a sharp move over the days immediately ahead, although it doesn’t point to a particular direction. One possible outcome involves an upside breakout within the next two days from the contracting triangle drawn on the following chart and then a downward reversal. This is the near-term outcome that would confuse the greatest number of traders, which is why I favour it.

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I never risk money on guesses about what any financial market is going to do over time periods as short as a few days, but it’s still fun to guess.

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