Officially, the US has a fractional-reserve banking system (as does almost every other country), meaning that a fraction of deposits are backed by cash reserves held in bank vaults or at the Fed. In reality, the US has a zero-reserve banking system.

I don’t mean that there are no reserves in the banking system, as currently there are huge reserves courtesy of the Fed’s QE programs. What I mean is that there is no relationship between bank reserves and bank lending and that bank reserves do not impose any limit on bank deposits. It has been this way for about 25 years.

To further explain, the most important aspect of a fractional reserve banking system is that a bank can create new deposits by lending out existing deposits up to the point where its total deposits are a predetermined multiple of its reserves. The aforementioned multiple is called the “money multiplier” and the maximum “money multiplier” is the reciprocal of the minimum reserve requirement. For example, in a system where a bank’s reserves are required to be at least 10% of its total deposits, the potential “money multiplier” is 10. In the current US system, however, there is effectively no lower limit on reserves, which means that the so-called “money multiplier” can correctly be thought of as either non-existent or infinite.

Regardless of their deposit levels, US banks are able to reduce their required reserve levels to zero. This is possible for two reasons. First, only demand deposits are subject to reserve requirements. Second, banks employ software that shuffles money between accounts to ensure that they fulfill the regulatory reserve requirement regardless of their actual deposit and reserve levels. For example, you might think you have a demand deposit, but for regulatory purposes what you might actually have is a zero-interest CD.

The absence of any relationship between US bank reserve levels and US bank credit is illustrated by the following chart. The chart compares total US bank credit and total bank reserves (vault cash plus reserves held at the Fed) from the beginning of 1989 through to mid-2008 (just prior to the start of the QE programs that swamped the normal relationships). During this period, bank credit shot up from $2,400B to $9,000B while total bank reserves oscillated between $50B and 65B. Notice that the volume of bank reserves was actually a little lower in 2008 with bank credit at $9.0T than in 1989 with bank credit at $2.4T.

An implication, even prior to the QE programs that inundated the banks with reserves, is that the US fractional-reserve banking system will never go into reverse due to a shortage of reserves. In other words, US banks will never contract their balance sheets due to a lack of reserves. Another implication is that having a huge pile of “excess” reserves will never cause banks to expand credit. Instead, regardless of their reserve levels banks will expand or contract credit to the extent that their overall balance sheets can support additional leverage and they can find willing/qualified borrowers.

I opened a blog post on 7th October with the statement that gold was money in the distant past and might again be money in the future, but isn’t money in any developed economy today. I then explained this statement. The post stirred up a veritable hornet’s nest, in that over the ensuing 24 hours my inbox was inundated with dozens of messages arguing that I was wrong and a couple of messages thanking me for pointing out the obvious (that gold is not money today). The negative responses were mostly polite*, but in many cases went off on a tangent. Rather than trying to respond individually, this post is my attempt to rebut or otherwise address some of the comments provoked by the earlier post on the same topic.

In general, the responders to my earlier “Gold Is Not Money” post made the same old mistakes of arguing that gold is an excellent long-term store of value, which is true but has nothing to do with whether gold is money today, or confusing what should be with what is. Some responders simply asserted that gold is money because…it is. Not a single responder provided a practical definition of money and explained how gold fit this definition. That’s despite my emphasis in the earlier post that before you can logically argue whether something is or isn’t money, you must first have a definition of money.

Due to the fact that many different things (salt, tally sticks, beads, shells, stones, gold, silver, whiskey, pieces of paper, etc.) have been money in the past, a reasonable definition of money MUST be based on money’s function. Also, the definition must be unique to money. In other words, when defining money you must start with the question: What function does money perform that nothing other than money performs?

“General medium of exchange”, meaning the general enabler of indirect exchange, is the function performed by money and only by money within a particular economy. Now, there are certainly pockets of the world in which gold and other items that we don’t normally use as money in our daily lives do, indeed, perform the monetary function. For example, there are prisons in which cigarettes are the most commonly-used medium of exchange. It is certainly fair to say that cigarettes are money within the confines of such a prison, but I want a definition that applies throughout the economy of a developed country. Gold is not money in the economy of any developed country today, although there could well be small communities in which gold is money.

I’ll now address some of the specific comments received in response to my earlier post, starting with the popular claim that there’s a difference between currency and money, and that although gold is no longer a currency it is still money. The line of thinking here appears to be that currency is the medium that changes hands to complete a transaction whereas money is some sort of esoteric concept. This is hardly a practical way of thinking about currency and money. Instead, it appears to be an attempt to avoid reality.

A more practical way of thinking about the difference between currency and money is that almost anything can be a currency whereas money is a very commonly-used currency. In other words, “currency” is a medium of exchange whereas “money” in the general medium of exchange. The fact is that gold is sometimes used as a currency, but it is currently not money.

Moving on, some people clearly believe that gold is money because the US Constitution says so. Actually, the US Constitution doesn’t say so, as the only mention of gold is in the section that limits the powers of states and is specifically about the payment of debts, but in any case this line of argument is just another example of confusing what should be with what is. The bulk of what the US Federal Government does these days is contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Some people apparently believe that gold is money (or money is gold) because JP Morgan said so way back in 1912. My response is that JP Morgan was absolutely correct. When he made that statement gold was definitely money because at that time it was the general medium of exchange in the US. However, today’s monetary system bears almost no resemblance to the monetary system of 1912. For example, when JP Morgan said “Money is gold” the US was on a Gold Standard and the Federal Reserve didn’t exist.

Several people informed me that gold must be money because some central banks are buying it or holding it in large quantities. OK, does this mean that something is money if central banks are buying/holding it regardless of whether or not it is being used as money throughout the economy? If so, then Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) must now be money in the US because the Fed has bought a huge pile of MBSs over the past few years, and T-Bonds must now be money throughout the world because most CBs hold a lot of T-Bonds. Obviously, something does not become money simply because CBs hold/buy it.

A similar mistake is to claim that gold must be money because major clearing houses accept gold as collateral. The fact is that the same clearing houses also accept the government bonds of most developed countries as collateral. General acceptance as collateral clearly does not make something money.

Lastly, some readers came back at us with the tired old claim that gold has intrinsic value whereas the US$ and the rest of today’s fiat currencies don’t. At the risk of seeming arrogant, you can only make such a claim if you are not well-versed in good economic theory. All value is subjective, which means that no value is “intrinsic”. Most people subjectively assign a high value to gold today, but they also subjectively assign a high value to the US$. In any case, even if the “intrinsic value” statement had merit it wouldn’t be a valid argument that gold is money.

In conclusion, gold is something that is widely perceived to have substantial value. Furthermore, good arguments can be made that its perceived value will be a lot higher in a few years’ time. However, it is currently not money.

*Those that weren’t polite have had the honour of being added to my “blocked senders” list.

Last week I wrote about the incorrect portrayal of the late-September spike in the Fed’s “Reverse Repo” (RRP) operations. Breathless commentary in some quarters had portrayed the RRP spike as an attempt by the Fed to ward-off a crisis, which didn’t make sense. One of the main reasons it didn’t make sense is that a reverse repo takes money OUT of the banking system and is therefore the opposite of what the Fed would be expected to do if it were trying to paper-over a financial problem.

I subsequently saw an article by Lee Adler that provides some more information about the RRP spike. If you are interested in the real reasons behind it then you should read the afore-linked article, but in summary it has to do with a “Fed stupid parlor trick and the temporary shortage of short term T-bills along with the resulting excess of cash.”

According to Mr. Adler: “The two salient facts are that the Fed regularly does two quarter end term repo operations that add to the end of quarter amounts outstanding. They are not a response to any market conditions. The Fed reveals in its FOMC meeting minutes and elsewhere that it instructs the NY Fed to conduct these quarter end operations. It has done so every quarter this year. The NY Fed posts a statement laying out the operations a few days in advance of the end of the quarter.”

I’ve indicated the quarter-end RRP spikes on the following chart. The latest quarterly spike was larger than the preceding three due to the fact that the weekly update of the Fed’s balance sheet happened to be published on the day after the end of the September quarter. Notice that the volume of outstanding RRPs plunged during the first week of the new quarter.

If the pattern continues then there will be another RRP spike during the final week of December, regardless of what’s happening in the financial world at the time.

Here’s an unmodified excerpt from a TSI commentary that was published a few days ago. It deals with something that has garnered more attention than it deserves and been wrongly interpreted in some quarters.

We’ve seen some excited commentary about the recent rise in the dollar volume of Reverse Repurchase (RRP) operations conducted by the Fed. Here’s a chart showing the increase in RRPs over the past few years and the dramatic spike that occurred during the final week of September (the latest week covered by the chart).

For the uninitiated, a reverse repurchase agreement is an open market operation in which the Fed sells a Treasury security to an eligible RRP counterparty with an agreement to repurchase that same security at a specified price at a specific time in the future. The difference between the sale price and the repurchase price, together with the length of time between the sale and purchase, implies a rate of interest paid by the Fed on the cash invested by the RRP counterparty. In short, it is a cash loan to the Fed that is collateralised by some of the Fed’s Treasury securities. The Fed receives some cash, the RRP counterparty receives some securities. Note that the Fed never actually needs to borrow money, but it sometimes does so as part of its efforts to control interest rates and money supply.

As mentioned above, the recent large spike in RRPs has caused some excitement. For example, some commentators have speculated that it signals an effort by the Fed to paper-over a major derivative blow-up. As is often the case in such matters, there are less entertaining but more plausible explanations.

We don’t pretend to know the exact reason(s) for the RRP spike, but here are some points that, taken together, go a long way towards explaining it:

1) The Fed recently enabled a much larger range of counterparties to participate in RRPs. Previously it was just primary dealers, but eligible participants now include GSEs, banks and money-market funds.

2) Reverse Repos involve a reduction in bank reserves, which means that the volume of RRPs is limited to some extent by the volume of reserves held at the Fed. Eight years ago the total volume of reserves at the Fed was almost zero, whereas today it is well over $2T. It could therefore make sense to consider the volume of RRPs relative to the volume of bank reserves.

The following chart does exactly that (it shows RRPs relative to total bank reserves at the Fed). Viewed in this way, the recent spike is a lot less dramatic.

3) Prior to this year RRPs were overnight transactions, but in March of 2015 the FOMC approved a resolution authorizing “Term RRP Operations” that span each quarter-end through January 29, 2016. The Fed has recently been ramping up its Term RRP Operations as part of an experiment related to ‘normalising’ monetary policy.

4) A reverse repo involves the participants parting with the most liquid of assets (cash) for a slightly less liquid asset (Treasury securities), so RRPs are NOT conducted with the aim of boosting financial-system ‘liquidity’. They actually remove liquidity from the financial system.

5) A corollary to point 4) is that because RRPs involve the temporary REMOVAL of money from the financial system, the Fed cannot possibly bail-out or support a bank (or the banking industry as a whole) via RRPs. In effect, a reverse repo is a form of monetary tightening. It is the opposite of “QE”.

6) The recent large increase in the volume of RRPs could be partly due to a temporary shortage of Treasury securities — a shortage that the Fed helped create via its QE and that the US Federal Government has exacerbated by reducing the supply of new securities in response to the closeness of its official “debt ceiling”. That is, the Fed could be using RRPs to alleviate a temporary shortage of government debt securities. However, we suspect that interest-rate arbitrage is playing a larger role, because the RRP participants are getting paid an interest rate that in today’s zero-interest world could look attractive.

7) Lending money to the Fed is the safest way to temporarily park large amounts of cash.