Latest thoughts on Bitgold/Goldmoney

March 4, 2016

There have recently been far more than the normal number of interesting trading opportunities in the stock market, causing me to be busier than usual. This is due to the time involved in researching the larger number of opportunities with the aim of deciding what to present in the weekly TSI reports and what to do with my own money. I’m not complaining; this is just a roundabout way of explaining why I’ve posted less at the blog over the past two weeks, why this post on Goldmoney will not be as detailed as originally intended, and why blog posts could be sparse over the next few weeks. As a non-profit enterprise conducted mostly for fun, the blog necessarily plays second fiddle to preparing the TSI reports and planning/executing my own trades.

Getting to the point, here’s how I concluded my last post on Goldmoney (XAU.V): “At this stage I don’t have enough information to value Goldmoney, although I suspect that ‘reasonable value’ is a long way below the current price. I’ll post some updated thoughts when I have a clearer view of what the stock is worth, which might not be until February next year. In the meantime I’ll stay away. I have no desire to own the stock and, despite the apparent valuation-related downside risk, no desire to short the stock.” More information about Goldmoney’s financial performance has since become available.

I currently don’t have the time to go through the information in detail, but a cursory look at the company’s latest financial statements confirms my earlier impression that Goldmoney will have trouble making a profit. It made another loss in the final quarter of last year and continues to consume cash.

From the perspective of a Goldmoney user, the business is great. Customers can store gold, use gold as a medium of exchange and even take delivery of physical gold in manageable quantities, all at a low (or no) cost. From the perspective of a Goldmoney shareholder, however, the business is not so great. Of particular significance, unlike a mutual fund that charges a fee based on AUM (Assets Under Management), Goldmoney charges nothing to store its customers’ assets (gold bullion). This means that the larger the amount of Goldmoney’s AUM, the greater the net cost to the owners of the business (Goldmoney’s shareholders).

It’s important that under the current fee structure, Goldmoney will generally lose money on customers who use the service primarily for store-of-value purposes. This is where PayPal has a big advantage over Goldmoney. Nobody views their PayPal account as a long-term store of value. Instead, they view it as short-term parking for money to be spent, and when the money is spent PayPal usually gets a commission. This results in PayPal being very profitable, with earnings of US$1.2B (US$1.00/share) in 2015. Many of Goldmoney’s customers, however, view the service as a convenient way to store their physical gold. They don’t want to spend their gold, they want to save it.

Based on what I’ve seen to date I continue to believe that Goldmoney offers a great product, but is operating an inherently low-margin business deserving of a low valuation. Use the service, but don’t buy the stock.

XAU_030316

Print This Post Print This Post

Gold and Confidence

March 1, 2016

This post is a modified excerpt from a recent TSI report.

A point I’ve made many times in TSI commentaries over the years is that the major trends in gold’s relative value have nothing to do with what most people think of as “inflation” (a rising CPI). They are, instead, driven by shifts in how the financial establishment (the central bank plus the commercial banks) is perceived and by shifts in the perception of economic growth prospects. In more general terms, they are driven by shifts in confidence. There are times when a substantial decline in confidence is related to rising inflation expectations, but in developed economies there are more times when it isn’t. And even when it is, it’s not really the decline or the expected decline in the purchasing power of money that results in a greater desire to own gold; it’s the belief* that the stewards of the monetary system are losing control.

The happenings of the past three months constitute an excellent example. Inflation expectations were low when gold began to turn upward in December and if anything are even lower now, but over the past several weeks we had a very fast rally in the real gold price. It should be clear to any knowledgeable observer that the rally had absolutely nothing to do with fear of “CPI inflation”. Rather, it was driven by the combination of fear that the economically-destructive insanity known as Negative Interest-Rate Policy (NIRP) will spread to the US and fear of banking collapse in Europe.

Everything that the world’s most important central banks are doing is based on logical conclusions drawn from false premises. The false premise upon which interest-rate suppression is based is that economic growth is caused by borrowing and consumption. The reality is that saving is the foundation of sustainable economic growth. By pursuing policies that punish saving and reward borrowing, central banks set the scene for slower economic progress.

Now, progress-hindering monetary policy is not something new. It has been the order of the day for a very long time, but it has never before been taken to such extremes. Moreover, senior central bankers are making it crystal clear that they are not close to being done — that they are ready and willing to continue along the current path if the relentless beatings fail to lift morale — even though it is becoming more obvious by the day that the unconventional monetary policies have hurt far more than helped.

The upshot is that today’s central bankers are completely stupid, where stupid is defined as having an unwitting tendency towards self destruction**. Unfortunately, due to their immense power these men and women are taking entire economies along for the ride. The gradual dawning that this is happening is why gold is getting more popular.

*Central banks and governments never had genuine control, but there has been widespread BELIEF over the past several years in the abilities of central banks to create stronger economies.

**The Doug Casey definition.

Print This Post Print This Post

An oil glut doesn’t preclude an oil price bottom

February 23, 2016

This blog post is a modified excerpt from a 17th February TSI commentary.

I don’t need to read/watch the news to know that the supply-demand backdrop remains unsupportive for the oil price. All I have to do is look at the spread between spot prices and futures prices in the oil market. The larger the contango, that is, the higher the futures price relative to the spot price, the more abundant the current supply and the less price-supportive the so-called ‘fundamentals’.

As recently as a few days ago, oil for delivery in July-2016 was $6.40/barrel, or about 20%, more expensive than oil for immediate delivery onto the cash market. This was very unusual. It meant that if someone could buy physical oil and store it cheaply they could make a risk-free annualised return of almost 40% by simultaneously selling July futures contracts. The reason that every man and his dog was not eager to do this trade is that the cost of storing oil is now so high that even a contango that represents a potential 40% annualised return on a physical-futures arbitrage is not very profitable. And the reason that the cost of storing oil is now so high is that there is a much-greater-than-normal amount of oil already in storage.

Unfortunately, knowing that there is an oil glut and, therefore, that the ‘fundamentals’ remain bearish doesn’t tell us what will happen to the oil price in the future. This is because the bearish fundamentals are very well known and are factored into the current price. It is also because the fundamentals are always bearish at major price bottoms in commodities markets.

I suspect that the oil price is now close to a major bottom. This is because at its recent low the “inflation”-adjusted oil price was below its 1986 bottom and almost as low as its 1998 bottom (the two lowest points of the past 40 years). It is also because if stock markets have made long-term peaks then the commodities markets are likely to be among the main beneficiaries of future monetary inflation.

However, it’s very unlikely that there will be a ‘V’ bottom in the oil market. Considering the short-term positive correlation between the oil price and the S&P500 Index (see chart below) and the well-known bearish fundamentals, it’s more likely that the oil market will build a base this year involving a Q1 bottom and one or two successful tests of the bottom.

oil_SPX_220216

Print This Post Print This Post

The “Streetlight Effect” in the gold market

February 22, 2016

In an old joke, a policeman sees a drunk searching for something under a streetlight and asks what he has lost. The drunk says that he lost his keys, and they both start looking under the streetlight together. After a few minutes the policeman asks the drunk if he is sure he lost them here, and the drunk replies, “no, I lost them in the alley”. The policeman then says “so why are you looking here?”, and the drunk replies, “because this is where the light is”. This joke led to the name “Streetlight Effect” being given to a psychological tendency for people to look for clues where it is easiest. Many gold-market analysts have obviously succumbed to this psychological tendency.

It is obvious that many gold-market analysts have succumbed to the “Streetlight Effect” because they fixate on a tiny fraction of the overall gold supply and they do so because this tiny fraction of the overall supply is where the well-defined numbers are. The rest of the supply, which probably accounts for at least 90% of the total, is ignored because its location can’t be pinpointed and its size can’t be accurately measured. In effect, due to a lack of definitive data they make the assumption that the bulk of the world’s gold supply doesn’t exist. No wonder their supply-demand analyses don’t make sense.

To be more specific, there are many gold-market analysts who focus on the amount of gold produced by the mining industry, the amount of gold in COMEX warehouses, the publicly-reported warehouse stocks in London and the bullion inventories of gold ETFs, as if the sum of these quantities was a reasonable estimate of the world’s total amount of gold in saleable form. This is a huge mistake. Furthermore, they assume that once gold leaves a warehouse for which there are publicly-reported numbers the gold effectively ceases to exist, as if it has evaporated into the air. However, it is far more reasonable to assume that almost every ounce of gold that leaves a publicly-reported inventory remains part of the total supply.

In any case and as I explained last week, even if the “Streetlight Effect” didn’t apply and the location of every ounce of aboveground gold was known, the information wouldn’t tell us anything about the price and therefore wouldn’t be useful from an investing/speculating perspective.

Print This Post Print This Post