[This blog post is an abbreviated excerpt from a recent commentary published at www.speculative.investor.com]

On Friday of last week the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) ruled against the tariffs imposed by Trump under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). What will be the financial-market and economic effects?

Based on the financial world’s initial reaction, the effects will be relatively minor. For example, the following weekly chart shows that the iShares 20+ Year Treasury ETF (TLT) consolidated last week but held the preceding week’s upside breakout. Also, the currency market did very little in response to the news.

The small initial market reaction probably stems from the fact that the Trump Administration intends to replace the tariff revenues lost through the inability to use the IEEPA with tariff revenues gained through other avenues, such as “Section 122”. In fact, Trump already has stated that he will use Section 122 to impose a global 15% (initially 10% but raised to 15% one day later) tariff on US imports. This would keep total tariff revenue at around the same level, but it would change substantially the distribution of the tariffs. For example, the average tariff on imports from China would be reduced, but the average tariff applied to imports from Canada would increase.

The single biggest problem associated with Trump’s use of tariffs has been the uncertainty resulting from the sudden changes. The uncertainty remains, because there will be many changes to product tariff rates in response to last Friday’s SCOTUS ruling, necessitating changes to many business plans. Furthermore, the President’s authority under Section 122 only enables the imposition of tariffs for up to 150 days. What happens after that?

Trump has been fortunate in that the business investment that has been curtailed/delayed by his many tariff-related threats and policy flip-flops has coincided with a massive increase in investment associated with AI — investment that would have happened regardless of who was in the White House. As illustrated by the following quarterly chart, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment (RGPDI) in the US has dropped from its Q1-2025 all-time high, but not by much. Moreover, with at least US$1 trillion of AI-related investment slated to occur during 2026 in an economy with a current RGPDI run-rate of about US$4.4 trillion, there’s a good chance that RGPDI will make a new all-time high within the next three quarters despite the uncertainty caused by the tariffs.

Unfortunately, this AI-related investment binge won’t do anything for average Americans other than increase their electricity costs and make their jobs less secure.

Summing up, last Friday’s ruling on Trump’s tariffs has removed a ‘known unknown’, but it has created new unknowns and hasn’t prompted a change to our outlook for any market. Currently, the ‘known unknown’ with the largest potential short-term market impact is the US-Iran situation.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary at www.speculative-investor.com]

The stock prices of companies focussed on Rare Earth Elements (REEs) rallied well in advance of the underlying commodities during May-October of last year, but recently the prices of the commodities have gone up a lot while the REE sector of the stock market has been in correction mode. This actually is normal for some commodity sectors, chief among them being REEs and lithium, during cyclical bull markets. First the equities make big up-moves while the commodities do very little, after which the equities correct/consolidate while commodity prices catch up. Then the cycle repeats, with the equities rallying anew.

The following daily charts illustrate what we just described. The first chart shows that there was a massive rally in the stock price of MP Materials (MP), a proxy for the REE equity sector, from a low in May to a peak in October of last year, at which point a substantial correction began. The second chart shows that during May-October there was only a moderate advance in the price of Neodymium (Nd), a proxy for REEs, but that over the past two months there has been a parabolic rise to well above the October high.

Based on the historical pattern, we expect that the Nd price will level off within the coming month or so and that at around the same time the REE equities will commence new intermediate-term upward trends.

Upward pressure on the prices of many industrial commodities, including REEs, lithium, copper, tin, nickel and natural gas, will be maintained for at least another 12 months due to the on-going datacentre buildout, which not only is continuing but accelerating. Just four companies (Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft) are together anticipating capital spending of around US$650B this year, up from the already-substantial amount of US$360B in 2025. These spending plans could explain January’s large rise in the ISM Manufacturing New Orders Index.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published about two weeks ago at www.speculative-investor.com]

During February-March of last year there was talk of the US government revaluing the gold bullion that currently is an asset on the balance sheet of the Fed. The asset was being valued at $11B, or only US$42.22/ounce, whereas the market value of the asset at that time was around US$770B. The situation today is that the asset is still being valued at only US$11B, whereas its market value is now around US$1.2 trillion. This means that bringing the asset’s official valuation in line with its market value would now result in the addition of more than $1 trillion to the Treasury’s account at the Fed (the Treasury General Account, or TGA). Is this likely to happen anytime soon?

When we addressed this topic in February of last year, our answer to the above question was “no”. The reason, in a nutshell, was that while the monetary injection would give the economy a short-term boost, it would have longer-term negative effects including higher price inflation. We concluded that due to the short-term nature of any positive effect on the economy, from a purely political perspective it would make more sense to implement the revaluation during the final year of the Presidential term than during the first year.

Due to the looming importance to Trump of the November-2026 mid-term elections, we now think that the revaluation could happen within the next few months.

If the mid-term elections result in the Democratic Party gaining control of the House, the path ahead for Trump would become far more difficult. Not only would it be harder for him to pursue his policy agenda, but also he probably would be impeached for a third time. Creating the impression that the economy was strong or at least improving during the months leading up to the election would reduce the risk of this happening. In this respect, we can’t think of anything realistic that would be as effective as a $1 trillion monetary injection that did not have to be financed via debt.

Adding a trillion new dollars to the TGA would be short-term bullish for almost everything except the US$. It would be bullish for the stock market, gold, commodities, bitcoin, and economic statistics such as GDP. It even would be bullish for the Treasury market, because it would enable the US government to spend a lot of money without issuing new debt. In fact, it’s possible that some of the money would be used to repurchase existing Treasury debt, thus lowering interest rates across the economy for a while.

Beyond the short-term it would be bullish for gold and commodities, but very bearish for Treasury bonds and the economy. However, that would be a 2027 story.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary at www.speculative-investor.com]

Whether it is war or accidents at major mines or weather or trade disputes or political upheaval or power shortages, every large rise in the price of any commodity will have its own unique drivers. However, there are periods when many commodities experience large price rises. Even though each of these price rises will have its own fundamental reasons and will seem special when viewed in isolation, a broader view will indicate that they are related.

One reason for the existence of periods during which many commodities experience large price rises, each for a seemingly unique reason, is that long periods of under-investment in commodity production due to low prices make the markets far more vulnerable to supply disruptions. Consequently, an issue (for example, a drought, a mine collapse, a civil war) in one part of the world that during some periods would be taken in stride and result in a relatively small rise in the international price, can lead to a globally important shortage and a huge price rise.

A second reason is the macroeconomic/monetary backdrop and a feedback loop involving commodities and conflict. Monetary inflation eventually leads to economic hardship by raising the cost of living and getting in the way of economic progress. As the inflation problem becomes more obvious, commodities are hoarded both for insurance and speculation purposes, putting additional upward pressure on prices throughout the economy and exacerbating the hardship. This leads to conflict within countries and between countries. If the conflict involves countries that are important in the global supply chain for any commodity, which it often does, then the price of that commodity will rise in dramatic fashion.

The current situation in the tin market is a relevant example. Over the past year there have been supply disruptions due to decisions to curtail production in Myanmar, where 10%-15% of the world’s tin supply originates, and conflict between government and rebel forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where about 6% of the world’s tin supply originates. These supply issues have led to the price surge illustrated below. While a short-term price peak probably will be set soon, this market will remain acutely vulnerable to supply disruptions due to the combination of additional demand from the building of datacentres and long-term under-investment in mining.

There have been several dramatic price rises in commodity markets over the past six months and we expect to see many more over the next two years. Each will have its own unique drivers, but almost all of them will be related to the underlying influences outlined above.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary at www.speculative-investor.com]

The broad rally in the world of metals has continued during the first full week of 2026. During December the upward price momentum in the white metals (silver and the PGMs) became extreme, but now we are seeing dramatic upward price acceleration elsewhere. In particular, the rises in the prices of copper and lithium have become parabolic.

During the first half of this week the copper price in the US traded above US$6/pound for the first time ever, and the following chart shows that the price of copper on the London Metal Exchange (LME), which is less affected by tariff stupidity than the price in the US, is now above US$13,000/tonne. Prior to the past two months it had never been above US$11,000/tonne.

For its part, lithium carbonate priced in Chinese Yuan per tonne (CNY/t) has gained about 120% since June-2025 and about 45% over just the past month. Refer to the following chart for the details. Furthermore, since the Yuan has strengthened relative to the US$ the performance in US$ terms has been even better.

We wrote numerous times over the past two years that the gold bull market would broaden to encompass almost all commodities, starting with the white metals and then moving to other industrial metals and lastly to oil. We noted soon after it happened that the tariff-related panic in April-2025 had marked a turning point for the white metals relative to gold, while industrial metals in general have been strengthening relative to gold since October-2025. Therefore, it is fair to say that the broad strength that we are seeing across the metals markets was anticipated.

At this point in the cycle, it’s very unlikely that industrial metals such as copper and lithium are close to major price tops. On the contrary, the rallies from last year’s lows probably are just the initial rallies — the first of two or three bull-market legs. However, like the price action in silver and the PGMs, the price action in the copper and lithium markets is setting the stage for multi-month corrections. It also will be increasing costs in many industries, which is a related issue because there will be demand destruction if prices continue to rise rapidly. For example, in response to the huge recent price rise in silver, solar cell manufacturers, the largest industrial consumers of silver, are finding ways to substitute base metals for silver in their products.

So, don’t forget to take some profits!

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published at www.speculative-investor.com within the past fortnight]

It has become clear to many analysts that the amount of money being poured into AI-related investment doesn’t make sense. The numbers just don’t add up, meaning that there appears to be little chance that many of the individual investments will achieve reasonable returns and no chance that the investment, in the aggregate, will achieve a reasonable return. This is true, but the rapid rate of spending probably will continue. Fortunately, there is a way to profit that doesn’t involve trying to pick winners in the technology race and doesn’t rely on the AI-related spending being profitable for the companies making the investments.

The rapid rate of spending on AI probably will continue, for two main reasons. The first is that although concerns regarding the magnitude of capital spending by formerly capital-light companies such as Oracle (ORCL) are beginning to appear in both the stock market and the bond market, it’s likely that the senior managers of the mega-cap tech companies view falling behind in the AI race as an existential threat. In other words, the current rate of spending creates a big risk, but failing to spend enough and thus falling behind one’s competitors could be an even bigger risk.

The second is that political leaders in both the US and China clearly believe that for both military and economic purposes, AI-related development in their country must at least keep up with the AI-related development in the country perceived to be their main adversary. Therefore, it’s reasonable to expect that there will be government pressure and incentives to ensure that the private sector continues to invest massive sums in AI and the associated infrastructure.

We think that the safest way to participate in this on-going investment boom is to own the shares of the companies that produce the raw materials that are needed to 1) build datacentres and the equipment that goes into them, and 2) build and fuel the systems that supply power to datacentres. Examples include the producers of natural gas, uranium, copper, tin, REEs and lithium.

The strategy of owning the stocks of companies that produce the raw materials required for the AI boom has worked well for us over the past 12 months and probably will work well for at least another 1-2 years, with — naturally — the occasional gut-wrenching correction along the way. Moreover, this strategy not only obviates any need to pick the AI winners, but also meshes with the fact that we have entered the phase of the economic cycle in which industrial commodities would likely perform well even without the additional impetus provided by the AI spending binge.

A final related point is that while the commodities mentioned above probably have all commenced cyclical bull markets, they tend to rally and correct at different times within these overarching cyclical upward trends. For example, the stocks of REE- and uranium-focussed companies were star performers during the second and third quarters of this year, but during September-November the focus shifted to lithium stocks and over the past few weeks the focus shifted again — to natural gas stocks. This means that it is not uncommon for a short-term selling opportunity in the stocks of companies focussed on one commodity to coincide with a short-term buying opportunity in the stocks of companies focussed on a different commodity.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent commentary at www.speculative-investor.com]

Aggregates such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Consumer Price Index (CPI) always have been fatally flawed. For example, the GDP calculation treats a dollar of wasteful spending as if it were the same as a dollar of productive spending, and the concept that a single number (the CPI) could represent the economy-wide price of money has never made sense. However, over the past several years some of the highest-profile economic aggregates have become more misleading than ever, prompting economists and politicians to wonder: “Why is the average person so concerned about his/her financial situation when the economy is doing so well?”

In the US, the Bureau of Economic Analysis probably will report that real GDP grew at the annualised rate of 3%-4% during the third quarter of this year, which is suggestive of a strong economy. At the same time, however, President Trump’s approval rating on the economy is very low and measures of consumer confidence are in the dumps. For example, the following chart shows that US Consumer Sentiment as measured by the University of Michigan is near a 10-year low.

The discrepancy between the economic aggregates and the perception of the average person was explained in a recent FT article. Here’s an excerpt:

“The American economy is deeply split, with those at the top enjoying unparalleled prosperity and the rest of the country struggling to make ends meet. The top 10 per cent of earners now account for almost half of all spending, up from about a third in the 1990s. Many are feeling particularly flush as they enjoy the fruits of a strong stock market — the S&P is up more than 15 per cent this year, despite a few wobbles. For everyone else, the picture is gloomy. Lay-offs are surging, consumer sentiment has fallen by 30 per cent year on year to near-record lows, and three out of four Americans tell pollsters that the economy is in fair or poor shape.”

And:

“The share of Americans who describe themselves as middle class has dropped from 85 per cent a decade ago to 54 per cent. Over 40 per cent of Americans consider themselves lower or working class, suggesting that many of the finer things feel completely out of reach.”

In short, the aggregates reflect a large increase in spending on the part of the wealthy, while most people are struggling financially. This has political consequences and probably is the main reason for Trump’s success in November-2024 despite the strong — according to high-profile statistics — economy of the time. Moreover, the economic trends of 2022-2024 and their effects on the political realm have continued this year, with the recent election of Zohran Mamdani, a so-called “democratic socialist”, as the New York City Mayor being one of the consequences.

All economic trends affect the financial markets in some way and economic trends that bring about political upheaval tend to have big effects on the financial markets. Although the “inflation” resulting from simultaneously creating a supply shock and showering the populace with money during 2020-2021 is the main cause of the current malaise, it’s a good bet that additional inflationary policies will be part of the official solution to the problem. For example, Trump is talking about sending a $2,000 “tariff dividend check” to almost everyone next year and cutting income tax*, while the Federal Reserve almost certainly will be taking actions to ease monetary conditions. We expect that these policies will extend the gold bull market and fuel even bigger price gains within the ranks of industrial commodities.

*Trump is saying that the income tax cut will be funded by tariff revenue, but you only need rudimentary understanding of the size of the federal budget relative to projected tariff revenue to know that this is nonsense. Any significant cut in US income taxes will be funded by an increase in government indebtedness.

We have never come across a satisfactory way of quantifying overall financial market liquidity, but major trend changes in liquidity can be observed in the price action. In this regard, the price action in several markets points to a major downward reversal in the liquidity trend having occurred during the first half of October.

To further explain, too many markets reversed course during the first half of October for it to be a random coincidence. Therefore, during this period there must have been an underlying shift in something with the ability to pressure prices in diverse markets upward or downward. A shift in the liquidity trend is the most logical explanation.

A shift in the liquidity trend could explain why all the following happened within a 2-week period:

1) There were spectacular downward reversals in the prices of stocks focussed on Rare Earth Elements (REEs), indicating that the REE bubble — a bubble that was extremely profitable for us — has burst.

2) The prices of gold and silver rocketed upward and then reversed downward.

3) The gold mining indices/ETFs peaked in mid-October, two days after breaking above their 2011 highs, and then plunged.

4) The prices of platinum and palladium rocketed upward and then plunged.

5) After peaking during the second week of October, US Antimony Corp. (UAMY), a proxy for the antimony speculation, quickly lost about two-thirds of its value.

6) Bitcoin made a new all-time high and then reversed downward.

7) The German stock market, as represented on the following chart by the DAX, made a marginal new all-time high and then reversed course. The chart indicates that the DAX may be about to complete an intermediate-term topping pattern.

The most important market that is yet to show evidence of declining liquidity is the one that is being supported to the greatest extent by passive money flows: the US stock market as represented by the SPX. However, if a major liquidity trend reversal is underway then its effects should start to become apparent in the senior US equity indices by early next year at the latest. More generally, if a major liquidity trend reversal is underway then no market will be spared and the next several months will be a period in which to ‘play defence’.

[This blog post is a brief excerpt from a commentary published at www.speculative-investor.com on 9th November]

In the 15th October Interim Update, under the heading “The REE Bubble”, we wrote that all the REE-related stocks that we track except for Neo Performance Materials (NEO.TO) were now in bubble territory. This was not only because equity prices had gone parabolic, but also because the price gains in the stock market were not supported by price gains in the underlying commodities. We went on to write that the bull market possibly had years to run, but the risk of an intervening crash had become high. Therefore, we recommended that anyone with significant exposure to REE-related stocks who had not yet harvested meaningful profits, should do so right away. Our warning was well timed, because a crash began almost immediately.

The first of the following daily charts shows that MP Materials (MP), the largest (in terms of market capitalisation) stock in the REE sector and a stock that we use as a sector proxy, fell by 50% from its October high to last week’s low. The second chart shows the performance of USA Rare Earth (USAR), a stock that looked very expensive in early-September — BEFORE it tripled in price on the way to a blow-off top in October. USAR lost two-thirds of its value from its October high to last week’s low.

On average, the prices of the REE stocks on our radar screen fell by around 50% from last month’s high to last week’s low. The stock price of Neo Performance Materials (NEO.TO) held up relatively well and suffered a peak-to-trough decline of ‘only’ 32%, because it didn’t rise by as much in the lead-up to the top and because its current valuation is underpinned by current revenue and earnings.

The way these things usually go, the initial phase of the crash will be followed by a rebound to a lower high, a decline that tests or breaches the initial low, and then several months of base-building. After that, the next leg of the bull market possibly will begin. Note that last Friday’s price action suggests that the initial phase of the crash is complete, so over the weeks ahead there probably will be a rebound.

With commodity-related stocks, we like to do most of our buying during base-building periods and to scale-out during the parabolic rallies.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published at www.speculative-investor.com on 26th October]

After the close of trading last Thursday, Newmont Mining (NEM), the first senior gold producer to report quarterly financial results, released its results for Q3-2025. As expected, given the high average gold price and gold/oil ratio during the quarter, the results were extremely good and included record-high quarterly cash-flow. The company earned US$1.71/share during the quarter, which is US$6.84/share annualised. This means that despite this year’s large gain in its share price, NEM is being valued by the stock market at only about 12-times trailing earnings. We expect that it will be a similar story for most senior and mid-tier gold producers.

Further to comments in our lithium discussion earlier in today’s report, the fact that earnings are high and P/E ratios are low in the gold mining sector does not preclude the possibility that a long-term price top is forming. On the contrary, in the commodity realm, financial results and valuations tend to be most inviting near the ends of bull markets. However, the signs that normally are seen near the end of a gold-mining bull market are not currently evident. Before we get to that, the long-term underperformance of gold mining stocks relative to gold bullion is worth a brief revisit.

The main reason that gold mining stocks, as a group, underperform gold bullion over the long-term is that just as monetary inflation and the associated interest-rate manipulation promote malinvestment in the broad economy, they do the same in the gold mining sector. The difference is that booms in the gold mining sector generally coincide with busts in the broad economy, and vice versa.

As an aside, don’t be misled by the performances of equity indices such as the SPX into thinking that the US economy is in the boom phase of the economic cycle. Due to the domination of passive investing, the performance of the stock market now has very little to do with the performance of the broad economy. In the US economy over the past few years there have been booms in a small number of sectors, chief among them being AI and the related infrastructure, but the economy as a whole has been in the bust phase. Busts usually, but not always, culminate in a recession, with a surge in monetary inflation associated with the official response to the recession sowing the seeds of the next boom.

In the gold mining sector, the malinvestment that eventually stems from a boom involves ill-conceived acquisitions and project developments, the costs of which get written-off years later during the bust phase. The result is wealth destruction over the long-term.

A point we want to make today is that at this stage of the gold sector’s boom there are no signs of widespread malinvestment. On the contrary, NEM and other large-scale gold producers still appear to be more focussed on cost reduction and cash-flow maximisation than on growth, especially ‘growth at any price’. This suggests to us that the end of the boom phase is not imminent.

The end of the boom is not imminent, but the intermediate-term upward trend that began late last year is almost certainly over.

The following charts relate to an update on the markets that was just emailed to TSI subscribers.

1) Gold

2) The Gold Miners ETF (GDX)

3) The Yen

4) The S&P500 Index (SPX)

5) The Russell2000 ETF (IWM)

6) The Dow Transportation Average (TRAN)

7) The iShares 20+ Year Treasury ETF (TLT)

[This blog post is a modified excerpt from a TSI commentary]

In one important respect, the average central banker is like the average politician. They both tend to focus on the direct and/or short-term effects and ignore the indirect and/or long-term effects of policies. In the case of the politician, this is understandable if not excusable. After all, the overriding concern of the average politician is winning the next election. The desire to be popular also influences the decisions of central bankers, but there is a deeper reason for the members of this group’s shortsightedness. The deeper reason is their unwavering commitment to Keynesian economic theory.

All central bankers are Keynesians at heart (if they weren’t they wouldn’t be central bankers), and Keynesian economic theory revolves around the short-term and the superficial. It’s all about policy-makers in the government and the central bank attempting to ‘manage’ the economy by stimulating demand under some conditions and dampening demand under other conditions, with the conditions determined by measures of current or past economic activity. For example, if certain statistics move an arbitrary distance in one direction then an attempt will be made to boost “aggregate demand”. That the concept of “aggregate demand” is bogus is never acknowledged, because acknowledging that the economy comprises millions of distinct individuals as opposed to an amorphous blob would call into question the entire basis for central control of money and interest rates.

In the short-term, the manipulation of money and interest rates often seems to work. In particular, pumping money and forcing interest rates below where they otherwise would be can lead to increased economic activity in the form of more consumption and more investment. What’s happening, however, is that false signals are causing people to make mistakes.

One problem is that people are incentivised by cheaper credit to consume more than they can afford, which guarantees reduced consumption in the future. The bigger problem, though, is on the investment front, in that projects and businesses that would not be financeable at free-market rates of interest are made to appear economically viable. This could seem like a very good thing for a while, but it means that a lot of resources get used in ventures that eventually will fail. It also means that the businesses that would have been viable in a non-manipulated rate environment suffer profit-margin compression due to the ability, created by the abundance of artificially-cheap credit, of relatively inefficient and/or unprofitable competitors to remain in operation.

In addition to the above, the persistent downward manipulation of interest rates leads to huge pension-fund deficits. However, burgeoning shortfalls in the world of pension funds is a major economic and political issue that deserves separate treatment and is outside the scope of this short discussion. Suffice to say right now that the massive unfunded pension liabilities that have arisen due to the policy of interest-rate suppression could be the excuse for new policies that are even more destructive, such as policies based on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).

Summing up, the policy of interest-rate suppression promotes resource wastage and general profit-margin compression. It therefore reduces economic growth over the long term. Furthermore, it’s not so much that central bankers weigh the long-term cons against the short-term pros and opt for the latter; it’s that their chosen theoretical framework doesn’t even allow them to consider the long-term cons. That’s how the head of the ECB is able to argue with a straight face that even though euro-zone interest rates have been manipulated well into negative territory, more interest-rate suppression is needed to support the economy.

In a blog post in early-September I noted that the 10-year TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Security) yield had just gone negative and that the previous two times that this proxy for the real interest rate went negative (August-2011 and July-2016) the gold price was at an important peak. I then attempted to answer the question: If gold tends to benefit from a lower real interest rate, why would the gold price reverse downward shortly after the real interest rate turned negative?

In the earlier post I gave three reasons why a downward reversal in the gold price could coincide with the ‘real’ interest rate going negative. They were:

1) The dip into negative territory marked a low point for the real interest rate.

2) The real interest rate is just one of several fundamental gold-price drivers, so the upward pressure on the gold price exerted by a falling real interest rate could be counteracted by the downward pressure exerted by other fundamental influences.

3) The gold-bullish fundamental backdrop had been fully discounted by the current gold price.

At the time I thought that the third of the above-mentioned reasons may be applicable, because the speculative net-long position in Comex gold futures was very close to an all-time high and the weekly RSI (an intermediate-term momentum indicator) was almost as high as it ever gets.

As it turned out, the first and third reasons were applicable. Sentiment and momentum indicators pointed to extreme enthusiasm for gold on the part of the speculating community, and the following chart, which is an update of the chart included in the blog post linked above, shows that the 10-year TIPS yield reversed upward at the beginning of September.

The current situation is that neither sentiment nor fundamentals are conducive to substantial strength in the gold price. There could be a counter-trend rebound at any time, but the conditions are not right for a resumption of the major upward trend that got underway in the second half of last year.

In an earlier blog post I discussed the relationship between gold and inflation expectations. Contrary to popular opinion, gold tends to perform relatively poorly when inflation expectations are rising and relatively well when inflation expectations are falling.

The relationship outlined above is very clear on the following charts. The first chart shows that over the past 6 years there has been a strong positive correlation between RINF, an ETF designed to move in the same direction as the expected CPI, and the commodity/gold ratio (the S&P Spot Commodity Index divided by the US$ gold price). In other words, it shows that a broad basket of commodities has outperformed gold during periods when inflation expectations were rising and underperformed gold during periods when inflation expectations were falling. The second chart shows the same comparison over the past 12 months. Notice that inflation expectations bottomed for the year (to date) in mid-August and the commodity/gold ratio bottomed about two weeks later.

A large part of the reason for the strong inverse relationship between gold’s relative strength and inflation expectations is the general view that “inflation” of 2%-3% is not just normal, it is beneficial. In fact, most people have been conditioned to believe that it’s a serious economic problem necessitating draconian central bank intervention if money fails to lose purchasing power at a slow and steady pace.

Eventually the rate of “price inflation” will rise to a level where it starts being seen by the public as a major economic problem, and, as a result, the desire to maintain cash savings will enter a steep decline. It is at this point that the relationship depicted above will stop working and the demand for gold will begin to surge in parallel with rising inflation expectations. In other words, at some point the relationship depicted on the above chart will reverse due to declining confidence in the official money. This point probably will arrive within the next 10 years, but probably won’t arrive within the next 12 months. Over the next 12 months it’s likely that gold will continue to be favoured during periods of falling inflation expectations and other commodities will continue to be favoured during periods of rising inflation expectations.

So, if you think that the recent inflation-expectations bounce is the start of a trend then you should be looking for opportunities to increase your exposure to commodities such as oil and copper, not gold. My guess is that inflation expectations bottomed during August-October of this year, but I’m open to the possibility that the bottoming process will extend into early next year.

In a blog post on 30th September I noted that the banking sector (as represented by the US Bank Index – BKX) had begun to show relative strength, a ramification of which was that my Gold True Fundamentals Model (GTFM) had shifted from bullish to bearish. An update is warranted because the situation has changed since then in a way that is both interesting and a little surprising.

Just to recap, the relative performance of the banking sector (as indicated by the BKX/SPX ratio) is an input to my “true fundamentals” models for both the US stock market and the gold market, the difference being that when the input is bullish for one of these markets it is bearish for the other. In particular, relative weakness in the banking sector is considered to be bullish for gold and bearish for general equities.

As explained in the above-linked post, there was enough relative strength in the banking sector during the first half of September to flip the BKX/SPX input from gold-bullish to equity-bullish, causing the GTFM to shift from bullish to bearish. My guess at the time was that the GTFM would return to gold-bullish territory within the next two months, but I pointed out that it is usually better to base decisions on real-time information than on what might happen in the future.

Within a few days of my 30th September post the GTFM shifted back to bullish, where it remains today. This means that apart from a 3-week period during September, the fundamental backdrop has been supportive for gold since the beginning of this year. Refer to the following chart for more detail (the fundamental backdrop is gold-bullish when the blue line on the chart is above 50). Furthermore, there is evidence in the recent price action that gold’s correction is over. However, the fundamental and technical signs of strength in the gold market were not accompanied by signs of weakness in the banking sector.

What’s both interesting and a little surprising is that the renewed signs of strength in gold have gone hand-in-hand with additional signs of strength in the banking sector. Specifically, since my 30th September post the BKX has broken out to the upside (refer to the top section of the following weekly chart) and the BKX/SPX ratio has broken a sequence of declining tops that dates back to early last year (refer to the bottom section of the following chart).

The BKX/SPX ratio is just one of seven inputs to the GTFM, so there are circumstances in which the gold price can trend upward along with relative strength in the banking sector of the stock market. In other words, it isn’t out of the question that over the next few months we will get a gold rally in parallel with a continuing rise in the BKX/SPX ratio and strength in general equities. It’s more likely, however, that the emerging signs of strength in gold are warning of a short-term reversal to the downside in both the broad stock market and the banking sector.

[This post is an excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

Once an equity bear market is well underway it runs its course, regardless of the Fed’s actions. For example, the Fed started cutting interest rates in January of 2001, but the bear market that began in March of 2000 continued until October-2002. For another example, the Fed started cutting interest rates in September-2007, but a bear market commenced in October-2007 and continued until March-2009 despite numerous Fed actions designed to halt the price decline. On this basis it can be argued that the Fed’s introduction of a new asset monetisation program roughly one week ago won’t prevent the stock market from rolling over into a major bearish trend. However, there is a good reason to think that it could be different this time (dangerous words, we know) and that the Fed’s new money-pumping scheme will prove to be game-changer.

The reason to think that it could be different this time is that in one respect it definitely is different. We are referring to the fact that although the Fed started cutting interest rates in the early parts of the last two cyclical bear markets (2000-2002 and 2007-2009), it didn’t begin to directly add new money to the financial markets until the S&P500 Index had been trending downward with conviction for about 12 months.

To further explain, when the Fed’s targeted interest rates follow market interest rates downward, which is what tends to happen during at least the first half of an economic downturn, the official rate cuts do not add any liquidity to the financial system. It’s only after the Fed begins to pump new money into the financial markets that its actions have the potential to support asset prices.

During the last two bear markets, by the time the Fed started to pump money it was too late to avoid a massive price decline. This time around, however, the Fed has introduced a fairly aggressive money-pumping program while the S&P500 is very close to its all-time high and seemingly still in a bullish trend.

The Fed has emphasised that the new asset monetisation program should not be called “QE” because it does not constitute a shift in monetary policy. Technically this is correct, but in a way it’s worse than a shift towards easier monetary policy. The Fed’s new program is actually a thinly-disguised attempt to help the Primary Dealers absorb an increasing supply of US Treasury debt. To put it another way, the Fed is now monetising assets for the purpose of financing the US federal government, albeit in a surreptitious manner.

This relates to a point we made in a recent blog post. The point is that when the central bank is perceived to be financing the government, as opposed to implementing monetary policy to achieve economic (non-political) objectives such as “price stability”, there is a heightened risk that a large decline in monetary confidence will be set in motion. One effect of this would be an increase in what most people think of as “inflation”.

Summing up, it’s possible that the Fed’s new asset monetisation program will extend the current cycle (prolong the equity bull market) and lead to more “price inflation” than earlier programs.

[This post is a modified excerpt from a recent TSI commentary.]

We regularly look at what’s happening with monetary inflation around the world, but today we’ll focus exclusively on the US monetary inflation rate. This is because of the recent evidence that the unusually-low level of this long-term monetary indicator is starting to have a significant short-term effect.

The following chart shows that the year-over-year rate of change in US True Money Supply (TMS), a.k.a. the US monetary inflation rate, made a new 12-year low in August-2019. Furthermore, the latest TMS growth figure for the US is very close to the 20-year low registered in September-2006.

Within three months of the TMS growth trough in September-2006 the first obvious crack appeared in the US mortgage debt/securitisation bubble. The crack was a trading update issued by HSBC on 5th December 2006 that noted the increasing “challenges” being faced by the Mortgage Services operations of HSBC Finance Corporation. This initial sign of weakness was followed by the appearance of a much larger crack on 7th February 2007. That’s when HSBC issued another trading update that included a profit warning due to substantially increased loan impairment charges. Within days of this February-2007 HSBC update, the shares of sub-prime lending specialists such as New Century Financial and NovaStar Financial went into freefall. This marked the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis, although the US stock market didn’t top out until October of 2007 and industrial commodities such as oil and copper didn’t top out until mid-2008.

The above-mentioned events could be relevant to the current situation, in that the recent chaos in the US short-term funding market could be the initial ‘crack’ in today’s global debt edifice. While the low rate of US monetary inflation was not the proximate catalyst for the recent chaos, there is little doubt that it played a part. Temporary issues such as a corporate tax deadline and a large addition by the US Treasury to its account at the Fed would not have had such a dramatic effect if the money supply had been growing at a ‘normal’ pace.

Generally, when the money supply is growing very slowly within a debt-based monetary system, a relatively small increase in the demand for cash can create the impression that there is a major cash shortage.

Now, if there’s one thing we can be sure of it’s that the next crisis will look nothing like the last crisis. The financial markets work that way because after a crisis occurs ‘everyone’, including all policy-makers, will be on guard against a repeat performance, making a repeat performance extremely improbable. Therefore, we can be confident that even if the recent temporary seizure of the US short-term funding market was a figurative shot across the bow, within the next couple of years there will NOT be a major liquidity event that looks like the 2007-2008 crisis. However, some sort of crisis, encompassing an economic recession, is probable within this 2-year period.

The nature of the next crisis will be determined by how the Fed reacts to signs of economic weakness and short-term funding issues such as the one that arose a few weeks ago. In particular, quick action by the Fed to boost the money supply would greatly reduce the probability of a deflation scare and greatly increase the risk that the next crisis will involve relatively high levels of what most people call “inflation”.

As an aside, there’s a big difference between the Fed cutting its targeted short-term interest rates and the Fed directly boosting the money supply. For example, in reaction to signs of stress in the financial system the Fed commenced a rate-cutting program in September of 2007, but it didn’t begin to directly pump money into the system until September of 2008. In effect, during the last crisis the Fed did nothing to address liquidity issues until almost two years after the appearance of the initial ‘crack’. As a consequence, the monetary inflation rate remained low and monetary conditions remained ‘tight’ until October of 2008 — 12 months after the start of an equity bear market and 10 months after the start of an economic recession.

Early indications are that the Fed will be very quick to inject new money this time around, partly because 2007-2008 is still fresh in the memory. These early indications include the rapidity of the Fed’s response to the effective seizure of the “repo” market last month and the fact that last Friday the Fed introduced a $60B/month asset monetisation program. This program is QE in everything except name. In other words, the Fed already has resumed Quantitative Easing even though GDP is growing at about 2%/year, the unemployment rate is at a generational low and the stock market is near an all-time high.

In summary, while it is too early to have a clear view of how the next major crisis will unfold, something along the lines of 2007-2008 can be ruled out. Also, there are tentative signs that the next crisis will coincide with or follow a period of relatively high “inflation”.

The events of the past 10 years have fostered the belief that central banks can create a virtually unlimited amount of money without significant adverse consequences for the purchasing power of money. Since the law of supply and demand applies to money similarly to how it applies to every other economic good, this belief is wrong. However, the ‘failure’ of QE programs to bring about high levels of what most people think of as inflation has generated a false sense of security.

The difference between money and every other economic good is that money is on one side of almost every economic transaction. Consequently, there is no single number that can accurately represent the price (purchasing power) of money, meaning that even the most honest and rigorous attempt to calculate the “general price level” will fail. This doesn’t imply that changes in the supply of money have no effect on money purchasing power, but it does imply that the effects of changes in the money supply can’t be explained or understood via a simple equation.

Further to the above, the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) is not a valid theory. Ludwig von Mises thoroughly debunked this theory a hundred years ago and I summarised its basic flaws in a blog post two years ago. Unfortunately, QTM’s obvious inability to explain how the world works has strengthened the belief that an increase in the supply of money has no significant adverse effect on the price of money.

The relationship between an increase in the money supply and its economic effects is complicated by the fact that the effects will differ depending on how and where the new money is added. Of particular relevance, the economic effects of a money-supply increase driven by commercial banks making loans to their customers will be very different from the economic effects of a money-supply increase driven by central banks monetising assets. In the former case the first receivers of the new money will be within the general public, for example, house buyers/sellers and the owners of businesses, whereas in the latter case the first receivers of the new money will be bond speculators (Primary Dealers in the US). Putting it another way, “Main Street” is the first receiver of the new money in the former case and “Wall Street” is the first receiver of the new money in the latter case. This alone goes a long way towards explaining why the QE programs of Q4-2008 onward had a much greater effect on financial asset prices than on the prices that get added together to form the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

Clearly, the QE programs implemented over the past 11 years had huge inflationary effects, just not the effects that many people expected.

A proper analysis of the effects of the QE programs has not been done by central bankers and the most influential economists. As a result, there is now the false sense of security mentioned above. It is now generally believed that substantially increasing the money supply does not lead to problematic “inflation”, which, in turn, lends credibility to monetary quackery such as MMT (Modern Monetary Theory).

Due to the combination of the false belief that large increases in the supply of money have only a minor effect on the purchasing power of money and the equally false belief that the economy would benefit from a bit more “price inflation”, it’s a good bet that central banks and governments will devise ways to inject a lot more money into the economy in reaction to future economic weakness. As is always so, the effects of this money creation will be determined by how and where the new money is added. If the money is added via another QE program then the main effects of the money-pumping again will be seen in the financial markets, at least initially, but if the central bank begins to monetise government debt directly* then the “inflationary” effects in the real economy could be dramatic.

The difference between the direct and the indirect central-bank monetising of government debt is largely psychological, but it is important nonetheless. When the central bank monetises government debt indirectly, that is, via intermediaries such as Primary Dealers, it is perceived to be conducting monetary policy (manipulating interest rates, that is). However, when the central bank monetises government debt directly it is perceived to be financing the government, thus eliminating any semblance of central bank independence and potentially setting in motion a large decline in monetary confidence.

According to the book Monetary Regimes and Inflation, ALL of the great inflations of the 20th Century were preceded by central bank financing of large government deficits. Furthermore, in every case when the government deficit exceeded 40% of expenditure and the central bank was monetising the bulk of the deficit, a period of high inflation was the result. In some cases hyperinflation was the result.

In summary, growth in the money supply matters, but not in the simplistic way suggested by the Quantity Theory of Money. There’s a good chance that this fact will be rediscovered within the next few years, especially if legislative changes enable/force the Fed to monetise government debt directly.

*In the US this would entail the Fed paying for government debt securities by depositing newly-created dollars into the government’s account at the Fed. The government would then spend the new money. Currently the Fed buys government debt securities from Primary Dealers (PDs), which means that the newly-created dollars are deposited into the bank accounts of the PDs.

One of the past month’s interesting stock-market developments was the strength of the banking sector in both nominal terms and relative to the broad market. The strength in nominal dollar terms is illustrated by the top section of the following weekly chart, which shows that the US Bank Index (BKX) is threatening to break out to the upside. The strength relative to the broad market is illustrated by the bottom section of the chart, which reveals a sharp rebound in the BKX/SPX ratio since the beginning of September.

Bank stocks tend to perform relatively well when long-term interest rates are rising in both absolute terms and relative to short-term interest rates. This explains why the banking sector outperformed during September and also why bank stocks generally have been major laggards since early last year.

Valuations in the banking sector are depressed at the moment, as evidenced by relatively low P/Es and the fact that the BKX/SPX ratio is not far from a 25-year low. This opens up the possibility that we will get a few quarters of persistent outperformance by bank stocks after long-term interest rates make a sustained turn to the upside.

On a related matter, the relative performance of the banking sector (as indicated by the BKX/SPX ratio) is an input to my “true fundamentals” models for both the US stock market and the gold market. However, when the input is bullish for one of these markets it is bearish for the other. In particular, relative weakness in the banking sector is considered to be bullish for gold and bearish for general equities.

Until recently the BKX/SPX input was bullish in my gold model and bearish in my equity model, but there was enough relative strength in the banking sector during the first half of September to flip the BKX/SPX input from gold-bullish to equity-bullish. As a consequence, during the second week of September there was a shift from bullish to bearish in my Gold True Fundamentals Model (GTFM). This shift is illustrated on the following weekly chart by the blue line’s recent dip below 50.

The upshot is that the fundamental backdrop, which was supportive for gold from the beginning of this year through to early-September, is now slightly gold-bearish. My guess is that it will return to gold-bullish territory within the next two months, but in situations like this it is better to base decisions on real-time information than on what might happen in the future.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary published at TSI on 1st September 2019.]

It’s well known that the US$ gold price often trends in the opposite direction to the US real interest rate. This relationship is illustrated by the following chart in which the real interest rate is represented by the yield on the 10-year TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Security).

Notice that the 10-year TIPS yield has just gone negative and that the previous two times that this proxy for the real interest rate went negative the gold price was at an important peak. Specifically, the real interest rate going negative in August-2011 coincided with a long-term top in the gold price and the real interest rate going negative in July-2016 coincided with an intermediate-term top in the gold price. If gold tends to benefit from a lower real interest rate, why would the gold price reverse downward shortly after the real interest rate turned negative?

Considering only the 2016 case the answer to the above question seems obvious, because in July-2016 the TIPS yield reversed course and began trending upward soon after it dipped into negative territory. In other words, the downward reversal in the gold price coincided with an upward reversal in the real interest rate. However, in 2011-2012 the real interest rate continued to trend downward for more than a year after the gold price peaked.

We think there are two reasons why the gold price didn’t make additional gains in 2011-2012 after the real interest rate turned negative. First and foremost, the real interest rate is just one of several fundamental gold-price drivers (the 10-year TIPS yield is one of seven inputs to our Gold True Fundamentals Model), and after August-2011 the upward pressure exerted by a falling real interest rate was counteracted by the downward pressure exerted by other fundamental influences. Second, in August-2011 a further significant decline in the real interest rate had been factored into the current gold price.

The risk at the moment is that on a short-term basis the bullish fundamental backdrop, including the potential for a further decline in the ‘real interest rate’, is fully discounted by the current price. This risk is highlighted by the fact that the total speculative net-long position in Comex gold futures is very close to an all-time high. It is also highlighted by the fact that the RSI displayed in the bottom section of the following weekly chart is almost as high as it ever gets.