The cost of government debt is immediate

Most warnings about large increases in government indebtedness revolve around future repayment obligations. For example, there is the concern that greatly increasing the government debt in the present will necessitate much higher taxes in the future. For another example, there is the concern that if the debt load is cumbersome at a time of very low interest rates, then as interest rates rise the interest expense will come to dominate the budget and lead to an upward debt spiral as more money is borrowed to pay the interest on earlier debt. Although these concerns are valid they miss two critical points, including the main problem with government borrowing.

The first of the missed points is that there is no intention to repay the debt or even to reduce the total amount of debt. This is one way that government debt is very different to private debt. Nobody would ever lend money to a private organisation unless there was a good reason to believe that the debt eventually would be repaid, but when it comes to the government the plan is for the total debt to grow indefinitely. It will grow faster during some periods than other periods, but it will always grow. Therefore, it makes no sense to agonise over how the debt will be repaid. It simply won’t be repaid or even reduced.

The current debt-based monetary system has been designed to expand…and expand…until it collapses and is replaced by something else.

Of course, the idea of debt repayment gets plenty of lip service. It has to be that way to avoid a premature collapse. The old Russian joke “we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us” springs to mind, but in this case it’s “the government pretends to care about debt repayment and bond investors pretend to believe them”. It’s a game, and for bond investors one of the guidelines of the game is “you’ll be fine as long as there are still plenty of people pretending to believe the government’s promise to pay”.

A consequence is that the rate of increase in government debt only matters to the extent that it affects the timing of the monetary system’s collapse.

The second of the missed points, and the main problem with government borrowing, is that the costs of the borrowing are immediate as well as long-term. The reason is that with one exception, every dollar added to the government’s debt pile results in a dollar less invested in the private sector. In effect, government debt accumulation adds to government spending at the expense of private-sector investment. This is a negative for economic progress, although it can give a short-term boost to economic activity in the same way that activity gets boosted by hurricane damage.

The one exception mentioned above is when the government debt is monetised by the banking industry (the central bank or the commercial banks). In this case it appears that new savings are magically created to finance the government’s deficit spending, but what actually happens is that misleading price signals are generated. In particular, interest rates are artificially lowered. The ramifications are less negative in the short-term and more negative in the long-term.

Summing up, when the government goes further into debt the biggest problem isn’t that it places a burden on future generations, since the debt will never be repaid anyway. The biggest problem is the immediate dampening effect it has on economic progress.

It’s normal for the stock market to ignore a rising interest-rate trend for a long time. The reason is that while the interest rate is a major determinant of the value of most corporations, the interest rate that matters for equity valuation isn’t the current one. What matters is the level of interest rates for a great many years to come. Therefore, a rise in interest rates only affects the stock market to the extent that it affects the general perception of where interest rates will be over the next decade or longer.

To further explain, the value of a company is the sum of the present values of all its future cash flows, with the present value of each future cash flow determined via the application of a discount rate (interest rate). Nobody knows what these cash flows will be or what the appropriate discount rate should be, but guesses, also known as forecasts, are made. Clearly, when discounting a set of cash flows spanning, say, the next 30 years, it won’t make sense to simply use the current interest rate. Instead, the analyst doing the calculation will have to make a stab at what will happen to interest rates in the future.

The analyst’s ‘stab’ naturally will be influenced by what is happening in the present, but the future interest rate levels that are plugged into valuation models won’t be adjusted in response to what are considered to be normal fluctuations in the current interest rate. It’s only when the current interest rate breaks out of an established range that it affects expectations in a big way.

That, in a nutshell, is why it isn’t a fluke that the 3rd October downside breakout in the bond market (represented by TLT in the following chart) coincided with the start of a rapid downward re-pricing in the stock market.

In addition to stocks being influenced by big moves (breakouts from ranges) in bonds, bonds are influenced by big moves in stocks. That’s especially so when important stock-market support levels are breached with little warning. For example, within a few days of the 3rd October downside breakout in the bond market setting in motion a sharp decline in the stock market, the stock market’s weakness was helping to prop-up the bond market. Interestingly, though, the quick 10% decline in the S&P500 Index from its peak led to only a minor rebound in the bond market, despite there being a record-high speculative net-short position in bond futures. As illustrated above, TLT didn’t even manage to rebound by enough to test its 3rd October downside breakout and has dropped back to near its early-October low in response to this week’s recovery in the stock market.

The bond market’s lacklustre response to the recent equity weakness suggests that equities will have to weaken further before the interest-rate trend transforms from a stock-market head-wind to a stock-market tail-wind. Also, the fact that the bond market has already dropped back to near its October low suggests that the stock market will be unable to make significant additional gains without pushing interest rates to new multi-year highs. This, in turn, suggests that there is minimal scope for additional short-term strength in the stock market.

[This blog post is a slightly-modified excerpt from a TSI commentary published about three weeks ago. Not much has changed in the meantime.]

If you rely on the mainstream financial press for your information then you could be forgiven for believing that financial crises happen with no warning. However, there are always warnings if you know where to look.

Here are four leading indicators of financial stress and/or economic confidence that are both easy to monitor and worth monitoring. It’s likely that all four of these indicators will issue timely warnings prior to the next financial crisis and a virtual certainty that at least two of them will.

1) The yield curve, as depicted on the following chart by the 10yr-2yr yield spread.

As explained in many previous commentaries, the yield curve ‘flattening’ to an extreme and then beginning to steepen warns that an inflation-fueled boom has begun to unravel. For example, the yield curve reached its maximum ‘flatness’ in November-2006 and provided clear evidence of a reversal in June-2007. That was the financial crisis warning. By August of 2007 the ‘steepening’ trend was accelerating.

The yield curve’s current situation looks more like Q4-2006 than Q3-2007. It is nothing like 2008.

2) Credit spreads, as depicted on the following chart by the difference between the Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II Effective Yield and the yield on the 10-Year T-Note.

Credit spreads start to widen, indicating a decline in economic confidence and/or a rise in the perceived risk of default at the junk end of the debt market, well before a recession or crisis. For example, evidence of a new widening trend in credit spreads emerged in July-2007 and by November-2007 it was very obvious that trouble was brewing.

Note that when it comes to warning of a coming crisis, credit spreads are far more likely to generate a false positive signal than a false negative signal, that is, they are far more likely to cry wolf when there’s no wolf than to remain silent when there is a wolf.

Right now they are silent.

3) The short-term interest rate at which banks lend to other banks versus the equivalent interest rate at which the US federal government borrows money, as depicted on the following chart by the LIBOR-UST3M spread.

When trouble begins to brew in parts of the banking system it gets reflected by higher interest rates being charged for short-term inter-bank loans well before it becomes common knowledge. This causes the spread between 3-month LIBOR (the average 3-month interbank lending rate) and the 3-month T-Bill yield to increase. For example, the LIBOR-UST3M spread was languishing at around 0.20% in early-2007, indicating minimal fear within the banking system, but then began to rise steadily and reached 0.75% in June-2007. This was an early warning sign of trouble. The spread then pulled back into July-2007 before rocketing up to 2.25% in August-2007. This constituted a very loud warning. After that the spread became very volatile and moved as high as 4.5% at the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in October-2008.

At the moment the LIBOR-UST3M spread is languishing at around 0.20%.

4) The gold price relative to industrial metals prices, as depicted on the following chart by the gold/GYX ratio (the US$ gold price divided by the Industrial Metals Index).

The gold/GYX ratio acts like a credit spread. This is because gold’s performance relative to the industrial metals sector tends to go in the same direction as economic confidence. In particular, when confidence begins to decline in the late stage of a boom or the early stage of a bust, the gold/GYX ratio begins to trend upward.

The following chart illustrates the long-term positive correlation between gold/GYX and a credit spread indicator in the form of the IEF/HYG ratio.

The gold/GYX ratio recently bounced from the bottom of its 7-year range. If the bounce continues and gold/GYX exceeds its early-2018 high it would be the first sign of a declining trend in economic confidence.

Currently, none of the above indicators is warning that a financial crisis is imminent or even that a financial crisis is starting to develop. The probability could change as new information becomes available, but based on the present values of the best leading indicators there is almost no chance that a financial crisis will erupt within the next three months.

A stock market crash is a different ‘kettle of fish’, because while a financial crisis always will be accompanied by a large decline in the stock market it is possible for a large decline in the stock market to occur in the absence of a financial crisis. The 1987 stock market crash is an excellent example.

While the four indicators mentioned above should issue timely warnings prior to a financial crisis, they may not warn of a stock market crash that isn’t part of a broader crisis. As is the case with a financial crisis, though, a stock market crash won’t happen ‘out of the blue’. In particular, the stock market won’t make a new all-time high one day and crash the next. This is because it takes time (generally at least two months) from the ultimate price high to create the sentiment backdrop that makes a crash possible.

In summary, short-term stock market risk is high, but there are no warning signs that a financial crisis is brewing or that a stock market crash (as opposed to, say, a 10% correction) is a realistic short-term possibility.

[This post is a brief excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

During the first three quarters of 2016 we were open to the possibility that a new cyclical gold bull market got underway in December of 2015, but over the past 18 months we have been consistent in our opinion that the December-2015 upward reversal in the US$ gold price did NOT mark the start of a bull market. Since late-2016 there have been some interesting rallies in the gold price, but at no time has there been a good reason to believe that we were dealing with a bull market. That’s still the case. The question is: what will it take to set a new cyclical gold bull market in motion?

The simple answer is that it will take a US equity bear market. However, this is not a practical answer because in real time there often will be no way of differentiating the first 6-9 months of an equity bear market from an intermediate-term bull-market correction. The most practical answer we can come up with is that it will take an upward reversal in the yield curve.

It has become popular to argue that due to extraordinary monetary policy the yield curve is not as important as it was in the past, but we strongly disagree. In our opinion the yield curve is, if anything, more important now — in the face of extraordinary monetary policy — than it has ever been.

The potential for the US yield curve to invert in the not-too-distant future is a red herring. Except to the extent that it influences the psychology of senior Fed officials, whether or not the curve inverts is neither here nor there. It’s the reversal from ‘flattening’ to ‘steepening’ that matters, regardless of whether the reversal happens before or after the curve inverts.

If the next major reversal of the yield curve is driven primarily by falling short-term interest rates then it will signal the onset of an economic bust. An economic bust would naturally coincide with an equity bear market and the start of a gold bull market. On the other hand, if the next major reversal of the yield curve is driven primarily by rising long-term interest rates then it will signal the onset of an inflationary blow-off that likely would go hand-in-hand with a powerful 1-2 year rally in the gold price and the prices of most other commodities.

Last week the 10yr-2yr yield spread, a proxy for the US yield curve, fell to within 2 basis points of the 10-year low reached in mid-July. Therefore, at this time there is no sign of an upward reversal.

The US yield curve, as indicated by the spread between the 10-year and 2-year T-Note yields, made a new 10-year extreme over the past fortnight, meaning that it recently became the ‘flattest’ it has been in more than 10 years. While this may indicate that the boom is nearing its end, it definitely indicates that the transition from boom to bust has not yet begun.

As explained numerous times in the past, the ‘flattening’ of the yield curve (short-term interest rates rising relative to long-term interest rates) is a characteristic of a monetary-inflation-fueled economic boom. It doesn’t matter how flat the yield curve becomes or even if it becomes inverted, the signal that the boom has ended and that a bust encompassing a recession is about to begin is the reversal of the curve’s major trend from flattening to steepening. To put it another way, the signal that the proverbial chickens are coming home to roost is short-term interest rates peaking RELATIVE TO long-term interest rates and then beginning to decline relative to long-term interest rates. This generally will happen well before the Fed sees a problem and begins to cut its targeted short-term interest rate.

The following chart highlights the last two major reversals of the US yield curve from flattening to steepening. These reversals were confirmed about 6 months prior to the recessions that began in March-2001 and December-2007.

The fact that the yield curve is still hitting new extremes in terms of ‘flatness’ suggests that the next US recession will not begin before 2019.

The above is essentially a repeat of what I’ve written in the past, but an additional point warrants a mention. The additional point is that while it would be almost impossible for the US economy to transition from boom to bust without a timely reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening, there is a realistic chance that the next yield-curve trend reversal from flattening to steepening will NOT signal the onset of an economic bust/recession. That’s why I do not depend solely on the yield curve when determining recession probabilities.

The reason that the next yield-curve trend reversal from flattening to steepening will not necessarily signal the onset of an economic bust/recession is that there are two potential drivers of such a reversal. The reversal could be driven by falling short-term interest rates or rising long-term interest rates. If it’s the former it signals a boom-bust transition, but if it’s the latter it signals rising inflation expectations.

As an aside, regardless of whether a major yield-curve reversal from flattening to steepening is driven by the unravelling of an artificial boom or rising inflation expectations, it is bullish for gold. By the same token, a major reversal in the yield curve from steepening to flattening is always bearish for gold.

With the T-Bond likely to strengthen for at least the next two months there is little chance that rising long-term interest rates will drive a yield curve reversal during the third quarter of this year, but it’s something that could happen late this year or during the first half of next year.

[This post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary]

Conventional wisdom is that an inversion of the yield curve (short-term interest rates moving above long-term interest rates) signals that a recession is coming, but this is only true to the extent that a recession is always coming. A reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening is a far more useful signal.

What a yield curve inversion actually means is that the interest-rate situation has become extreme, but there is no telling how extreme it will become before the eventual breaking point is reached. Furthermore, although there was a yield-curve inversion prior to at least the past seven US recessions, Japan’s most recent recessions were not preceded by inverted yield curves and there is no guarantee that short-term interest rates will rise by enough relative to long-term interest rates to cause the yield curve to become inverted prior to the next US recession. In fact, a good argument can be made that due to the extraordinary monetary policy of the past several years the start of the next US recession will NOT be preceded by a yield curve inversion.

Previous US yield curve inversions have happened up to 18 months prior to the start of a recession, and as mentioned above it’s possible that there will be no yield curve inversion before the next recession. Therefore, we wouldn’t want to be depending on a yield curve inversion for a timely warning about the next recession or financial crisis. However, the yield curve can provide us with a much better, albeit still imperfect, recession/crisis warning in the form of a confirmed trend reversal from flattening to steepening. This was discussed in numerous TSI commentaries over the years and was also covered in a blog post last December.

There are two reasons that a reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening is a more useful recession/crisis warning signal. First, it is timelier. Second, it should work regardless of whether or not the yield curve becomes inverted.

Now, from a practical speculation standpoint it is not essential to understand WHY the yield curve reverses from flattening to steepening ahead of major economic problems bubbling to the surface. It is enough to know that it does. However, if you understand why the curve has reversed direction ahead of previous recessions you will understand why it either should or might not reverse direction in a timely manner in the future. After all, if extraordinary monetary policy could prevent the yield curve from becoming inverted ahead of the next recession then perhaps it also could prevent the yield curve from reversing course the way it has in the past.

With regard to understanding the why, the first point to grasp is that the boom phase of the cycle is characterised by borrowing short-term to lend/invest long-term. This puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates, meaning that it causes the yield curve to flatten. Also, when the boom is mature and is approaching its end there will be a scramble for additional short-term financing to a) complete projects that were started when monetary conditions were easier and b) address cash shortages that have arisen due to completed projects not delivering the predicted cash flows. This puts further upward pressure on short-term rates relative to long-term rates, and could, although won’t necessarily, cause the yield curve to become inverted.

Next, as the boom nears its end the quantity of loan defaults will begin to rise and the opportunities to profit from short-term leverage will become scarcer. Everything will still seem fine to casual observers, central bankers, the average economist and the vast majority of commentators on the financial markets, but it will now be apparent to a critical mass of astute operators (investors, speculators and financiers) that many of the investments that were incentivised by years of easy money were ill-conceived. These operators will begin shifting towards ‘liquidity’ and away from risk.

The aforementioned increasing desire for the combination of safety and liquidity leads to greater demand for cash and gold. But more importantly as far as this discussion is concerned, it boosts the demand for short-term Treasury debt relative to long-term Treasury debt (thus putting downward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates). The reason is that the shorter the term of the Treasury debt, the lower the risk of an adverse price movement. For example, if you lend $10B to the US government via the purchase of 3-month T-Bills then in three months’ time you will have something worth $10B, but if you lend $10B to the US government via the purchase of 10-year T-Notes then in three months’ time you could have something that is worth significantly more or less than $10B.

As an aside, what an investor focused on boosting liquidity really wants is cash, but if he has billions of dollars then cash is not a viable option. This is because the cash would have to be deposited in a bank, which means that the investor would be lending the money to a bank and taking the risk of a massive loss due to bank failure. Lending to the US government is a much safer choice.

In summary, it’s mainly the desire for greater liquidity and safety that begins to emerge at the tail-end of a boom that causes the yield curve to stop flattening and start steepening. As demonstrated by the events of the past few years the central bank has substantial power to postpone the end of a boom, but eventually a breaking point will be reached and when it is the yield curve’s trend will change from flattening to steepening.

[The following is an excerpt from a commentary posted at TSI last week.]

One of the financial world’s most dangerous expressions is “this time is different”, because the expression is often used during investment bubbles as part of a rationalisation for extremely high market valuations. Such rationalisations involve citing a special set of present-day conditions that supposedly transforms a very high valuation by historical standards into a reasonable one. However, sometimes it actually is different in the sense that all long-term trends eventually end. Sometimes, what initially looks like another in a long line of price moves that run counter to an old secular trend turns out to be the start of a new secular trend in the opposite direction. We continue to believe that the current upward move in interest rates is different, in that it is part of a new secular advance as opposed to a reaction within an on-going secular decline. Here are two of the reasons:

The first and lesser important of the reasons is the price action, one aspect of which is the performance of the US 10-year T-Note yield. With reference to the following chart, note that:

a) The 2016 low for the 10-year yield was almost the same as the 2012 low, creating what appears to be a long-term double bottom or base.

b) The 10-year yield has broken above the top of a well-defined 30-year channel.

c) By moving decisively above 3.0% last week the 10-year yield did something it had not done since the start of its secular decline in the early-1980s: make a higher-high on a long-term basis.

The more important of the reasons to think that the secular interest-rate trend has changed is the evidence that the bond market’s performance from early-2014 to mid-2016 constituted a major blow-off. The blow-off and the resulting valuation extreme are not apparent in the US bond market, but they are very obvious in the euro-zone bond market.

In the euro-zone, most government debt securities with durations of 2 years or less rose in price to the point where they had negative yields to maturity, and some long-term bonds also ended up with negative yields. For example, the following chart shows that the yield on Germany’s 10-year government bond fell from around 2% in early-2014 to negative 0.25% in mid-2016.

Although yields have trended upward in the euro-zone since Q3-2016, German government debt securities with durations of 5 years or less still trade with negative yields to maturity. Even more remarkable considering that Italy’s new government is contemplating a partial debt default and a large increase in the budget deficit, Italy’s 2-year government bond yield moved out of negative territory only two weeks ago and is about 220 basis points below the equivalent US yield. To be more specific, you can buy a US 2-year Treasury note today and get paid about 2.5% per year or you can buy an Italian government 2-year note today and get paid about 0.3% per year.

Why would anyone lend money to the Italian government for 2 years at close to 0% today when there is a non-trivial chance of default during this period? Why would anyone have lent money to the Italian government or even to the more financially-sound European governments over the past three years at rates that guaranteed a nominal loss if the debt was held to maturity?

There are two reasons, the first being the weakness of the euro-zone banking system. The thinking is that you lock in a small loss by purchasing government bonds with negative yields to maturity, but in doing so you avoid the risk of a large or even total loss due to bank failure (assuming the alternative is to lend the money to a private bank). The main reason, however, is the ECB’s massive bond-buying program. This program was widely anticipated during 2014 and came into effect in early-2015.

With the ECB regularly hoovering-up large quantities of bonds almost regardless of price, speculators could pay ridiculously-high prices for bonds and be safe in the knowledge that they could offload their inventory to the ECB at an even higher price.

Negative interest rates and negative yields-to-maturity could not occur in a free market. It took the most aggressive central-bank interest-rate manipulation in history to bring about the situation that occurred in Europe over the past few years.

We don’t think it’s possible for the ECB to go further without completely destroying the euro-zone’s financial markets. Also, if it isn’t obvious already it should become obvious within the next couple of years that the aggressive bond-buying programs conducted by the ECB, the Fed and other central banks did not work the way they were advertised. Therefore, even if it were technically possible for the major central banks to go further down the interest-rate suppression path, they won’t be permitted to do so.

That’s why it’s a very good bet that the secular downward trend in interest rates is over.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

The year-over-year rate of growth in the US True Money Supply (TMS) was around 11.5% in October of 2016 (the month before the US Presidential election) and is now only 2.4%, which is near a 20-year low. Refer to the following monthly chart for details. In terms of effects on the financial markets and the economy, up until recently the US monetary inflation slowdown was largely offset by continuing rapid monetary inflation elsewhere, most notably in Europe. However, the tightening of US monetary conditions has started to have noticeable effects and these effects should become more pronounced as the year progresses.

The tightening of monetary conditions eventually will expose the mal-investments of the last several years, which, in turn, will result in a severe recession, but the most obvious effect to date is the increase in interest rates across the entire curve. The upward acceleration in interest rates over the past six months has more than one driver, but it probably wouldn’t have happened if money had remained as plentiful as it was two years ago.

It would be a mistake to think that the tightening has been engineered by the Fed. The reality is that the Fed has done very little to date.

The Fed has made several 0.25% increases in its targeted interest rates, but the main effect of these rate hikes is to increase the amount of money the Fed pays to the commercial banks in the form of interest on reserves (IOR). It doesn’t matter how you spin it, injecting more money into banks ain’t monetary tightening!

The Fed’s actual efforts on the monetary loosening/tightening front over the past 5 years are encapsulated by the following weekly chart of Reserve Bank Credit (RBC). This chart shows that there was a rapid rise in RBC during 2013-2014 that ended with the completion of QE in October-2014. For the next three years RBC essentially flat-lined, which is what should be expected given that the Fed was neither quantitatively easing nor quantitatively tightening during this period. In October-2017 the Fed introduced its Quantitative Tightening (QT) program. To date, this program has resulted in only a small reduction in RBC, but the plan is for the pace of the QT to ramp up.

Strangely, the most senior members of the Fed appear to believe that their baby-step rate hikes constitute genuine tightening and that the contraction of the central bank’s balance sheet is neither here nor there. The reality is the opposite.

So, the Fed is not responsible for the large decline in the US monetary inflation rate and the resultant tightening of monetary conditions that has occurred to date.

The responsibility for the tightening actually lies with the commercial banks. As illustrated by the next chart, the year-over-year rate of growth in commercial bank credit was slightly above 8% at around the time of the Presidential election in late-2016 and is now about 3%.

We won’t be surprised if a steepening yield curve prompts commercial banks to collectively increase their pace of credit creation over the next two quarters, but with the Fed set to quicken the pace of its QT the US monetary inflation rate probably will remain low by the standards of the past two decades. At the same time, the ECB will be taking actions that reduce the monetary inflation rate in the euro-zone. This could lead to stock and bond market volatility during the second half of this year that dwarfs what we’ve witnessed over the past two months.

In a recent newsletter John Mauldin wrote: “It is monetary policy madness to raise rates and undertake quantitative tightening at the same time.” However, this is exactly what the Fed plans to do in 2018. Has the Fed gone mad?

If mad is defined as diverging in an irrational way from normal practice then the answer to the above question is no. The Fed is following the same rule book it has always followed.

It should first be understood that earlier rate-hiking campaigns were always accompanied by quantitative tightening (QT). Otherwise, how could the Fed have caused its targeted interest rate (the Fed Funds rate) to rise? The Fed is powerful, but not powerful enough to command the interest rate to perform in a certain way. Instead, it has always manipulated the rate upward by reducing the supply of reserves to the banking system via a process that also reduces the money supply within the economy; that is, via QT. In other words, far from there being something unusual about the Fed simultaneously raising rates and undertaking QT, it is standard procedure.

What’s unusual about the current cycle is the scale. Having created orders of magnitude more money and bank reserves than normal during the easing part of the cycle the Fed must now implement QT on a much larger scale than ever before. At least, that’s what the Fed must do if it follows its rule book.

A plausible argument can be made that the Fed should now deviate from its rule book, but the argument isn’t that the economy is too weak to cope with tighter monetary policy. The correct argument is that the damage in the form of misdirected investment and resource wastage was done by the earlier quantitative easing (QE) programs and this damage cannot be undone or even mitigated by deflating the money supply. In effect, the incredibly loose monetary policy of 2008-2014 has made a painful economic denouement inevitable. At this point, reducing the money supply — as opposed to stopping the inflation of the money supply, which would be beneficial as it would prevent new mal-investment from being added to the pile — would exacerbate the pain for no good reason.

In other words, the damage done by monetary inflation cannot be subsequently undone by monetary deflation.

A plausible argument can also be made that for the first time ever the Fed now has the option of hiking interest rates without doing any QT. This is due to its ability to pay interest on bank reserves. This ability was acquired about 9 years ago solely for the purpose of enabling the Fed to hike its targeted interest rate while leaving the banking system inundated with “excess reserves” (refer to my March-2015 blog post for more detail). That is, this ability was acquired so that the Fed would not be forced to undertake QT at the same time as it was hiking rates.

However, the Fed is not going to deviate from its rule book. This is mainly because the Fed’s leadership believes that a new QE program will be required in the future.

To explain, a Fed decision not to implement QT would create an expectations-management problem in the future. Specifically, an announcement by the Fed that it was going to maintain its balance sheet at the current bloated level would be a tacit admission that QE involved a permanent addition to the money supply rather than a temporary exchange of money for securities. If the Fed were to admit this then the next time a QE program was announced there would be a surge in inflation expectations.

There has been monetary policy madness in spades over the past two decades, but within this context there is nothing especially mad about the Fed’s plan to raise rates and undertake quantitative tightening at the same time.

[This post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary published on 6th December]

The central bank is not the root cause of the boom-bust cycle. The root cause is fractional reserve banking (the ability of banks to create money and credit out of nothing). The central bank’s effect on the cycle is to extend the booms, make the busts more severe and prevent the investment errors of the boom from being fully corrected prior to the start of the next cycle. Consequently, there are some important relationships between interest rates and the performance of the economy that would hold with or without a central bank, provided that the practice of fractional reserve banking was widespread. One of these relationships is the link between a reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening and the start of an economic recession/depression.

Unfortunately, the data we have at our disposal doesn’t go back anywhere near as far as we’d like, where “as far as we’d like” in this case means 150 years or more. For example, the data we have for the 10year-2year spread, which is our favourite indicator of the US yield curve, only goes back to the mid-1970s.

For a longer-term look at the performance of the US yield curve the best we can do on short notice is use the Fed’s data for the 10year-3month spread, which goes back to the early-1960s. However, going back to the early-1960s is good enough for government work and is still satisfactory for the private sector.

As explained in many previous commentaries, the boom phase of the cycle is characterised by borrowing short-term to lend/invest long-term in order to take advantage of the artificial abundance of cheap financing enabled by the creation of money and credit out of nothing. This puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates, meaning that it causes the yield curve to flatten.

At some point, usually after the boom has been in progress for several years, it becomes apparent that some of the investments that were incentivised by the money/credit inflation were ill-conceived. Losses start being realised, the quantity of loan defaults begins to rise, and the opportunities to profit from short-term leverage become scarcer. At this point everything still seems fine to casual observers, central bankers, the average economist and the vast majority of commentators on the financial markets, but the telltale sign that the cycle has begun the transition from boom to bust is a trend reversal in the yield curve. Short-term interest rates begin to fall relative to long-term interest rates, that is, the yield curve begins to steepen.

The following monthly chart of the 10year-3month spread illustrates the process described above. On this chart, the boom periods roughly coincide with the major downward trends (the yield-curve ‘flattenings’) and the bust periods roughly coincide with the major upward trends (the yield-curve ‘steepenings’). The shaded areas are the periods when the US economy was officially in recession.

The black arrows on the chart mark the major trend reversals from flattening to steepening. With two exceptions, such a reversal occurred shortly before the start of every recession.

The first exception occurred in the mid-1960s, when a reversal in the yield spread from a depressed level was not followed by a recession. It seems that something happened at that time to suddenly and temporarily elevate the 10year yield relative to the 3month yield.

The second exception was associated with the first part of the famous double-dip recession of 1980-1982. Thanks to the extreme interest-rate volatility of the period, the yield spread reversed from down to up shortly before the start of the recession in 1980, which is typical, but during the first month of the recession it plunged to a new low before making a sustained reversal.

Due to the downward pressure being maintained on short-term interest rates by the Fed, the yield curve reversal from flattening to steepening that signals an imminent end to the current boom probably will happen with the above-charted yield spread at an unusually high level. We can’t know at what level or exactly when it will happen, but it hasn’t happened yet.

In a blog post earlier this week I briefly argued that “government-controlled cryptocurrency” was a contradiction in terms. It depends on what is meant by “cryptocurrency”, but now that I’ve done some more research on the subject I understand how a central bank could make use of blockchain technology and why the government would want to implement a type of cryptocurrency.

My understanding of the subject was improved by reading the white paper on the “Fedcoin” published a few months ago by Yale University. I also read about the difference between “permissioned” and “permissionless” blockchains. As a result, I now understand that a blockchain is a data structure that can be either distributed, as is the case with Bitcoin, or centrally controlled, as would be the case with a “cryptocurrency” issued by a central bank.

I also understand how the commercial banks could profit from the advent of a centrally-controlled cryptocurrency. This is an important consideration because the way the world currently works it is unrealistic to expect the introduction of a new form of official money that would result in substantially-reduced profits for the major banks.

The Fedcoin paper linked above lays out how a state-sponsored cryptocurrency could work. Here are some of the salient aspects:

1. The system comprises a central ledger of all transactions (the blockchain) maintained by the Fed, nodes (commercial banks) and users (anyone who wants to spend or receive a Fedcoin).

2. A user of Fedcoins must have an account at the Fed. Opening an account would involve providing the KYC (Know Your Customer) identity information that anyone who has dealt with a financial institution over the past few years would be familiar with.

3. Users would have digital wallets that held encrypted funds and all transactions would have to be digitally signed, so in this respect the term “cryptocurrency” would apply. However, the Fed and the government would be able to determine the identity of the users involved in any/every transaction (due to item 2 above), so the encryption would not result in genuine privacy. Moreover, the government would have the power to “blacklist” a Fedcoin account, effectively freezing the account.

4. Commercial banks (the “nodes” of the system) would maintain copies of the central ledger and would verify transactions to ensure no double spending. Also, all Fedcoin transactions would be announced to the network of nodes.

5. The Fed would audit and allocate fees to the nodes, with bonuses going to the fastest nodes. I suspect that the payments would be high enough to make this a lucrative business for the nodes (the banks).

6. Nodes would send sealed low-level blocks to the Fed for incorporation into high-level blocks that get added to the blockchain.

7. The Fed would guarantee that one Fedcoin could be converted into one dollar. This would ensure that the Fedcoin had the same stability as the dollar.

8. From an accounting perspective, a Fedcoin would be equivalent to a dollar note. In particular, like physical notes and coins, Fedcoins would be liabilities on the Fed’s balance sheet.

9. The Fed would have total control over the supply of Fedcoins, so the advent of this cryptocurrency would not reduce the central bank’s ability to manipulate the money supply and interest rates. On the contrary, the central bank’s ability to manipulate would be enhanced, because it’s likely that the Fedcoin would replace physical cash. Among other things, this would simplify the imposition of negative interest rates should such a policy be deemed necessary by central planners.

What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a government-controlled cryptocurrency such as Fedcoin?

According to the Bank of England (BOE), digital currency could permanently raise GDP by up to 3% due to reductions in real interest rates and monetary transaction costs. Also, the central bank would be more able to stabilise the business cycle.

The BOE’s arguments amount to unadulterated hogwash, for reasons that many of my readers already know and that I won’t rehash at this time.

Clearly, the driving force behind a centrally-controlled cryptocurrency would be the maximisation of tax revenue, in that the replacement of physical cash with a digital system that enabled every transaction to be monitored would eliminate a popular means of doing business below the government radar. Fighting crime and promoting economic growth would be nothing more than pretexts.

That being said, a currency such as Fedcoin would offer one significant advantage to the average person, which is that people could do on-line transfers and payments without having an account with a commercial bank. This is because currency transfers could be done directly between digital wallets.

Also, an official cryptocurrency such as Fedcoin would offer some advantages over Bitcoin, the most popular unofficial cryptocurrency. First, Fedcoin would not have the Bitcoin volatility problem. Second, Fedcoin would be vastly more efficient.

With regard to the efficiency issue, the Proof of Work (POW) aspect of Bitcoin is a massive waste of resources (electricity, mainly). Furthermore, Bitcoin’s inefficiency is deliberately built into the system to limit the rate of supply increase. To explain using an analogy, the high and steadily-increasing costs deliberately imposed on Bitcoin transaction verification and the resultant creation of new coins would be akin to forcing all gold mining to be done by hand, and then, after a certain amount of gold was extracted, making a new rule that required all gold mining to be manually done by crippled miners.

In a way, Bitcoin and the “altcoins” constitute a large and rapidly-expanding Keynesian make-work project. Too bad that such projects result in long-term wealth destruction.

Given the benefits that the government, the central bank and the most influential economists (all of whom are Keynesian) would perceive, it’s a good bet that state-sponsored cryptocurrencies are on the way. For the private sector the introduction of such currencies would lead to cost savings in the money-transfer area, but enhancing the ability of the government to divert resources to itself and enabling even greater central bank control of money definitely would be a barrier to economic progress.

The theme of a recent report from Casey Research was that the Russian government is planning to issue its own cryptocurrency (the “CryptoRuble”) that would be created, tracked and held on a state-controlled digital ledger. This was portrayed as being a huge plus for the Russian economy. I don’t see how giving the government greater ability to monitor financial transactions and thus divert more money into its own coffers could be anything other than a negative for any economy, but the Casey report got me thinking about whether a state-sponsored cryptocurrency is a valid concept.

I’m far from an expert on cryptocurrencies and so I could be missing something (please let me know if I am), but it seems to me that it is not a valid concept. The essence of the blockchain technology that underlies cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is that the ledger is DISTRIBUTED. This is what makes the system secure. Cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets can be hacked, but the blockchain itself is, for all intents and purposes, ‘unhackable’.

If a digital currency exists on a centrally-controlled ledger it is not a cryptocurrency, it is a garden variety electronic currency like the dollars in your bank account.

Central banks and governments want to eliminate physical cash so that there is a digital record of all transactions. This is not to promote economic growth or to fight terrorism or to reduce crime or to further any other noble cause; it is primarily to maximise tax revenue and secondarily to cut off a way of escaping from negative interest rates. Therefore, it’s a good bet that physical cash will be outlawed in the not-too-distant future. For exactly the same reason (they make it more difficult for the government to monitor financial transactions and thus maximise tax revenue) it’s likely that cryptocurrencies will be outlawed at some stage.

Another relevant point is that commercial banks generate a lot of profit by lending new money into existence and monetising securities. Given the banking industry’s influence on government and the reliance of government on the financial support of banks, there is no chance of the government implementing a monetary system that substantially reduces the profitability of commercial banks.

In summary, I expect that governments will attempt to make the official currency 100% digital/electronic, but not introduce their own cryptocurrencies. As far as I can tell, “government-controlled cryptocurrency” is a contradiction in terms.

[This post is a brief excerpt from a TSI commentary published a week ago]

The US economic boom is still in progress, where a boom is defined as a period during which monetary inflation and the suppression of interest rates create the false impression of a growing/healthy economy*. We know that it is still in progress because the gap between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields — our favourite proxy for the US yield curve — continues to shrink and is now the narrowest it has been in 10 years.

Reiterating an explanation we’ve provided numerous times in the past, an important characteristic of a boom is an increasing desire to borrow short to lend/invest long. This puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates, which is why economic booms are associated with flattening yield curves. The following chart shows the accelerating upward trend in the US 2-year yield that was the driving force behind the recent sharp reduction in the 10yr-2yr yield spread.

The above paragraph explains why a yield-curve trend reversal from flattening to steepening invariably occurs around the time of a shift from economic boom to economic bust. Such a reversal is a sign that the willingness and/or ability to take on additional short-term debt to support investments in stocks, real estate, factors of production and long-term bonds has diminished beyond a critical level. From that point forward, a new self-reinforcing trend involving debt reduction and the liquidation of investments becomes increasingly dominant.

The recent performance of the yield curve indicates that the US economy hasn’t yet begun the transition from boom to bust.

*The remnants of capitalism enable some genuine progress to be made during the boom phase, but the bulk of the apparent economic vibrancy is associated with monetary-inflation-fueled price rises and activities that essentially consume the ‘seed corn’.

The following monthly chart shows that relative to a broad basket of commodities*, gold commenced a very long-term bull market (47 years and counting) in the early-1970s. It’s not a fluke that this bull market began at the same time as the final official US$-gold link was severed and the era of irredeemable free-floating fiat currency kicked off.

Anyone attempting to apply a traditional commodity-type analysis to the gold market would have trouble explaining the above chart. This is because throughout the ultra-long-term upward trend in the gold/commodity ratio the total supply of gold was orders of magnitude greater, relative to commercial demand, than the supply of any other commodity. Based on the sort of supply-demand analysis that routinely gets applied to other commodities, gold should have been the worst-performing commodity market.

The reason that a multi-generational upward trend in the gold/commodity ratio began in the early-1970s and is destined to continue is not that gold is money. The reality is that gold no longer satisfies a practical definition of money. The reason is the combination of the greater amount of mal-investment enabled by the post-1970 monetary system and the efforts by central bankers to dissuade people from saving in terms of the official money.

In brief, what happens is this: Central banks put downward pressure on interest rates (by creating new money) in an effort to promote economic growth, but the economy’s prospects cannot be improved by falsifying the most important price signals. Instead, the price distortions lead to clusters of ill-conceived investments, thus setting the stage for a recession or economic bust. Once it is widely realised that cash flows are going to be a lot less than previously expected there is a marked increase in the general desire to hold cash. At the same time, however, central banks say that if you hold cash then we will punish you. They don’t use those words, but it is made clear that they will do whatever it takes to prop-up prices and prevent the savers of money from earning a real return on their savings. This prompts people to look for highly liquid assets that can be held in lieu of the official money, which is where gold comes in.

This is why the gold/commodity ratio tends to trend downward when everything seems fine on the surface and rocket upward when it becomes apparent that numerous investing mistakes have been made and that the future will be nowhere near as copacetic as previously assumed.

It’s reasonable to expect that the multi-generational upward trend in the gold/commodity ratio that began in the early-1970s will continue for at least as long as the current monetary system remains in place. Why wouldn’t it?

*For the broad basket of commodity prices the chart uses the CRB Index up to 1992 and the GSCI Spot Commodity Index (GNX) thereafter.

The yield curve is a remarkably useful leading indicator of major economic and financial-market events. For example, its long-term trend can be relied on to shift from flattening to steepening ahead of economic recessions and equity bear markets. Also, usually it will remain in a flattening trend while a monetary-inflation-fueled boom is in progress. That’s why I consider the yield curve’s trend to be one of the true fundamental drivers of both the stock market and the gold market. Not surprisingly, when the yield curve’s trend is bullish for the stock market it is bearish for the gold market, and vice versa.

A major steepening of the yield curve will have one of two causes. If the steepening is primarily the result of rising long-term interest rates then the root cause will be rising inflation expectations, whereas if the steepening is primarily the result of falling short-term interest rates then the root cause will be increasing risk aversion linked to declining confidence in the economy and/or financial system. The latter invariably begins to occur during the transition from boom to bust.

A major flattening of the yield curve will have the opposite causes, meaning that it could be the result of either falling inflation expectations or a general increase in economic confidence and the willingness to take risk.

On a related matter, the conventional wisdom is that a steepening yield curve is bullish for the banking system because it results in the expansion of banks’ profit margins. While superficially correct, this ‘wisdom’ ignores the reality that one of the two main reasons for a major steepening of the yield curve is widespread, life-threatening problems within the banking system. For example, the following chart shows that over the past three decades the US yield curve experienced three major steepening trends: the late-1980s to early-1990s, the early-2000s and 2007-2011. All three of these trends were associated with economic recessions, while the first and third got underway when balance-sheet problems started to appear within the banking system and accelerated when it became apparent that most of the large banks were effectively bankrupt.

Here’s an analogy that hopefully helps explain the relationship (under the current monetary system) between major yield-curve trends and the economic/financial backdrop: Saying that a steepening of the yield curve is bullish because it eventually leads to a stronger economy and generally-higher bank profitability is like saying that bear markets are bullish because they eventually lead to bull markets; and saying that a flattening of the yield curve is bearish because it eventually — after many years — is followed by a period of severe economic weakness is like saying that bull markets are bearish because they always precede bear markets.

Both rising inflation expectations and increasing risk aversion tend to boost the general desire to own gold, whereas gold ownership becomes less desirable when inflation expectations are falling or economic/financial-system confidence is on the rise. Consequently, a steepening yield curve is bullish for gold and a flattening yield curve is bearish for gold.

The US yield curve’s trend has not yet reversed from flattening to steepening, meaning that its present situation is bullish for the stock market and bearish for the gold market. However, the yield curve is just one of seven fundamentals that factor into my gold model and one of five fundamentals that factor into my stock market model.

In a blog post in February of last year I explained that an inversion of the US yield curve has never been a recession signal. Instead, the genuine recession signal has always been the reversal in the curve from ‘flattening’ (short-term interest rates rising relative to long-term interest rates) to ‘steepening’ (short-term interest rates falling relative to long-term interest rates) after an extreme is reached. It just so happens that under normal monetary conditions an extreme usually isn’t reached and the reversal therefore doesn’t occur until after the yield curve becomes inverted.

The fact is that it doesn’t matter how ‘flat’ or inverted the yield curve becomes, there’s a good chance that the monetary-inflation-fueled economic boom will be intact as long as short-term interest rates are rising relative to long-term interest rates. The reason, in a nutshell, is that the boom periods are dominated by borrowing short to lend or invest long, a process that puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates. It’s when short-term interest rates begin trending downward relative to long-term interest rates that we know the boom is in trouble.

The following chart shows that the spread between the 10-year T-Note yield and the 2-year T-Note yield is much narrower now than it was a few years ago. This means that there has been a substantial flattening of the US yield curve. Also, the chart shows no evidence of a trend reversal. This implies that the inflation-fueled boom is still intact.

[This post is a slightly-modified excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

The US economic boom that followed the bust of 2007-2009 is still in progress. It has been longer than average, but at the same time it has been unusually weak. The weakness is even obvious in the government’s own heavily-manipulated and positively-skewed data. For example, the following chart shows that during the current boom* the year-over-year growth rate of real GDP peaked at only 3.3% and has averaged only about 2.0%. Why has the latest boom been so weak and what does this say about the severity of the coming bust?

Before attempting to answer the above question it’s important to explain what is meant by the terms “boom” and “bust”.

An economy doesn’t naturally oscillate between boom and bust. The oscillations are related to fractional reserve banking and these days are driven primarily by central banks. When I use the term “boom” in relation to an economy I am therefore not referring to a period of strong and sustainable economic progress, I am referring to a period during which monetary inflation and interest-rate suppression bring about an unsustainable surge in economic activity.

Booms are always followed by and effectively give birth to busts, with each bust wiping out a good portion (sometimes 100%) of the gain achieved during the preceding boom. Putting it another way, once a boom has been set in motion by the central bank a bust becomes an inevitable consequence. The only unknowns are the timing of the bust and how much of the boom-time gain will be erased.

Returning to the question asked in the opening paragraph, the main reason for the unusual weakness of the latest boom is the unprecedented aggressiveness of the central bank’s response to the 2007-2009 bust. In broad terms, this response came in two parts. First, there was the initial knee-jerk reaction during 2008-2009 that involved massive bailouts for banks and bondholders. In particular, by various means the Fed channeled many hundreds of billions of dollars into financial institutions to keep these institutions in business and ensure that their largest creditors remained whole. Because the Fed cannot create new wealth, this effectively involved a huge transfer of wealth from the rest of the economy to financial institutions and the associated bondholders. Second, the Fed continued to ramp up the money supply and keep its targeted interest rates near zero for several years after a recovery had begun, that is, the Fed’s ‘crisis-fighting’ persisted for many years after the crisis was over. Ironically, this got in the way of the recovery.

A related point is that from a monetary perspective the biggest difference between the current boom and earlier booms is that a lot of the monetary fuel for the current boom was directly provided by the Fed, whereas almost all of the monetary fuel for earlier booms was loaned into existence by the commercial banks. When commercial banks lend money into existence the first receivers of the new money are individual and corporate customers of the banks, but when the Fed creates money via its QE programs the first receivers of the new money are Primary Dealers (PDs). The PDs invest the money in bonds, which means that the second receivers of the new money will be bond investors. These investors then use the money to buy other securities (bonds or stocks). The upshot is that when the Fed creates money the money gets shuffled around between the accounts of financial-market operators for an extended period, only leaking slowly into the real economy.

This explains why the economy has fared unusually poorly during the current boom while the stock and bond markets have fared unusually well. In effect, due to the way the new money was injected it had a much greater impact on financial asset prices than the real economy.

This could actually be a blessing in disguise. If the boom were to end within the coming 12 months, which it will if monetary conditions continue to tighten, then the ensuing recession may be far more severe in the financial markets (where the monetary inflation had its greatest impact) than in the real economy. In other words, the bust may look more like 2000-2002, when a short and mild economic recession was accompanied by a 50% decline in the stock market, than 2007-2009, when a devastating economic recession was accompanied by a similar decline in the stock market.

*The booms in the GDP growth chart included herewith are roughly equal the periods between the shaded areas, except that the official recessions (the shaded areas on the chart) typically didn’t begin until 6-12 months after the preceding boom ended. For example, whereas the most recent official recession began in December-2007, the bust probably began in late-2006 — when (mal) investments in sub-prime lending started ‘blowing up’.

According to the article linked HERE, if the US or the Australian or the UK government repaid all of its debt, the economy would tank. The article contains such a large number of factual errors and such a copious amount of nonsense that completely debunking it would take far more time than I’m prepared to spend, so in this post I’ll only deal with a few of the flaws.

To begin, the article points out that US government surpluses have, in the past, often been followed by depressions or recessions, the implication being that the government surplus caused the subsequent economic downturn. The two specific examples that are mentioned are the Great Depression of the 1930s, which apparently followed surpluses during the 1920s, and the recession of 2001, which followed the so-called Clinton surplus of 1999.

This is nothing more than confusing correlation with causation. The same logical fallacy could be used to show that a rising stock market causes a depression or recession, given that the stock market almost always rises during the years prior to the start of an economic contraction.

In an effort to show that there is, indeed, a causal relationship between a government surplus and a severe economic downturn, the article includes the following quote from an ‘economist’:

“…reducing or retiring the debt isn’t what caused the economic downturns. It was the surpluses that caused it. Simply put, you cannot operate an economy with no money in it.”

This brings me to the concept that runs through the article and is the logical basis for the assertion that government surpluses are very bad. It is that the running of a government surplus removes money from the economy and, therefore, that paying off most of the government’s debt would eliminate most of the economy’s money. That the author of the article found economists who genuinely believe this to be the case is extraordinary. It is akin to finding a physicist who genuinely believes that the Earth is flat.

The fact is that neither a government surplus nor a government deficit alters the economy-wide supply of money; all it does is change the distribution of the existing money supply. Here’s why.

First, when the government runs a deficit it is a net taker (borrower) of money from bond investors. It then spends the money. Money is therefore cycled from bond investors through the government to the individual or corporate recipients of government payments (including government employees). If this money had not been ‘invested’ in government bonds then it would have been invested elsewhere and subsequently spent in a different way.

Second, when the government runs a surplus it is a net provider of money to bond investors, with money being cycled from taxpayers through the government to the accounts of these investors. Collectively, the bond investors who receive these payments immediately turn around and reinvest them in corporate bonds or equity. Private corporations then spend the money on employee wages, employee healthcare, supplies, maintenance, plant, training, dividends, etc.

Either way, there is no change to the economy-wide money supply.

To further explain, in general terms there are only two ways that money can be added to the economy. The first involves deposit creation by commercial banks. For example, when Fred borrows $1M from his bank to buy a house, the bank adds 1M newly-created dollars to Fred’s demand account. That is, the money supply is boosted by $1M. The second involves asset monetisation by the central bank. In the US case, prior to 2008 almost all money was created by commercial banks, but from September-2008 through to the end of “QE” in October-2014 the Fed was the dominant creator of new money. Since November of 2014 the commercial-banking system has been the sole net-creator of new money.

In general terms there are also only two ways that money can be removed from the economy. The first involves the elimination of a deposit at a commercial bank when a loan is repaid (note that a loan default does not reduce the money supply). For example, if Fred were to pay-off his $1M home mortgage in one fell swoop then $1M would immediately be removed from the money supply. The second involves the sale of assets by the central bank — the opposite of the asset monetisation process.

Notice that the government was not mentioned in the above two paragraphs. Regardless of whether the government is running a budget deficit or a budget surplus, the banking system determines whether the supply of money rises or falls. I’m not saying that’s the way it should be, but that’s the way it is.

The next part of the article is a tribute to the old canard that the government’s debt doesn’t matter “because we owe it to ourselves”. In reality, there is no “we” and “ourselves”. The government’s debt comprises bonds that are owned by a few specific entities. It is to those entities, that in the US case includes foreign governments, to whom the debt is owed, with taxpayers technically being ‘on the hook’ for the future repayment. I say “technically” because what happens in practice is that the debt is never repaid; it just grows and grows until eventually the entire system collapses.

Related to the “government debt doesn’t matter because we owe it to ourselves” nonsense is the notion that the government’s debt is the private sector’s asset and, therefore, that more government deficit-spending leads to greater private-sector wealth. Ah, if only wealth creation were that easy! In the real world, government debt is not an additional asset for the private sector, it is a replacement asset. This is because when the government issues new debt it necessarily draws money away from other investments. Putting it another way, investing money in government bonds involves foregoing other investment opportunities. To argue that this would be a plus for the economy is to argue that the government usually allocates savings more productively than the private sector.

There are a lot more logical fallacies and factual errors in the article than I’ve dealt with above, but I’m going to leave it there. I just wanted to point out that much of what is observed about the relationship between government indebtedness and private-sector indebtedness can be explained by central bank manipulation of money and interest rates. When the central bank fosters an artificial boom via monetary inflation and the suppression of interest rates it prompts the private sector to go further into debt, which, by the way, is not an unintended effect.* At the same time, the rising asset prices and the temporary increase in economic activity that stem from the same monetary policy cause more money to flow into the government’s coffers, which could temporarily enable the government to report a surplus and should at least result in a slower pace of government debt accumulation. That is, it isn’t the reduced pace of government debt accumulation that causes the pace of private sector debt accumulation to accelerate; the driving force is the central bank’s misguided attempt to stimulate the economy.

I’ll end by stating that a government surplus is not inherently better or worse than a government deficit. What really matters is the total amount of government spending as a percentage of the overall economy. The higher this percentage, the worse it will be for the economy.

*Ben Bernanke made it very clear during 2009-2014 that the Fed’s actions were designed to boost the private sector’s borrowing and general risk-taking.

The following monthly chart shows that the year-over-year (YOY) growth rate of US True Money Supply (TMS) made a multi-year peak in late-2016 and has since fallen sharply to an 8-year low. The downward trend in US monetary inflation since late last year has been driven by the commercial banks, meaning that the pace of commercial-bank credit creation has been declining. The Fed, on the other hand, hasn’t yet done anything to tighten US monetary conditions. All the Fed has done to date is edge its targeted interest rates upward in a belated reaction to rising market interest rates.

That the Fed has been tagging along behind the market is evidenced by the following chart comparison of the US 2-year T-Note yield (in blue) and the Effective Fed Funds Rate (in red). The chart shows that a) the 2-year T-Note yield bottomed and began trending upward in the second half of 2011, b) the Effective FFR bottomed and began trending upward in early-2014, and c) the Fed made its first rate hike in December-2015. The market has therefore been pushing the Fed to raise its targeted interest rates for several years.

Interestingly, the Fed has caught up with and is possibly now even a little ahead of the market. This suggests scepticism on the part of the market that economic and/or financial conditions will be conducive to additional Fed rate hikes over the coming few months.

Based on the prices of Fed Funds Futures contracts we know that the market does not expect the Fed to make another rate hike until December at the earliest. This expectation is probably correct. Rather than make an additional ‘baby step’ rate hike there’s a good chance that the Fed’s next move will be to start reducing the size of its balance sheet by not reinvesting all the proceeds from maturing debt securities. Unless the stock market tanks in the meantime, this balance-sheet reduction will probably be announced on 20th September (following the FOMC Meeting) and kick off in October.

When the aforementioned balance-sheet reduction does start happening it will constitute the Fed’s first genuine attempt to tighten monetary conditions, although, as mentioned above, US monetary conditions have been tightening since late last year thanks to the actions of the commercial banks.

Most people with a basic grounding in economics know that increasing the supply of money leads to a fall in the purchasing power of money. However, this is usually as far as their understanding goes and explains why monetary inflation is generally not unpopular unless the cost of living happens to be rising rapidly. Monetary inflation would be far more unpopular if its other effects were widely understood.

Here are some of these other effects:

1. A greater wealth gap between rich and poor. For example, monetary inflation is probably a large part of the reason that the percentage of US household wealth owned by the richest 0.1% of Americans has risen from 7% to 23% since the mid-1970s and is now, for the first time since the late-1930s, greater than the percentage US household wealth owned by the bottom 90%. Inflation works this way because asset prices usually respond more quickly than the price of labour to increases in the money supply, and because the richer you are the better-positioned you will generally be to protect yourself from, or profit from, rising prices.

2. Large multi-year swings in the economy (a boom/bust cycle), with the net result over the entire cycle being sub-par economic progress due to the wealth that ends up being consumed during the boom phase.

3. Reduced competitiveness of industry within economies with relatively high monetary inflation rates, due to the combination of rising material costs and distorted price signals. The distortion of price signals caused by monetary inflation is very important because these signals tell the market what/how-much to produce and what to invest in, meaning that there will be a lot of misdirected investment and inefficient use of resources if the signals are misleading.

4. Higher unemployment (an eventual knock-on effect of the misdirection of investment mentioned above).

5. A decline or stagnation in real wages over the course of the inflation-generated boom/bust cycle. I point out, for example, that real median household income in the US was about the same in 2015 as it was in 1998 and that the median weekly real earnings level in the US was about the same in Q3-2016 as it was in Q1-2002.

Real earnings decline or stagnate because during the boom phase of the cycle wages will usually be near the end of the line when it comes to responding to the additional money, whereas during the bust phase the higher unemployment rate (the excess supply of labour) will put downward pressure on wages.

Note that while a lower average real wage will partially offset the decline in industrial competitiveness resulting from distorted price signals, it won’t result in a net competitive advantage. It should be intuitively obvious — although to the Keynesians it apparently isn’t — that an economy could never achieve a net competitive advantage from what amounts to counterfeiting on a grand scale. In any case, what sort of economist would advocate a course of action that firstly made the economy less efficient and secondly tried to make up for the loss of efficiency by reducing living standards (a reduction in real wages equals a reduction in living standards).

6. More speculating and less saving. The greater the monetary inflation, the less sense it will make to save in the traditional way and the more sense it will make to speculate. This is problematic for two main reasons. First, saving is the foundation of long-term economic progress. Second, most people aren’t adept at financial speculation.

7. Weaker balance sheets, because during the initial stages of monetary inflation — the stages that occur before the cost of living and interest rates begin to surge — people will usually be rewarded for using debt-based leverage.

8. Financial crises. Rampant mal-investment, speculation and debt accumulation are the ingredients of a financial crisis such as the one that occurred during 2007-2009.

The above is a sampling of what happens when central bankers try to ‘help’ the economy by creating money out of nothing.