The absurdity known as “TARGET2″

[This blog post is an excerpt from a commentary posted at TSI about three weeks ago]

TARGET2 is the system set up in the euro-zone to clear inter-bank payments. The Bundesbank (Germany’s central bank) describes it as a payment system that enables the speedy and final settlement of national and cross-border payments. The problem is that often there is no “final settlement” under TARGET2. Instead, credits and debits can build up indefinitely.

To understand the issue it first must be understood that although the 19 countries that comprise the euro-zone use a common currency, the euro-zone isn’t really a unified monetary system. It is more like 19 separate monetary systems, each of which is overseen by a National Central Bank (NCB). These NCBs are, in turn, overseen and coordinated by the ECB. TARGET2 is the means by which money is transferred quickly and efficiently between these 19 separate monetary systems. The transfer may well be quick and efficient, but, as noted above, it often doesn’t result in final settlement.

Further explanation is provided by the Bundesbank, as follows:

“…both the Bundesbank and the Banque de France will be involved in a cross-border payment transaction made in settlement of a German export to France, for instance. That transaction begins when the French importer’s commercial bank in France debits the purchase amount from the importer’s account and submits a credit transfer in TARGET2 to the German exporter’s commercial bank in Germany. The Banque de France then debits the amount from the TARGET2 account it operates for the French commercial bank and posts a liability owed to the Bundesbank. For its part, the Bundesbank posts a claim on the Banque de France and credits the amount to the German commercial bank’s TARGET2 account. The transaction is concluded when the commercial bank credits the amount in question to the account it operates for the German exporter.

At the end of the business day, all the intraday bilateral liabilities and claims are automatically cleared as part of a multilateral netting procedure and transferred to the ECB via novation, leaving a single NCB liability to, or claim on, the ECB.

Viewed in isolation, the transaction used as an example above leaves the Banque de France with a liability to the ECB and the Bundesbank with a claim on the ECB at the end of the business day. These claims on, or liabilities to, the ECB are generally referred to as TARGET2 balances.”

The example given above by the Bundesbank refers to a German export to France, but the same process would apply when someone transfers money from a bank deposit in one EZ country to a bank deposit in another EZ country. For example, the electronic wiring of funds from a commercial bank account in Italy to a commercial bank account in Luxembourg would leave the Banca d’Italia with a liability to the ECB and the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg with a claim on the ECB.

The process described above means that there is never any net clearing of cross border payments at the NCB level. Unless the money flowing in one direction (into Country X) equals the money flowing in the opposite direction (out of Country X), credit/debit balances will build up and there is no limit to how large these balances can become.

As illustrated by the following chart from Yardeni.com, this is not just a hypothetical issue. The NCBs of some EZ countries, most notably Germany and Luxembourg, now have huge positive TARGET2 balances, and the NCBs of some other EZ countries, most notably Italy and Spain, now have huge negative TARGET2 balances.

As at October-2018, the central bank of Germany was owed 928 billion euros by the TARGET2 system, while together the central banks of Italy and Spain owed 887 billion euros to the TARGET2 system. Is this a problem?

The system is so strange that there doesn’t appear to be a clear-cut answer to the above question, at least not one that we can fathom. It could be a huge problem or it could be no problem at all.

The Bundesbank is sitting there with an asset valued at almost 1 trillion euros that will never pay any interest and cannot be collected. At first blush this appears to be a huge problem. It implies that at some point the asset will have to be written off, perhaps leading to a very expensive bailout funded by German taxpayers. But then again, due to the way the current monetary system works it may well be possible for TARGET2 balances to grow indefinitely with no adverse consequences. That’s why we haven’t devoted any commentary space to this issue in the past.

If we were forced to give an answer to the above question it would be that rising interest rates, burgeoning government debt levels and private bank failures will become system-threatening issues in the EZ long before the TARGET2 balances pose a major threat.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary published about three weeks ago and covers a few general thoughts about what will happen in the financial world this year. Specific thoughts about what I expect this year from the stock, gold, bond, currency and commodity markets have also been included in TSI commentaries over the past three weeks.]

1) Early last year we predicted that the US stock market would experience greater-than-average volatility over the year ahead. This obviously happened, as there were more 2%+ single-day moves in the SPX during 2018 than in an average year.

We expect the same for this year, that is, we expect price volatility to remain elevated. The reason is that the two most likely scenarios involve abnormally-high price volatility. One of these scenarios is that a cyclical bear market began last October, and bear markets are characterised by periods of substantial weakness followed by rapid rebounds. The other scenario is that a very long-in-the-tooth cyclical bull market is about to embark on its final fling to the upside.

2) When attempting to predict when a period of economic growth will end it is futile to look more than 6-12 months into the future, because there are no leading recession indicators that can predict that far ahead with acceptable reliability. There are, however, leading indicators that can be used to determine the probability of a recession beginning within the next few quarters.

Early last year these indicators told us that a US recession would not begin during the first half of the year. They currently tell us that the US economy stands a good chance of commencing a recession this year, most likely during the second half of the year. Note, though, that if a recession does get underway this year it won’t become official until 2020, because recessions usually aren’t confirmed by the National Bureau of Economic Research until about 12 months after they start.

3) Regarding ‘cryptoassets’, at around this time last year we wrote:

“…it’s a good bet that the Bitcoin bubble reached its maximum level of inflation late last year. Also, the broader bubble in cryptoassets is set to burst during the first quarter of this year.”

And:

“By the end of 2018 it will be apparent that the public’s enthusiasm for Bitcoin and the “alt-coins” was one of history’s great speculative manias.”

This assessment looks correct.

We don’t have a strong opinion about what will happen to ‘cryptoassets’ in 2019. This is partly because there is no reasonable way to determine the fair value of these assets. For Bitcoin, for example, a price of $3,000 is no more or less sensible than a price of $30,000 or a price of $300.

Distributed ledgers can be very useful, but there should be ways to implement them without consuming a lot of resources. If so, the price of Bitcoin eventually will drop to almost zero.

A year ago we also predicted:

“Despite spectacular collapses in the prices of the popular ‘cryptoassets’ during 2018, central banks including the Fed and the ECB will firm-up plans to introduce their own blockchain-based currencies. This will be driven by a desire to eliminate physical cash, the thinking being that if there is no physical money it will be more difficult for the average person to make/receive unreported payments and escape a negative interest rate.”

As far as we know the major central banks didn’t firm-up plans to introduce their own blockchain-based currencies last year, but we continue to expect that they will — for the reasons mentioned above.

4) Regarding the Fed’s expected actions in 2018, early last year we wrote:

“Due to rising commodity prices it’s a good bet that “price inflation” will become a higher-profile issue during the first half of 2018, prompting the Fed to move ahead with its quantitative tightening (QT) and make two more rate hikes. However, both the QT and the rate-hiking will be put on hold during the second half of the year in reaction to increasing downside volatility in the stock market.”

We got the anticipated rate hikes during the first half and the increasing downside stock-market volatility during the second half of last year, but the Fed stuck to its guns. However, over the past three weeks the Fed Chairman has made it clear that the Fed will be quick to change direction if the stock market continues to decline and/or the economic numbers point to significant weakness.

For 2019 we expect one Fed rate hike, most likely in June. Also, we expect that people ‘in the know’ will explain to senior Fed members that it’s the balance-sheet reduction program (QT) that really counts, prompting the Fed to slow the pace of QT during the first half and conclude the QT program before year-end.

5) The ECB has just ended its QE program and has a tentative plan to implement its first rate hike during the third quarter of 2019. Given that nothing has been learned from the failed monetary experiments of the past few years, it’s a good bet that evidence of declining economic activity in the future will be met by the ramping-up or reintroduction of policies that failed in the past. Therefore, we predict that the ECB will not increase its targeted interest rates this year and will restart QE during the second half of the year.

6) This is not a prediction for 2019, but rather an observation that could apply for decades to come. We suspect that the age of real estate has ended.

We don’t mean that from now on it will be impossible to achieve good returns by investing in real estate, but that gone are the days when anyone could buy a house almost anywhere and likely end up with a sizable profit as long as they held for 10 years or more. From now on only astute investors will consistently make good returns from real estate, where “astute” means able to time the cyclical swings in the broad market or able to correctly anticipate future supply-demand imbalances in specific areas.

For the average person, residential property will transition from an investment to what it was prior to the 1970s: a consumer good (something bought solely for its use value).

The reason for the change is the interest-rate trend. The 3-4 decade downward trend in interest rates resulted in a 3-4 decade upward trend in housing affordability for buyers using debt-based leverage (that is, for the vast majority of buyers). There were corrections along the way, but provided that long-term interest rates continued to make lower lows there would eventually be a pool of new debt-financed buyers able to pay a much higher price.

There’s a good chance that the secular interest-rate trend reversed from down to up during 2016-2018. If so, future house buyers that don’t have good timing and/or substantial area-specific knowledge generally won’t make long-term capital gains on their residential property purchases.

The Fed probably will implement another 0.25% rate hike this week, but at the same time it probably will signal either an indefinite pause in its rate hiking or a slowing of its rate-hiking pace. The financial markets have already factored in such an outcome, in that the prices of Fed Funds Futures contracts reflect an expectation that there will be no more than one rate hike in 2019. However, this doesn’t imply that the Fed is about to stop or reduce the pace of its monetary tightening. In fact, there’s a good chance that the Fed unwittingly will maintain its current pace of tightening for many months to come.

The reason is that the extent of the official monetary tightening is not determined by the Fed’s rate hikes; it’s determined by what the Fed is doing to its balance sheet. If the Fed continues to reduce its balance sheet at the current pace of $50B/month then the rate at which monetary conditions are being tightened by the central bank will be unchanged, regardless of what happens to the official interest rate targets.

Another way of saying this is that a slowing or stopping of the Fed’s rate-hiking program will not imply an easier monetary stance on the part of the US central bank as long as the line on the following chart maintains a downward slope.

The chart shows the quantity of reserves held at the Fed by the commercial banking industry. A decline in reserves is not, in and of itself, indicative of monetary tightening, because bank reserves are not part of the economy’s money supply. However, when the Fed reduces bank reserves by selling securities to Primary Dealers (as is presently happening at the rate of $50B/month) it also removes money from the economy*.

I use the word “unwittingly” when referring to the likelihood of the Fed maintaining its current pace of tightening because, like most commentators on the financial markets and the economy, the decision-makers at the Fed are oblivious to what really counts when it comes to monetary conditions. They are labouring under the false impression that monetary tightening is effected mainly by hiking short-term interest rates and that the current balance-sheet reduction program is a procedural matter with relatively minor real-world consequences.

Therefore, over the next several weeks there could be a collective sigh of relief in the financial world as traders act as if the Fed has taken its foot off the monetary brake, followed by a collective shout of “oops!” when it becomes apparent that monetary conditions are still tightening.

*When the Fed sells X$ of securities to a Primary Dealer (PD) the effect is that X$ is removed from the PD’s account at a commercial bank and X$ is also removed from the reserves held at the Fed by the PD’s bank.

[This is an excerpt from a commentary posted at TSI about three weeks ago]

In an article titled “China’s monetary policy must change” Alasdair Macleod discusses a path that China’s government could take to make the Yuan gold-backed and thus bring about greater economic stability in China. Keith Weiner pointed out some flaws in the Macleod article, including the fact that the sort of Gold Standard that involves pegging a national currency to gold is just another government price-fixing scheme and therefore doomed to fail. We will single out an error in the article that Keith didn’t address and then briefly explain why a gold-backed Yuan is a pipe dream.

This excerpt from the article contains the error we want to focus on:

“China’s manufacturing economy will be particularly hard hit by the rise in interest rates that normally triggers a credit crisis. Higher interest rates turn previous capital investments in the production of goods into malinvestments, because the profit calculations based on lower interest rates and lower input prices become invalid.”

No, higher interest rates do not turn previous capital investments in the production of goods into malinvestments. A rise in interest rates can help reveal malinvestments for what they are, but it doesn’t create them.

Malinvestment occurs on a grand scale when the banking system creates a large amount of money out of nothing, generating false interest-rate signals and making it seem as if the amount of real savings in the economy is much greater than is actually the case. In response to the misleading (artificially low) interest rates and the increased future demand that these interest rates imply (more saving in the present implies more consumption in the future), investments are made in productive capacity. Many of these investments will prove to be ill-conceived, because future demand will turn out to be lower than expected. The investments only appeared to make sense due to the false impressions created by banks loaning copious quantities of new money into existence.

Another way to look at the situation is that a build-up of real savings requires a temporary reduction in consumption. Think of it as a savings-consumption trade-off. People abstain from consumption in the short term so that they will be able to consume more in the long term. When that happens on an economy-wide basis, interest rates move lower.

The falling interest rate indicates that savings are being increased and, by extension, that consumption will be higher in the future. In other words, the falling interest rate is a message that long-term investments in productive capacity are likely to pay off. The problem is that when money is created in large amounts out of nothing, interest rates tend to fall at the same time as consumption is increasing. So, entrepreneurs are being told (by the falling interest rate) that consumption will be greater in the future and to invest accordingly, but at the same time consumers are spending aggressively and ‘tapping themselves out’. Naturally, this doesn’t end well.

The crux of the matter is that malinvestment stems from artificially low interest rates. Also, once it has happened, it has happened. Rising interest rates can be part of the process via which the mistakes are revealed, but the mistakes won’t disappear if interest rates are prevented from rising. Putting it another way, it is not possible to avoid the painful consequences (economic recession or depression) that follow a period during which malinvestment was rife. This is relevant, because the Macleod article argues that interest rates could be kept low in China by linking the Yuan to gold and that by doing this the amount of existing investment that falls into the ‘mal’ category could be greatly reduced.

The reality is that regardless of what happens to interest rates in the future, the extent of the previous malinvestment is such that China’s economy will experience either a collapse or a very long period (probably at least a decade) of virtual stagnation. Given the control that the government has over the banking industry, we guess the latter.

The point is that linking the Yuan to gold wouldn’t be a way around the massive problems that are already baked into the cake. In any case this is a side issue, because there are two simpler reasons that the idea of a gold-backed Yuan is a non-starter.

The first reason is that in a world in which most international trades are US$-denominated, tying any currency apart from the US$ to gold would result in that currency’s exchange rate becoming as volatile as the US$ gold price. In fact, the exchange rate of the gold-backed currency would be totally determined by the performance of the US$ gold price. For example, if the US$ gold price were to rise by 20% in quick time then so would the exchange rate (against the US$) of the gold-backed currency.

The second and more important reason is that any government that implemented a Gold Standard would be relinquishing control of its currency. There would be no further scope for the manipulation of interest rates and currency exchange rates. Also, there no longer would be any scope for debt monetisation in particular and monetary stimulus in general. If we were to make an ordered list of the governments that are LEAST likely to give up these powers, China’s government would be at the top.

Summing up, linking the Yuan to gold would not prevent China’s economy from suffering the consequences of the widespread malinvestment of the past decade and probably would lead to much greater volatility in the prices of imports and exports. Most importantly, there is no way that the control freaks who lead the Communist Party of China are going to implement a monetary system that severely restricts their ability to intervene.

Most warnings about large increases in government indebtedness revolve around future repayment obligations. For example, there is the concern that greatly increasing the government debt in the present will necessitate much higher taxes in the future. For another example, there is the concern that if the debt load is cumbersome at a time of very low interest rates, then as interest rates rise the interest expense will come to dominate the budget and lead to an upward debt spiral as more money is borrowed to pay the interest on earlier debt. Although these concerns are valid they miss two critical points, including the main problem with government borrowing.

The first of the missed points is that there is no intention to repay the debt or even to reduce the total amount of debt. This is one way that government debt is very different to private debt. Nobody would ever lend money to a private organisation unless there was a good reason to believe that the debt eventually would be repaid, but when it comes to the government the plan is for the total debt to grow indefinitely. It will grow faster during some periods than other periods, but it will always grow. Therefore, it makes no sense to agonise over how the debt will be repaid. It simply won’t be repaid or even reduced.

The current debt-based monetary system has been designed to expand…and expand…until it collapses and is replaced by something else.

Of course, the idea of debt repayment gets plenty of lip service. It has to be that way to avoid a premature collapse. The old Russian joke “we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us” springs to mind, but in this case it’s “the government pretends to care about debt repayment and bond investors pretend to believe them”. It’s a game, and for bond investors one of the guidelines of the game is “you’ll be fine as long as there are still plenty of people pretending to believe the government’s promise to pay”.

A consequence is that the rate of increase in government debt only matters to the extent that it affects the timing of the monetary system’s collapse.

The second of the missed points, and the main problem with government borrowing, is that the costs of the borrowing are immediate as well as long-term. The reason is that with one exception, every dollar added to the government’s debt pile results in a dollar less invested in the private sector. In effect, government debt accumulation adds to government spending at the expense of private-sector investment. This is a negative for economic progress, although it can give a short-term boost to economic activity in the same way that activity gets boosted by hurricane damage.

The one exception mentioned above is when the government debt is monetised by the banking industry (the central bank or the commercial banks). In this case it appears that new savings are magically created to finance the government’s deficit spending, but what actually happens is that misleading price signals are generated. In particular, interest rates are artificially lowered. The ramifications are less negative in the short-term and more negative in the long-term.

Summing up, when the government goes further into debt the biggest problem isn’t that it places a burden on future generations, since the debt will never be repaid anyway. The biggest problem is the immediate dampening effect it has on economic progress.

It’s normal for the stock market to ignore a rising interest-rate trend for a long time. The reason is that while the interest rate is a major determinant of the value of most corporations, the interest rate that matters for equity valuation isn’t the current one. What matters is the level of interest rates for a great many years to come. Therefore, a rise in interest rates only affects the stock market to the extent that it affects the general perception of where interest rates will be over the next decade or longer.

To further explain, the value of a company is the sum of the present values of all its future cash flows, with the present value of each future cash flow determined via the application of a discount rate (interest rate). Nobody knows what these cash flows will be or what the appropriate discount rate should be, but guesses, also known as forecasts, are made. Clearly, when discounting a set of cash flows spanning, say, the next 30 years, it won’t make sense to simply use the current interest rate. Instead, the analyst doing the calculation will have to make a stab at what will happen to interest rates in the future.

The analyst’s ‘stab’ naturally will be influenced by what is happening in the present, but the future interest rate levels that are plugged into valuation models won’t be adjusted in response to what are considered to be normal fluctuations in the current interest rate. It’s only when the current interest rate breaks out of an established range that it affects expectations in a big way.

That, in a nutshell, is why it isn’t a fluke that the 3rd October downside breakout in the bond market (represented by TLT in the following chart) coincided with the start of a rapid downward re-pricing in the stock market.

In addition to stocks being influenced by big moves (breakouts from ranges) in bonds, bonds are influenced by big moves in stocks. That’s especially so when important stock-market support levels are breached with little warning. For example, within a few days of the 3rd October downside breakout in the bond market setting in motion a sharp decline in the stock market, the stock market’s weakness was helping to prop-up the bond market. Interestingly, though, the quick 10% decline in the S&P500 Index from its peak led to only a minor rebound in the bond market, despite there being a record-high speculative net-short position in bond futures. As illustrated above, TLT didn’t even manage to rebound by enough to test its 3rd October downside breakout and has dropped back to near its early-October low in response to this week’s recovery in the stock market.

The bond market’s lacklustre response to the recent equity weakness suggests that equities will have to weaken further before the interest-rate trend transforms from a stock-market head-wind to a stock-market tail-wind. Also, the fact that the bond market has already dropped back to near its October low suggests that the stock market will be unable to make significant additional gains without pushing interest rates to new multi-year highs. This, in turn, suggests that there is minimal scope for additional short-term strength in the stock market.

[This blog post is a slightly-modified excerpt from a TSI commentary published about three weeks ago. Not much has changed in the meantime.]

If you rely on the mainstream financial press for your information then you could be forgiven for believing that financial crises happen with no warning. However, there are always warnings if you know where to look.

Here are four leading indicators of financial stress and/or economic confidence that are both easy to monitor and worth monitoring. It’s likely that all four of these indicators will issue timely warnings prior to the next financial crisis and a virtual certainty that at least two of them will.

1) The yield curve, as depicted on the following chart by the 10yr-2yr yield spread.

As explained in many previous commentaries, the yield curve ‘flattening’ to an extreme and then beginning to steepen warns that an inflation-fueled boom has begun to unravel. For example, the yield curve reached its maximum ‘flatness’ in November-2006 and provided clear evidence of a reversal in June-2007. That was the financial crisis warning. By August of 2007 the ‘steepening’ trend was accelerating.

The yield curve’s current situation looks more like Q4-2006 than Q3-2007. It is nothing like 2008.

2) Credit spreads, as depicted on the following chart by the difference between the Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II Effective Yield and the yield on the 10-Year T-Note.

Credit spreads start to widen, indicating a decline in economic confidence and/or a rise in the perceived risk of default at the junk end of the debt market, well before a recession or crisis. For example, evidence of a new widening trend in credit spreads emerged in July-2007 and by November-2007 it was very obvious that trouble was brewing.

Note that when it comes to warning of a coming crisis, credit spreads are far more likely to generate a false positive signal than a false negative signal, that is, they are far more likely to cry wolf when there’s no wolf than to remain silent when there is a wolf.

Right now they are silent.

3) The short-term interest rate at which banks lend to other banks versus the equivalent interest rate at which the US federal government borrows money, as depicted on the following chart by the LIBOR-UST3M spread.

When trouble begins to brew in parts of the banking system it gets reflected by higher interest rates being charged for short-term inter-bank loans well before it becomes common knowledge. This causes the spread between 3-month LIBOR (the average 3-month interbank lending rate) and the 3-month T-Bill yield to increase. For example, the LIBOR-UST3M spread was languishing at around 0.20% in early-2007, indicating minimal fear within the banking system, but then began to rise steadily and reached 0.75% in June-2007. This was an early warning sign of trouble. The spread then pulled back into July-2007 before rocketing up to 2.25% in August-2007. This constituted a very loud warning. After that the spread became very volatile and moved as high as 4.5% at the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in October-2008.

At the moment the LIBOR-UST3M spread is languishing at around 0.20%.

4) The gold price relative to industrial metals prices, as depicted on the following chart by the gold/GYX ratio (the US$ gold price divided by the Industrial Metals Index).

The gold/GYX ratio acts like a credit spread. This is because gold’s performance relative to the industrial metals sector tends to go in the same direction as economic confidence. In particular, when confidence begins to decline in the late stage of a boom or the early stage of a bust, the gold/GYX ratio begins to trend upward.

The following chart illustrates the long-term positive correlation between gold/GYX and a credit spread indicator in the form of the IEF/HYG ratio.

The gold/GYX ratio recently bounced from the bottom of its 7-year range. If the bounce continues and gold/GYX exceeds its early-2018 high it would be the first sign of a declining trend in economic confidence.

Currently, none of the above indicators is warning that a financial crisis is imminent or even that a financial crisis is starting to develop. The probability could change as new information becomes available, but based on the present values of the best leading indicators there is almost no chance that a financial crisis will erupt within the next three months.

A stock market crash is a different ‘kettle of fish’, because while a financial crisis always will be accompanied by a large decline in the stock market it is possible for a large decline in the stock market to occur in the absence of a financial crisis. The 1987 stock market crash is an excellent example.

While the four indicators mentioned above should issue timely warnings prior to a financial crisis, they may not warn of a stock market crash that isn’t part of a broader crisis. As is the case with a financial crisis, though, a stock market crash won’t happen ‘out of the blue’. In particular, the stock market won’t make a new all-time high one day and crash the next. This is because it takes time (generally at least two months) from the ultimate price high to create the sentiment backdrop that makes a crash possible.

In summary, short-term stock market risk is high, but there are no warning signs that a financial crisis is brewing or that a stock market crash (as opposed to, say, a 10% correction) is a realistic short-term possibility.

[This post is a brief excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

During the first three quarters of 2016 we were open to the possibility that a new cyclical gold bull market got underway in December of 2015, but over the past 18 months we have been consistent in our opinion that the December-2015 upward reversal in the US$ gold price did NOT mark the start of a bull market. Since late-2016 there have been some interesting rallies in the gold price, but at no time has there been a good reason to believe that we were dealing with a bull market. That’s still the case. The question is: what will it take to set a new cyclical gold bull market in motion?

The simple answer is that it will take a US equity bear market. However, this is not a practical answer because in real time there often will be no way of differentiating the first 6-9 months of an equity bear market from an intermediate-term bull-market correction. The most practical answer we can come up with is that it will take an upward reversal in the yield curve.

It has become popular to argue that due to extraordinary monetary policy the yield curve is not as important as it was in the past, but we strongly disagree. In our opinion the yield curve is, if anything, more important now — in the face of extraordinary monetary policy — than it has ever been.

The potential for the US yield curve to invert in the not-too-distant future is a red herring. Except to the extent that it influences the psychology of senior Fed officials, whether or not the curve inverts is neither here nor there. It’s the reversal from ‘flattening’ to ‘steepening’ that matters, regardless of whether the reversal happens before or after the curve inverts.

If the next major reversal of the yield curve is driven primarily by falling short-term interest rates then it will signal the onset of an economic bust. An economic bust would naturally coincide with an equity bear market and the start of a gold bull market. On the other hand, if the next major reversal of the yield curve is driven primarily by rising long-term interest rates then it will signal the onset of an inflationary blow-off that likely would go hand-in-hand with a powerful 1-2 year rally in the gold price and the prices of most other commodities.

Last week the 10yr-2yr yield spread, a proxy for the US yield curve, fell to within 2 basis points of the 10-year low reached in mid-July. Therefore, at this time there is no sign of an upward reversal.

The US yield curve, as indicated by the spread between the 10-year and 2-year T-Note yields, made a new 10-year extreme over the past fortnight, meaning that it recently became the ‘flattest’ it has been in more than 10 years. While this may indicate that the boom is nearing its end, it definitely indicates that the transition from boom to bust has not yet begun.

As explained numerous times in the past, the ‘flattening’ of the yield curve (short-term interest rates rising relative to long-term interest rates) is a characteristic of a monetary-inflation-fueled economic boom. It doesn’t matter how flat the yield curve becomes or even if it becomes inverted, the signal that the boom has ended and that a bust encompassing a recession is about to begin is the reversal of the curve’s major trend from flattening to steepening. To put it another way, the signal that the proverbial chickens are coming home to roost is short-term interest rates peaking RELATIVE TO long-term interest rates and then beginning to decline relative to long-term interest rates. This generally will happen well before the Fed sees a problem and begins to cut its targeted short-term interest rate.

The following chart highlights the last two major reversals of the US yield curve from flattening to steepening. These reversals were confirmed about 6 months prior to the recessions that began in March-2001 and December-2007.

The fact that the yield curve is still hitting new extremes in terms of ‘flatness’ suggests that the next US recession will not begin before 2019.

The above is essentially a repeat of what I’ve written in the past, but an additional point warrants a mention. The additional point is that while it would be almost impossible for the US economy to transition from boom to bust without a timely reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening, there is a realistic chance that the next yield-curve trend reversal from flattening to steepening will NOT signal the onset of an economic bust/recession. That’s why I do not depend solely on the yield curve when determining recession probabilities.

The reason that the next yield-curve trend reversal from flattening to steepening will not necessarily signal the onset of an economic bust/recession is that there are two potential drivers of such a reversal. The reversal could be driven by falling short-term interest rates or rising long-term interest rates. If it’s the former it signals a boom-bust transition, but if it’s the latter it signals rising inflation expectations.

As an aside, regardless of whether a major yield-curve reversal from flattening to steepening is driven by the unravelling of an artificial boom or rising inflation expectations, it is bullish for gold. By the same token, a major reversal in the yield curve from steepening to flattening is always bearish for gold.

With the T-Bond likely to strengthen for at least the next two months there is little chance that rising long-term interest rates will drive a yield curve reversal during the third quarter of this year, but it’s something that could happen late this year or during the first half of next year.

[This post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary]

Conventional wisdom is that an inversion of the yield curve (short-term interest rates moving above long-term interest rates) signals that a recession is coming, but this is only true to the extent that a recession is always coming. A reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening is a far more useful signal.

What a yield curve inversion actually means is that the interest-rate situation has become extreme, but there is no telling how extreme it will become before the eventual breaking point is reached. Furthermore, although there was a yield-curve inversion prior to at least the past seven US recessions, Japan’s most recent recessions were not preceded by inverted yield curves and there is no guarantee that short-term interest rates will rise by enough relative to long-term interest rates to cause the yield curve to become inverted prior to the next US recession. In fact, a good argument can be made that due to the extraordinary monetary policy of the past several years the start of the next US recession will NOT be preceded by a yield curve inversion.

Previous US yield curve inversions have happened up to 18 months prior to the start of a recession, and as mentioned above it’s possible that there will be no yield curve inversion before the next recession. Therefore, we wouldn’t want to be depending on a yield curve inversion for a timely warning about the next recession or financial crisis. However, the yield curve can provide us with a much better, albeit still imperfect, recession/crisis warning in the form of a confirmed trend reversal from flattening to steepening. This was discussed in numerous TSI commentaries over the years and was also covered in a blog post last December.

There are two reasons that a reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening is a more useful recession/crisis warning signal. First, it is timelier. Second, it should work regardless of whether or not the yield curve becomes inverted.

Now, from a practical speculation standpoint it is not essential to understand WHY the yield curve reverses from flattening to steepening ahead of major economic problems bubbling to the surface. It is enough to know that it does. However, if you understand why the curve has reversed direction ahead of previous recessions you will understand why it either should or might not reverse direction in a timely manner in the future. After all, if extraordinary monetary policy could prevent the yield curve from becoming inverted ahead of the next recession then perhaps it also could prevent the yield curve from reversing course the way it has in the past.

With regard to understanding the why, the first point to grasp is that the boom phase of the cycle is characterised by borrowing short-term to lend/invest long-term. This puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates, meaning that it causes the yield curve to flatten. Also, when the boom is mature and is approaching its end there will be a scramble for additional short-term financing to a) complete projects that were started when monetary conditions were easier and b) address cash shortages that have arisen due to completed projects not delivering the predicted cash flows. This puts further upward pressure on short-term rates relative to long-term rates, and could, although won’t necessarily, cause the yield curve to become inverted.

Next, as the boom nears its end the quantity of loan defaults will begin to rise and the opportunities to profit from short-term leverage will become scarcer. Everything will still seem fine to casual observers, central bankers, the average economist and the vast majority of commentators on the financial markets, but it will now be apparent to a critical mass of astute operators (investors, speculators and financiers) that many of the investments that were incentivised by years of easy money were ill-conceived. These operators will begin shifting towards ‘liquidity’ and away from risk.

The aforementioned increasing desire for the combination of safety and liquidity leads to greater demand for cash and gold. But more importantly as far as this discussion is concerned, it boosts the demand for short-term Treasury debt relative to long-term Treasury debt (thus putting downward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates). The reason is that the shorter the term of the Treasury debt, the lower the risk of an adverse price movement. For example, if you lend $10B to the US government via the purchase of 3-month T-Bills then in three months’ time you will have something worth $10B, but if you lend $10B to the US government via the purchase of 10-year T-Notes then in three months’ time you could have something that is worth significantly more or less than $10B.

As an aside, what an investor focused on boosting liquidity really wants is cash, but if he has billions of dollars then cash is not a viable option. This is because the cash would have to be deposited in a bank, which means that the investor would be lending the money to a bank and taking the risk of a massive loss due to bank failure. Lending to the US government is a much safer choice.

In summary, it’s mainly the desire for greater liquidity and safety that begins to emerge at the tail-end of a boom that causes the yield curve to stop flattening and start steepening. As demonstrated by the events of the past few years the central bank has substantial power to postpone the end of a boom, but eventually a breaking point will be reached and when it is the yield curve’s trend will change from flattening to steepening.

[The following is an excerpt from a commentary posted at TSI last week.]

One of the financial world’s most dangerous expressions is “this time is different”, because the expression is often used during investment bubbles as part of a rationalisation for extremely high market valuations. Such rationalisations involve citing a special set of present-day conditions that supposedly transforms a very high valuation by historical standards into a reasonable one. However, sometimes it actually is different in the sense that all long-term trends eventually end. Sometimes, what initially looks like another in a long line of price moves that run counter to an old secular trend turns out to be the start of a new secular trend in the opposite direction. We continue to believe that the current upward move in interest rates is different, in that it is part of a new secular advance as opposed to a reaction within an on-going secular decline. Here are two of the reasons:

The first and lesser important of the reasons is the price action, one aspect of which is the performance of the US 10-year T-Note yield. With reference to the following chart, note that:

a) The 2016 low for the 10-year yield was almost the same as the 2012 low, creating what appears to be a long-term double bottom or base.

b) The 10-year yield has broken above the top of a well-defined 30-year channel.

c) By moving decisively above 3.0% last week the 10-year yield did something it had not done since the start of its secular decline in the early-1980s: make a higher-high on a long-term basis.

The more important of the reasons to think that the secular interest-rate trend has changed is the evidence that the bond market’s performance from early-2014 to mid-2016 constituted a major blow-off. The blow-off and the resulting valuation extreme are not apparent in the US bond market, but they are very obvious in the euro-zone bond market.

In the euro-zone, most government debt securities with durations of 2 years or less rose in price to the point where they had negative yields to maturity, and some long-term bonds also ended up with negative yields. For example, the following chart shows that the yield on Germany’s 10-year government bond fell from around 2% in early-2014 to negative 0.25% in mid-2016.

Although yields have trended upward in the euro-zone since Q3-2016, German government debt securities with durations of 5 years or less still trade with negative yields to maturity. Even more remarkable considering that Italy’s new government is contemplating a partial debt default and a large increase in the budget deficit, Italy’s 2-year government bond yield moved out of negative territory only two weeks ago and is about 220 basis points below the equivalent US yield. To be more specific, you can buy a US 2-year Treasury note today and get paid about 2.5% per year or you can buy an Italian government 2-year note today and get paid about 0.3% per year.

Why would anyone lend money to the Italian government for 2 years at close to 0% today when there is a non-trivial chance of default during this period? Why would anyone have lent money to the Italian government or even to the more financially-sound European governments over the past three years at rates that guaranteed a nominal loss if the debt was held to maturity?

There are two reasons, the first being the weakness of the euro-zone banking system. The thinking is that you lock in a small loss by purchasing government bonds with negative yields to maturity, but in doing so you avoid the risk of a large or even total loss due to bank failure (assuming the alternative is to lend the money to a private bank). The main reason, however, is the ECB’s massive bond-buying program. This program was widely anticipated during 2014 and came into effect in early-2015.

With the ECB regularly hoovering-up large quantities of bonds almost regardless of price, speculators could pay ridiculously-high prices for bonds and be safe in the knowledge that they could offload their inventory to the ECB at an even higher price.

Negative interest rates and negative yields-to-maturity could not occur in a free market. It took the most aggressive central-bank interest-rate manipulation in history to bring about the situation that occurred in Europe over the past few years.

We don’t think it’s possible for the ECB to go further without completely destroying the euro-zone’s financial markets. Also, if it isn’t obvious already it should become obvious within the next couple of years that the aggressive bond-buying programs conducted by the ECB, the Fed and other central banks did not work the way they were advertised. Therefore, even if it were technically possible for the major central banks to go further down the interest-rate suppression path, they won’t be permitted to do so.

That’s why it’s a very good bet that the secular downward trend in interest rates is over.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

The year-over-year rate of growth in the US True Money Supply (TMS) was around 11.5% in October of 2016 (the month before the US Presidential election) and is now only 2.4%, which is near a 20-year low. Refer to the following monthly chart for details. In terms of effects on the financial markets and the economy, up until recently the US monetary inflation slowdown was largely offset by continuing rapid monetary inflation elsewhere, most notably in Europe. However, the tightening of US monetary conditions has started to have noticeable effects and these effects should become more pronounced as the year progresses.

The tightening of monetary conditions eventually will expose the mal-investments of the last several years, which, in turn, will result in a severe recession, but the most obvious effect to date is the increase in interest rates across the entire curve. The upward acceleration in interest rates over the past six months has more than one driver, but it probably wouldn’t have happened if money had remained as plentiful as it was two years ago.

It would be a mistake to think that the tightening has been engineered by the Fed. The reality is that the Fed has done very little to date.

The Fed has made several 0.25% increases in its targeted interest rates, but the main effect of these rate hikes is to increase the amount of money the Fed pays to the commercial banks in the form of interest on reserves (IOR). It doesn’t matter how you spin it, injecting more money into banks ain’t monetary tightening!

The Fed’s actual efforts on the monetary loosening/tightening front over the past 5 years are encapsulated by the following weekly chart of Reserve Bank Credit (RBC). This chart shows that there was a rapid rise in RBC during 2013-2014 that ended with the completion of QE in October-2014. For the next three years RBC essentially flat-lined, which is what should be expected given that the Fed was neither quantitatively easing nor quantitatively tightening during this period. In October-2017 the Fed introduced its Quantitative Tightening (QT) program. To date, this program has resulted in only a small reduction in RBC, but the plan is for the pace of the QT to ramp up.

Strangely, the most senior members of the Fed appear to believe that their baby-step rate hikes constitute genuine tightening and that the contraction of the central bank’s balance sheet is neither here nor there. The reality is the opposite.

So, the Fed is not responsible for the large decline in the US monetary inflation rate and the resultant tightening of monetary conditions that has occurred to date.

The responsibility for the tightening actually lies with the commercial banks. As illustrated by the next chart, the year-over-year rate of growth in commercial bank credit was slightly above 8% at around the time of the Presidential election in late-2016 and is now about 3%.

We won’t be surprised if a steepening yield curve prompts commercial banks to collectively increase their pace of credit creation over the next two quarters, but with the Fed set to quicken the pace of its QT the US monetary inflation rate probably will remain low by the standards of the past two decades. At the same time, the ECB will be taking actions that reduce the monetary inflation rate in the euro-zone. This could lead to stock and bond market volatility during the second half of this year that dwarfs what we’ve witnessed over the past two months.

In a recent newsletter John Mauldin wrote: “It is monetary policy madness to raise rates and undertake quantitative tightening at the same time.” However, this is exactly what the Fed plans to do in 2018. Has the Fed gone mad?

If mad is defined as diverging in an irrational way from normal practice then the answer to the above question is no. The Fed is following the same rule book it has always followed.

It should first be understood that earlier rate-hiking campaigns were always accompanied by quantitative tightening (QT). Otherwise, how could the Fed have caused its targeted interest rate (the Fed Funds rate) to rise? The Fed is powerful, but not powerful enough to command the interest rate to perform in a certain way. Instead, it has always manipulated the rate upward by reducing the supply of reserves to the banking system via a process that also reduces the money supply within the economy; that is, via QT. In other words, far from there being something unusual about the Fed simultaneously raising rates and undertaking QT, it is standard procedure.

What’s unusual about the current cycle is the scale. Having created orders of magnitude more money and bank reserves than normal during the easing part of the cycle the Fed must now implement QT on a much larger scale than ever before. At least, that’s what the Fed must do if it follows its rule book.

A plausible argument can be made that the Fed should now deviate from its rule book, but the argument isn’t that the economy is too weak to cope with tighter monetary policy. The correct argument is that the damage in the form of misdirected investment and resource wastage was done by the earlier quantitative easing (QE) programs and this damage cannot be undone or even mitigated by deflating the money supply. In effect, the incredibly loose monetary policy of 2008-2014 has made a painful economic denouement inevitable. At this point, reducing the money supply — as opposed to stopping the inflation of the money supply, which would be beneficial as it would prevent new mal-investment from being added to the pile — would exacerbate the pain for no good reason.

In other words, the damage done by monetary inflation cannot be subsequently undone by monetary deflation.

A plausible argument can also be made that for the first time ever the Fed now has the option of hiking interest rates without doing any QT. This is due to its ability to pay interest on bank reserves. This ability was acquired about 9 years ago solely for the purpose of enabling the Fed to hike its targeted interest rate while leaving the banking system inundated with “excess reserves” (refer to my March-2015 blog post for more detail). That is, this ability was acquired so that the Fed would not be forced to undertake QT at the same time as it was hiking rates.

However, the Fed is not going to deviate from its rule book. This is mainly because the Fed’s leadership believes that a new QE program will be required in the future.

To explain, a Fed decision not to implement QT would create an expectations-management problem in the future. Specifically, an announcement by the Fed that it was going to maintain its balance sheet at the current bloated level would be a tacit admission that QE involved a permanent addition to the money supply rather than a temporary exchange of money for securities. If the Fed were to admit this then the next time a QE program was announced there would be a surge in inflation expectations.

There has been monetary policy madness in spades over the past two decades, but within this context there is nothing especially mad about the Fed’s plan to raise rates and undertake quantitative tightening at the same time.

[This post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary published on 6th December]

The central bank is not the root cause of the boom-bust cycle. The root cause is fractional reserve banking (the ability of banks to create money and credit out of nothing). The central bank’s effect on the cycle is to extend the booms, make the busts more severe and prevent the investment errors of the boom from being fully corrected prior to the start of the next cycle. Consequently, there are some important relationships between interest rates and the performance of the economy that would hold with or without a central bank, provided that the practice of fractional reserve banking was widespread. One of these relationships is the link between a reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening and the start of an economic recession/depression.

Unfortunately, the data we have at our disposal doesn’t go back anywhere near as far as we’d like, where “as far as we’d like” in this case means 150 years or more. For example, the data we have for the 10year-2year spread, which is our favourite indicator of the US yield curve, only goes back to the mid-1970s.

For a longer-term look at the performance of the US yield curve the best we can do on short notice is use the Fed’s data for the 10year-3month spread, which goes back to the early-1960s. However, going back to the early-1960s is good enough for government work and is still satisfactory for the private sector.

As explained in many previous commentaries, the boom phase of the cycle is characterised by borrowing short-term to lend/invest long-term in order to take advantage of the artificial abundance of cheap financing enabled by the creation of money and credit out of nothing. This puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates, meaning that it causes the yield curve to flatten.

At some point, usually after the boom has been in progress for several years, it becomes apparent that some of the investments that were incentivised by the money/credit inflation were ill-conceived. Losses start being realised, the quantity of loan defaults begins to rise, and the opportunities to profit from short-term leverage become scarcer. At this point everything still seems fine to casual observers, central bankers, the average economist and the vast majority of commentators on the financial markets, but the telltale sign that the cycle has begun the transition from boom to bust is a trend reversal in the yield curve. Short-term interest rates begin to fall relative to long-term interest rates, that is, the yield curve begins to steepen.

The following monthly chart of the 10year-3month spread illustrates the process described above. On this chart, the boom periods roughly coincide with the major downward trends (the yield-curve ‘flattenings’) and the bust periods roughly coincide with the major upward trends (the yield-curve ‘steepenings’). The shaded areas are the periods when the US economy was officially in recession.

The black arrows on the chart mark the major trend reversals from flattening to steepening. With two exceptions, such a reversal occurred shortly before the start of every recession.

The first exception occurred in the mid-1960s, when a reversal in the yield spread from a depressed level was not followed by a recession. It seems that something happened at that time to suddenly and temporarily elevate the 10year yield relative to the 3month yield.

The second exception was associated with the first part of the famous double-dip recession of 1980-1982. Thanks to the extreme interest-rate volatility of the period, the yield spread reversed from down to up shortly before the start of the recession in 1980, which is typical, but during the first month of the recession it plunged to a new low before making a sustained reversal.

Due to the downward pressure being maintained on short-term interest rates by the Fed, the yield curve reversal from flattening to steepening that signals an imminent end to the current boom probably will happen with the above-charted yield spread at an unusually high level. We can’t know at what level or exactly when it will happen, but it hasn’t happened yet.

In a blog post earlier this week I briefly argued that “government-controlled cryptocurrency” was a contradiction in terms. It depends on what is meant by “cryptocurrency”, but now that I’ve done some more research on the subject I understand how a central bank could make use of blockchain technology and why the government would want to implement a type of cryptocurrency.

My understanding of the subject was improved by reading the white paper on the “Fedcoin” published a few months ago by Yale University. I also read about the difference between “permissioned” and “permissionless” blockchains. As a result, I now understand that a blockchain is a data structure that can be either distributed, as is the case with Bitcoin, or centrally controlled, as would be the case with a “cryptocurrency” issued by a central bank.

I also understand how the commercial banks could profit from the advent of a centrally-controlled cryptocurrency. This is an important consideration because the way the world currently works it is unrealistic to expect the introduction of a new form of official money that would result in substantially-reduced profits for the major banks.

The Fedcoin paper linked above lays out how a state-sponsored cryptocurrency could work. Here are some of the salient aspects:

1. The system comprises a central ledger of all transactions (the blockchain) maintained by the Fed, nodes (commercial banks) and users (anyone who wants to spend or receive a Fedcoin).

2. A user of Fedcoins must have an account at the Fed. Opening an account would involve providing the KYC (Know Your Customer) identity information that anyone who has dealt with a financial institution over the past few years would be familiar with.

3. Users would have digital wallets that held encrypted funds and all transactions would have to be digitally signed, so in this respect the term “cryptocurrency” would apply. However, the Fed and the government would be able to determine the identity of the users involved in any/every transaction (due to item 2 above), so the encryption would not result in genuine privacy. Moreover, the government would have the power to “blacklist” a Fedcoin account, effectively freezing the account.

4. Commercial banks (the “nodes” of the system) would maintain copies of the central ledger and would verify transactions to ensure no double spending. Also, all Fedcoin transactions would be announced to the network of nodes.

5. The Fed would audit and allocate fees to the nodes, with bonuses going to the fastest nodes. I suspect that the payments would be high enough to make this a lucrative business for the nodes (the banks).

6. Nodes would send sealed low-level blocks to the Fed for incorporation into high-level blocks that get added to the blockchain.

7. The Fed would guarantee that one Fedcoin could be converted into one dollar. This would ensure that the Fedcoin had the same stability as the dollar.

8. From an accounting perspective, a Fedcoin would be equivalent to a dollar note. In particular, like physical notes and coins, Fedcoins would be liabilities on the Fed’s balance sheet.

9. The Fed would have total control over the supply of Fedcoins, so the advent of this cryptocurrency would not reduce the central bank’s ability to manipulate the money supply and interest rates. On the contrary, the central bank’s ability to manipulate would be enhanced, because it’s likely that the Fedcoin would replace physical cash. Among other things, this would simplify the imposition of negative interest rates should such a policy be deemed necessary by central planners.

What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a government-controlled cryptocurrency such as Fedcoin?

According to the Bank of England (BOE), digital currency could permanently raise GDP by up to 3% due to reductions in real interest rates and monetary transaction costs. Also, the central bank would be more able to stabilise the business cycle.

The BOE’s arguments amount to unadulterated hogwash, for reasons that many of my readers already know and that I won’t rehash at this time.

Clearly, the driving force behind a centrally-controlled cryptocurrency would be the maximisation of tax revenue, in that the replacement of physical cash with a digital system that enabled every transaction to be monitored would eliminate a popular means of doing business below the government radar. Fighting crime and promoting economic growth would be nothing more than pretexts.

That being said, a currency such as Fedcoin would offer one significant advantage to the average person, which is that people could do on-line transfers and payments without having an account with a commercial bank. This is because currency transfers could be done directly between digital wallets.

Also, an official cryptocurrency such as Fedcoin would offer some advantages over Bitcoin, the most popular unofficial cryptocurrency. First, Fedcoin would not have the Bitcoin volatility problem. Second, Fedcoin would be vastly more efficient.

With regard to the efficiency issue, the Proof of Work (POW) aspect of Bitcoin is a massive waste of resources (electricity, mainly). Furthermore, Bitcoin’s inefficiency is deliberately built into the system to limit the rate of supply increase. To explain using an analogy, the high and steadily-increasing costs deliberately imposed on Bitcoin transaction verification and the resultant creation of new coins would be akin to forcing all gold mining to be done by hand, and then, after a certain amount of gold was extracted, making a new rule that required all gold mining to be manually done by crippled miners.

In a way, Bitcoin and the “altcoins” constitute a large and rapidly-expanding Keynesian make-work project. Too bad that such projects result in long-term wealth destruction.

Given the benefits that the government, the central bank and the most influential economists (all of whom are Keynesian) would perceive, it’s a good bet that state-sponsored cryptocurrencies are on the way. For the private sector the introduction of such currencies would lead to cost savings in the money-transfer area, but enhancing the ability of the government to divert resources to itself and enabling even greater central bank control of money definitely would be a barrier to economic progress.

The theme of a recent report from Casey Research was that the Russian government is planning to issue its own cryptocurrency (the “CryptoRuble”) that would be created, tracked and held on a state-controlled digital ledger. This was portrayed as being a huge plus for the Russian economy. I don’t see how giving the government greater ability to monitor financial transactions and thus divert more money into its own coffers could be anything other than a negative for any economy, but the Casey report got me thinking about whether a state-sponsored cryptocurrency is a valid concept.

I’m far from an expert on cryptocurrencies and so I could be missing something (please let me know if I am), but it seems to me that it is not a valid concept. The essence of the blockchain technology that underlies cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is that the ledger is DISTRIBUTED. This is what makes the system secure. Cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets can be hacked, but the blockchain itself is, for all intents and purposes, ‘unhackable’.

If a digital currency exists on a centrally-controlled ledger it is not a cryptocurrency, it is a garden variety electronic currency like the dollars in your bank account.

Central banks and governments want to eliminate physical cash so that there is a digital record of all transactions. This is not to promote economic growth or to fight terrorism or to reduce crime or to further any other noble cause; it is primarily to maximise tax revenue and secondarily to cut off a way of escaping from negative interest rates. Therefore, it’s a good bet that physical cash will be outlawed in the not-too-distant future. For exactly the same reason (they make it more difficult for the government to monitor financial transactions and thus maximise tax revenue) it’s likely that cryptocurrencies will be outlawed at some stage.

Another relevant point is that commercial banks generate a lot of profit by lending new money into existence and monetising securities. Given the banking industry’s influence on government and the reliance of government on the financial support of banks, there is no chance of the government implementing a monetary system that substantially reduces the profitability of commercial banks.

In summary, I expect that governments will attempt to make the official currency 100% digital/electronic, but not introduce their own cryptocurrencies. As far as I can tell, “government-controlled cryptocurrency” is a contradiction in terms.

[This post is a brief excerpt from a TSI commentary published a week ago]

The US economic boom is still in progress, where a boom is defined as a period during which monetary inflation and the suppression of interest rates create the false impression of a growing/healthy economy*. We know that it is still in progress because the gap between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields — our favourite proxy for the US yield curve — continues to shrink and is now the narrowest it has been in 10 years.

Reiterating an explanation we’ve provided numerous times in the past, an important characteristic of a boom is an increasing desire to borrow short to lend/invest long. This puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates, which is why economic booms are associated with flattening yield curves. The following chart shows the accelerating upward trend in the US 2-year yield that was the driving force behind the recent sharp reduction in the 10yr-2yr yield spread.

The above paragraph explains why a yield-curve trend reversal from flattening to steepening invariably occurs around the time of a shift from economic boom to economic bust. Such a reversal is a sign that the willingness and/or ability to take on additional short-term debt to support investments in stocks, real estate, factors of production and long-term bonds has diminished beyond a critical level. From that point forward, a new self-reinforcing trend involving debt reduction and the liquidation of investments becomes increasingly dominant.

The recent performance of the yield curve indicates that the US economy hasn’t yet begun the transition from boom to bust.

*The remnants of capitalism enable some genuine progress to be made during the boom phase, but the bulk of the apparent economic vibrancy is associated with monetary-inflation-fueled price rises and activities that essentially consume the ‘seed corn’.

The following monthly chart shows that relative to a broad basket of commodities*, gold commenced a very long-term bull market (47 years and counting) in the early-1970s. It’s not a fluke that this bull market began at the same time as the final official US$-gold link was severed and the era of irredeemable free-floating fiat currency kicked off.

Anyone attempting to apply a traditional commodity-type analysis to the gold market would have trouble explaining the above chart. This is because throughout the ultra-long-term upward trend in the gold/commodity ratio the total supply of gold was orders of magnitude greater, relative to commercial demand, than the supply of any other commodity. Based on the sort of supply-demand analysis that routinely gets applied to other commodities, gold should have been the worst-performing commodity market.

The reason that a multi-generational upward trend in the gold/commodity ratio began in the early-1970s and is destined to continue is not that gold is money. The reality is that gold no longer satisfies a practical definition of money. The reason is the combination of the greater amount of mal-investment enabled by the post-1970 monetary system and the efforts by central bankers to dissuade people from saving in terms of the official money.

In brief, what happens is this: Central banks put downward pressure on interest rates (by creating new money) in an effort to promote economic growth, but the economy’s prospects cannot be improved by falsifying the most important price signals. Instead, the price distortions lead to clusters of ill-conceived investments, thus setting the stage for a recession or economic bust. Once it is widely realised that cash flows are going to be a lot less than previously expected there is a marked increase in the general desire to hold cash. At the same time, however, central banks say that if you hold cash then we will punish you. They don’t use those words, but it is made clear that they will do whatever it takes to prop-up prices and prevent the savers of money from earning a real return on their savings. This prompts people to look for highly liquid assets that can be held in lieu of the official money, which is where gold comes in.

This is why the gold/commodity ratio tends to trend downward when everything seems fine on the surface and rocket upward when it becomes apparent that numerous investing mistakes have been made and that the future will be nowhere near as copacetic as previously assumed.

It’s reasonable to expect that the multi-generational upward trend in the gold/commodity ratio that began in the early-1970s will continue for at least as long as the current monetary system remains in place. Why wouldn’t it?

*For the broad basket of commodity prices the chart uses the CRB Index up to 1992 and the GSCI Spot Commodity Index (GNX) thereafter.

The yield curve is a remarkably useful leading indicator of major economic and financial-market events. For example, its long-term trend can be relied on to shift from flattening to steepening ahead of economic recessions and equity bear markets. Also, usually it will remain in a flattening trend while a monetary-inflation-fueled boom is in progress. That’s why I consider the yield curve’s trend to be one of the true fundamental drivers of both the stock market and the gold market. Not surprisingly, when the yield curve’s trend is bullish for the stock market it is bearish for the gold market, and vice versa.

A major steepening of the yield curve will have one of two causes. If the steepening is primarily the result of rising long-term interest rates then the root cause will be rising inflation expectations, whereas if the steepening is primarily the result of falling short-term interest rates then the root cause will be increasing risk aversion linked to declining confidence in the economy and/or financial system. The latter invariably begins to occur during the transition from boom to bust.

A major flattening of the yield curve will have the opposite causes, meaning that it could be the result of either falling inflation expectations or a general increase in economic confidence and the willingness to take risk.

On a related matter, the conventional wisdom is that a steepening yield curve is bullish for the banking system because it results in the expansion of banks’ profit margins. While superficially correct, this ‘wisdom’ ignores the reality that one of the two main reasons for a major steepening of the yield curve is widespread, life-threatening problems within the banking system. For example, the following chart shows that over the past three decades the US yield curve experienced three major steepening trends: the late-1980s to early-1990s, the early-2000s and 2007-2011. All three of these trends were associated with economic recessions, while the first and third got underway when balance-sheet problems started to appear within the banking system and accelerated when it became apparent that most of the large banks were effectively bankrupt.

Here’s an analogy that hopefully helps explain the relationship (under the current monetary system) between major yield-curve trends and the economic/financial backdrop: Saying that a steepening of the yield curve is bullish because it eventually leads to a stronger economy and generally-higher bank profitability is like saying that bear markets are bullish because they eventually lead to bull markets; and saying that a flattening of the yield curve is bearish because it eventually — after many years — is followed by a period of severe economic weakness is like saying that bull markets are bearish because they always precede bear markets.

Both rising inflation expectations and increasing risk aversion tend to boost the general desire to own gold, whereas gold ownership becomes less desirable when inflation expectations are falling or economic/financial-system confidence is on the rise. Consequently, a steepening yield curve is bullish for gold and a flattening yield curve is bearish for gold.

The US yield curve’s trend has not yet reversed from flattening to steepening, meaning that its present situation is bullish for the stock market and bearish for the gold market. However, the yield curve is just one of seven fundamentals that factor into my gold model and one of five fundamentals that factor into my stock market model.

In a blog post in February of last year I explained that an inversion of the US yield curve has never been a recession signal. Instead, the genuine recession signal has always been the reversal in the curve from ‘flattening’ (short-term interest rates rising relative to long-term interest rates) to ‘steepening’ (short-term interest rates falling relative to long-term interest rates) after an extreme is reached. It just so happens that under normal monetary conditions an extreme usually isn’t reached and the reversal therefore doesn’t occur until after the yield curve becomes inverted.

The fact is that it doesn’t matter how ‘flat’ or inverted the yield curve becomes, there’s a good chance that the monetary-inflation-fueled economic boom will be intact as long as short-term interest rates are rising relative to long-term interest rates. The reason, in a nutshell, is that the boom periods are dominated by borrowing short to lend or invest long, a process that puts upward pressure on short-term interest rates relative to long-term interest rates. It’s when short-term interest rates begin trending downward relative to long-term interest rates that we know the boom is in trouble.

The following chart shows that the spread between the 10-year T-Note yield and the 2-year T-Note yield is much narrower now than it was a few years ago. This means that there has been a substantial flattening of the US yield curve. Also, the chart shows no evidence of a trend reversal. This implies that the inflation-fueled boom is still intact.