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In a blog post a week ago I discussed why silver’s Commitments of Traders (COT) situation was nowhere near as bullish as it had been portrayed in numerous articles over the preceding two months. This prompted some criticism that involves a misunderstanding of how I use the COT data. Before I address the criticism, a brief recap is in order.

As stated in last week’s post, the enthusiastically-bullish interpretation of silver’s COT situation fixated on the positioning of large speculators (“NonCommercials”) in Comex silver futures. It was based on the fact that over the past two months the large specs had reduced their collective net-long silver exposure to its lowest level in a very long time, indicating that these traders had become more pessimistic about silver’s prospects than they had been in a very long time. This was clearly a bullish development given the contrary nature of speculative sentiment.

I then explained that two components of silver’s overall COT situation cast doubt on the validity of the bullish interpretation.

The first was that near important bottoms in the silver price the open interest (OI) in silver futures tends to be low, but in early-April of this year the OI hit an all-time high.

The second was that whereas the positioning of large specs in silver futures pointed to depressed sentiment, the positioning of small speculators (“NonReportables”) pointed to extreme optimism. This was evidenced by the fact that over the past two months these traders (the proverbial ‘dumb money’) had, as a group, accumulated their greatest net-long exposure in 9 years. It would be very unusual for a big rally to begin at the time when the ‘dumb money’ was positioned for a big rally.

The latest COT report showed minimal change in the positioning of the small specs. As illustrated by the following chart from goldchartsrus.com, their collective net-long exposure is down from its late-March peak but remains near the top of its 3-year range (and its 10-year range).

The main criticism of last week’s blog post was that the size of the total “NonCommercial” (large-spec) position is about 10-times the size of the total “NonReportable” (small-spec) position and therefore that what the “NonCommercials” are doing is an order of magnitude more important than what the “NonReportables” are doing.

My response is: not if the COT information is being used as a sentiment indicator, which is the only way I use it.

The reason it is useful to know the sentiment of the small traders in any financial market is NOT that these traders are the movers and shakers in the market. They obviously aren’t. If they were they wouldn’t be “small” traders and wouldn’t be classed as “NonReportables” in the COT reports. It is useful to know the sentiment of these minor players because as a group they tend to be wrong when they become extremely bullish or extremely bearish. They are the ‘dumb money’. As I wrote last week and repeated above, it would be very unusual for a big rally to begin at the time when the ‘dumb money’ was positioned for a big rally.

Not surprisingly, then, there was no big rally (or any rally worth trading) in the silver market over the past two months.

During March and April a number of articles appeared at precious-metals-focused web sites describing the silver market’s Commitments of Traders (COT) situation as extremely bullish. However, this unequivocally bullish interpretation overlooked aspects of the COT data that were bearish for silver. Taking all aspects of the data into consideration, my interpretation at the time (as presented in TSI commentaries) was that silver’s COT situation was neutral and that the setup for a large rally was not yet in place.

The enthusiastically-bullish interpretation of silver’s COT situation fixated on the positioning of large speculators in Comex silver futures. As illustrated by the following chart, over the past two months the large specs (called “NonCommercials” on the chart) first went ‘flat’ and then went net-short. This suggested that large specs had become more pessimistic about silver’s prospects than they had been in a very long time, which was clearly a bullish development given the contrary nature of speculative sentiment.

Chart source: http://www.goldchartsrus.com/

However, two components of silver’s overall COT situation cast doubt on the validity of the bullish interpretation.

The first is that near important bottoms in the silver price the open interest (OI) in silver futures tends to be low, but in early-April of this year the OI hit an all-time high.

The second and more significant is that whereas the positioning of large specs in silver futures pointed to depressed sentiment, the positioning of small specs (the proverbial dumb money) pointed to extreme optimism. This is evidenced by the following chart, which shows that over the past two months the small specs (called “NonReportable” on the chart) reached their greatest net-long exposure in 9 years. It would be very unusual for a big rally to begin at the time when the ‘dumb money’ was positioned for a big rally.

Chart source: http://www.goldchartsrus.com/

The upshot is that silver’s COT situation was not price-supportive at any stage over the past two months. This is mainly because the bullish implications of the unusually-low net-long exposure of large specs was counteracted by the bearish implications of the unusually-high net-long exposure of small specs.

[The following is an excerpt from a commentary posted at TSI last week]

The US economic expansion that began in mid-2009 has been much weaker than average, but, as indicated by the chart displayed below, it is also much longer than average. In fact, it is simultaneously the weakest and the second-longest expansion on record. Due to the advanced age of the expansion and the signs of weakness that have appeared over the past three months in economic statistics and the stock market, recession warnings are becoming more common. However, when we take an impartial look at the most reliable leading indicators of recession we arrive at the conclusion that these warnings are premature.

Chart source: http://realinvestmentadvice.com/bull-markets-actually-do-die-of-old-age/

The three leading indicators of US recession that we care about are the ISM New Orders Index (NOI), Real Gross Private Domestic Investment (RGPDI) and the yield curve. Not one of these indicators is close to giving a recession warning, which is why we say that the increasingly-common warnings of recession are premature.

The NOI, for instance, has declined each month since making a 13-year high in December-2017, but it remains far above the level that it would have to drop below (the red line on the following chart) to warn of a recession.

Also, there are not even tentative signs of major trend reversals in either RGPDI or the yield curve. That’s because last month the US yield curve became its flattest in more than 10 years (a recession is signaled by a major shift from flattening to steepening) and because the data published at the end of last week revealed that RGPDI hit a new all-time high in Q1-2018. RGPDI’s trend generally reverses downward at least two quarters prior to the start of a recession.

Note that the vertical red lines on the following chart mark the starting points of the last two recessions.

Based on the latest data, we roughly estimate the recession start-time probabilities as follows:
- Q2-2018: 0%
- Q3-2018: 10%
- Q4-2018: 30%
- Some time in 2019: >80%

The main reason for our high 2019 recession probability estimate is the decline in the G2 (US plus euro-zone) monetary inflation rate illustrated by the following chart. The inflation rate bounced in March, but it’s likely that the preceding decline was large enough to bring the artificial boom to an end.

I update gold’s true fundamentals* every week in commentaries and charts at the TSI web site, but my most recent blog post on the topic was on 20th March. At that time the fundamental backdrop was gold-bearish. What’s the current situation?

The fundamental backdrop (from gold’s perspective) is little changed since 20th March. In fact, it has not changed much since early this year. My Gold True Fundamentals Model (GTFM), a weekly chart of which is displayed below, turned bearish during the first half of January and was still bearish at the end of last week. There have been fluctuations along the way, but at no time over the past 3.5 months has the fundamental backdrop been supportive of the gold price.

It’s possible for a tradable rally in the US$ gold price to get underway at a time when the fundamental backdrop is not gold-bullish, but for this to happen the sentiment situation as indicated by the Commitments of Traders data would have to be very supportive or the US$ would have to be very weak. Currently, the fundamental backdrop is bearish, the sentiment situation is neutral and the Dollar Index has just broken out to the upside. Therefore, as things stand today there is no good reason to expect that a substantial gold rally will get underway in the near future.

Based on how I expect the fundamentals to shift over the weeks ahead my guess is that a substantial gold rally will begin from a May-June low. However, there is more to be lost than gained by ‘jumping the gun’ and buying a short-term trading position now in anticipation of such a rally.

*Note that I use the word “true” to distinguish the actual fundamental drivers of the gold price from the drivers that are regularly cited by gold-market analysts and commentators. According to many pontificators on the gold market, gold’s fundamentals include the volume of metal flowing into the inventories of gold ETFs, China’s gold imports, the volume of gold being transferred out of the Shanghai Futures Exchange inventory, the amount of “registered” gold at the COMEX, India’s monsoon and wedding seasons, jewellery demand, the amount of gold being bought/sold by various central banks, changes in mine production and scrap supply, and wild guesses regarding JP Morgan’s exposure to gold. These aren’t true fundamental price drivers. At best, they are distractions.

Most people support a political party in the same way they support a sports team. The support is through thick and thin, regardless of the policies that are being proposed/enacted. And criticism of their team is not tolerated, because, well, it’s their team. People love to be part of a team.

One consequence of the team-spirit aspect of politics is that the average person doesn’t decide the appropriateness and efficacy of a policy by objective analysis, but rather by who is proposing/implementing the policy. If the policy is put forward by Party A then the supporters of Party A will claim it is a good idea and the supporters of Party B will be critical, whereas if the identical policy is put forward by Party B then the Party B supporters will be in favour of it and the Party A supporters will be critical. In some cases a policy put forward by a particular party will be so obviously bad that the more rational supporters of that party will be unable to come out openly in favour of it, in which case they usually will remain silent. They are like the one-eyed sports fans who shout abuse when the referee makes a bad decision in the opposing team’s favour but turn a blind eye when the referee makes a bad decision in their team’s favour.

Another consequence of the tendency towards blind support of a political team and the associated unwillingness to objectively analyse the merits of policies is that people tend to embrace a set of beliefs covering many different socioeconomic issues, even if the beliefs are not consistent. This is because the set of beliefs is associated with their team and advocated by the leaders of their team. A knock-on effect is that if you know where someone stands on one hot-button issue, examples of which are climate change, gun control, immigration and abortion, in most cases you will know where they stand on all hot-button issues. That’s even though it doesn’t logically follow that a particular belief on, for example, gun control should be linked to a particular belief on, for example, climate change or abortion.

One of the most curious aspects of the strong identification with a particular political team and the animosity that members of one team often feel for members of the opposing team is that in practice the teams are very similar. At each election a sizable proportion of the population will vote for what they believe is a change of direction, but regardless of the outcome of the election nothing will really change. The leaders of the different teams will spew forth different rhetoric and there will be some differences in the policy details, but regardless of the election result there will be no meaningful change in the overall governmental approach. The main reason is that in a typical modern-day two (or more) party democracy, each of the major parties will be in favour of a powerful, intrusive government. In effect, when people vote to remove the team that’s currently in power they are voting for a change in the facade, not a change in the structure.

It would be great if the average person, instead of labeling himself/herself as a member of a particular political team (Republican, Democrat, Conservative, Liberal, Labour, etc.) and blindly supporting that team’s policies, either impartially assessed each policy proposal and railed against bad policy regardless of its origin or simply admitted to not being well-enough informed to have an opinion. Unfortunately, that’s never going to happen.

[Here is an excerpt from a commentary posted at TSI about a week ago]

In February of this year the year-over-year rate of growth in the US True Money Supply, a.k.a. the US monetary inflation rate, was only 2.4%. This was its lowest level since March of 2007 and not far from a multi-decade low. In March of this year, however, the monetary inflation rate almost doubled — to around 4.6%. Refer to the following chart for more detail. What caused the reversal and what effect will it have on the economy and the financial markets?

The Fed has been slowly removing money from the economy via its QT program, so March’s money-supply surge wasn’t caused by the central bank. The main cause also wasn’t the commercial banking industry, because although there has been an up-tick in the rate of bank credit expansion over the past month it is nowhere near enough to explain the increase in TMS.

We can’t be certain, but by a process of elimination we conclude that the sharp upward reversal in the US monetary inflation rate was due to money coming into the US from overseas. If so, the most likely driver would be the repatriation of corporate profits due to the tax changes approved near the end of last year.

In other words, it’s likely that March’s TMS surge was due more to the way that the banking system accounts for existing US dollars than an increase in the total supply of US dollars.

If the monetary inflation reversal has more to do with a change in the way existing US dollars are accounted for than a sudden large increase in the pace of new dollar creation, then the effects on the economy and the financial markets will be minimal. In any case, after the monetary inflation rate has moved high enough for long enough to set in motion an artificial boom, a drop to a relatively low inflation level will inevitably lead to a bust (an economic recession and a large decline in the stock market, often accompanied by a banking crisis). For example, the pronounced rebound in the TMS growth rate from Q4-2006 to Q3-2007 did not stop the recession, the equity bear market and the banking crisis of 2007-2009.

This means that as a result of the 2017 decline in the monetary inflation rate to near a 20-year low, the die has been cast.

The big unknown right now is the timing of the bust that will occur in response to last year’s precipitous decline in the monetary inflation rate. Will it get underway during the second half of this year or will it wait until next year?

In previous blog posts (e.g. HERE) I explained the limitations of sentiment as a market timing tool. Since the public is invariably wrong at price extremes, it certainly can be helpful to track the public’s sentiment and use it as a contrary indicator. However, whereas price extremes always coincide with sentiment extremes, sentiment extremes often don’t coincide with price extremes. This is especially the case during long-term bull markets, when sentiment is capable of staying very optimistic for years. It’s therefore best to think of a sentiment extreme as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a price extreme.

With regard to US stock market sentiment there was an optimistic extreme in January of this year. This is evidenced by the TSI Index of Bullish Sentiment (TIBS) hitting a 20-year high at that time. Refer to the following weekly chart for details. Note that TIBS is a weighted average of four sentiment surveys (Investors Intelligence, Market Vane, Consensus-inc and American Association of Individual Investors), the 5-day moving average of the equity put/call ratio and the 5-day moving average of the VIX.

What is the probability that January’s optimistic extreme coincided with the top of the equity bull market?

The answer is: quite low. While sentiment was consistent with a major top and valuations, on average, were definitely high enough to usher in a major top, an end to the long-term upward trend was not signaled by several important indicators. For example, there would normally be a pronounced widening of credit spreads at or before a bull market top, but credit spreads remain near their narrowest levels of the past 10 years. For another example, there is likely to be a reversal in the yield curve from flattening to steepening at or prior to a bull market top, but at the end of last week the US yield curve was at its ‘flattest’ in more than 10 years. For a third example, there has been more strength in market internals over the past two months than there normally would be if we were dealing with the early stage of a bear market.

So, despite the rampant optimism evident in January-2018, the decline that followed the January peak probably will turn out to be a bull-market correction.

Among the list of stock selection and trading ideas maintained at the TSI web site there was, until the week before last, a Tesla (TSLA) put option position. The position was exited — and a large profit recorded — after the stock’s recent plunge from well above $300 to the $250s. However, this stock could present multiple opportunities over the coming 12 months to profit on the dark (bearish) side as it makes its way along the path to zero. TSLA could become the short that keeps on giving.

In fact, the fast rebound from the 2nd April low in the mid-$240s to the 9th April high of $309.50 may have already created the next such opportunity. The reason is that the rebound appears to have ended near the top of the former major support at $300-$310, the implication being that the stock has completed a successful test of its breakdown.

The company is clearly in trouble. It is hemorrhaging cash and running out of money, it is suffering production problems, it has possibly engaged in fraudulent accounting and is under investigation, and it will soon be faced with much greater competition from companies that are far more adept at vehicle manufacturing. And yet, it still sports an extremely high market valuation.

TSLA bears will have to remain on guard, though, because Elon “the carnival barker” Musk is still capable of whipping up enthusiasm.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a TSI commentary published on 27th March 2018]

The policies of the Trump Administration are being influenced by the view that international trade is a zero sum game, where whoever receives the most money is the winner at the expense of whoever receives the most goods. Under this line of thinking, which sometimes goes under the name “mercantilism”, policies are beneficial if they increase the amount of money coming into the country relative to the amount of money going out of the country. As discussed below, it’s the wrong way to look at the world.

Another way of framing the mercantilist position is that the winner is the one who ends up with the larger amount of the medium of exchange and the loser is the one who ends up with the larger amount of real wealth. For reasons we’ll get into in a moment there are actually no winners and losers, but if it were true that one side was getting the better deal then surely it would be the one that ended up with the most real wealth; especially these days, when the medium of exchange is created out of nothing by the banking system.

Also, it’s important to understand that countries don’t trade with each other. For example, the US doesn’t trade with China. What we mean is that a country is not an economic entity that buys and sells. Instead, individuals in one country trade with individuals in another country and in each transaction both sides believe that they are benefiting (otherwise the transaction wouldn’t happen). While it is technically possible to lump together all the transactions undertaken by the individuals in one region and arrive at the conclusion that ‘we’ have a trade deficit or ‘we’ have a trade surplus, in the real world there is no ‘we’ when it comes to trade.

Unfortunately, however, governments pay attention to the meaningless lumping-together of millions of individual transactions, and if the result happens to be what is commonly called a deficit then the government will often conclude that it should place obstacles in the way of many transactions. You may think that you are benefiting from a deal with a foreign seller, but according to the government you are creating a problem for the collective ‘we’ and must be hindered or stopped.

The Trump Administration is in the spotlight at the moment for having undertaken three sets of protectionist measures over just the past two months. There were the tariffs on imported washing machines and solar panels announced in January, the tariffs on imported steel and aluminium announced at the beginning of March and the as-yet-unspecified tariffs on $60B of Chinese imports announced last week. However, the US government does not have a monopoly on counter-productive mercantilism. Far from it! The same sort of ‘reasoning’ that has informed the trade-related missteps of the US government over the past two months is informing the actions of most governments around the world.

For example, other governments are threatening to impose their own tariffs in response to the US tariffs, which is something they would not do unless they wrongly believed that such restrictions could benefit their own economies. For another example, the large quantity of US$-denominated reserves collectively held by central banks around the world has almost nothing to do with the US$ being the official reserve currency and almost everything to do with exchange-rate management designed, using terribly flawed logic, to gain an international trade advantage. Refer to the May-2015 post at the TSI Blog for more colour on this issue.

There is nothing that any one government can do directly to change the wrongheaded protectionist ways of other governments. The best that any single government can do is to not become part of the problem. The ideal situation is that no side erects barriers to international trade, but the second-best situation for any one country is that its own government opts not to erect barriers. Just because some other government decides to impose economic sanctions on its own citizens doesn’t mean that your government is justified in doing the same.

[This blog post is an excerpt from a recent TSI commentary]

The year-over-year rate of growth in the US True Money Supply (TMS) was around 11.5% in October of 2016 (the month before the US Presidential election) and is now only 2.4%, which is near a 20-year low. Refer to the following monthly chart for details. In terms of effects on the financial markets and the economy, up until recently the US monetary inflation slowdown was largely offset by continuing rapid monetary inflation elsewhere, most notably in Europe. However, the tightening of US monetary conditions has started to have noticeable effects and these effects should become more pronounced as the year progresses.

The tightening of monetary conditions eventually will expose the mal-investments of the last several years, which, in turn, will result in a severe recession, but the most obvious effect to date is the increase in interest rates across the entire curve. The upward acceleration in interest rates over the past six months has more than one driver, but it probably wouldn’t have happened if money had remained as plentiful as it was two years ago.

It would be a mistake to think that the tightening has been engineered by the Fed. The reality is that the Fed has done very little to date.

The Fed has made several 0.25% increases in its targeted interest rates, but the main effect of these rate hikes is to increase the amount of money the Fed pays to the commercial banks in the form of interest on reserves (IOR). It doesn’t matter how you spin it, injecting more money into banks ain’t monetary tightening!

The Fed’s actual efforts on the monetary loosening/tightening front over the past 5 years are encapsulated by the following weekly chart of Reserve Bank Credit (RBC). This chart shows that there was a rapid rise in RBC during 2013-2014 that ended with the completion of QE in October-2014. For the next three years RBC essentially flat-lined, which is what should be expected given that the Fed was neither quantitatively easing nor quantitatively tightening during this period. In October-2017 the Fed introduced its Quantitative Tightening (QT) program. To date, this program has resulted in only a small reduction in RBC, but the plan is for the pace of the QT to ramp up.

Strangely, the most senior members of the Fed appear to believe that their baby-step rate hikes constitute genuine tightening and that the contraction of the central bank’s balance sheet is neither here nor there. The reality is the opposite.

So, the Fed is not responsible for the large decline in the US monetary inflation rate and the resultant tightening of monetary conditions that has occurred to date.

The responsibility for the tightening actually lies with the commercial banks. As illustrated by the next chart, the year-over-year rate of growth in commercial bank credit was slightly above 8% at around the time of the Presidential election in late-2016 and is now about 3%.

We won’t be surprised if a steepening yield curve prompts commercial banks to collectively increase their pace of credit creation over the next two quarters, but with the Fed set to quicken the pace of its QT the US monetary inflation rate probably will remain low by the standards of the past two decades. At the same time, the ECB will be taking actions that reduce the monetary inflation rate in the euro-zone. This could lead to stock and bond market volatility during the second half of this year that dwarfs what we’ve witnessed over the past two months.

The major long-term driver of the gold price is confidence in the official money and in the institutions (governments, central banks and private banks) that create/promote/sponsor the official money. As far as long-term investors are concerned the gold story is therefore a simple one: gold will be in a bull market when confidence in the financial establishment (money, banks and government) is in a bear market and gold will be in a bear market when confidence in the financial establishment is in a bull market.

In real time it often doesn’t seem that simple, though, because on a weekly, monthly or even yearly basis a lot can happen to throw an investor off the scent. However, the risk of being thrown off the scent can be reduced by having an objective way of measuring the ebbs and flows in the confidence that drives, among other things, the performance of the gold market. That’s why I developed the Gold True Fundamentals Model (GTFM). The GTFM is determined mainly by confidence indicators such as credit spreads, the yield curve, the relative strength of the banking sector and inflation expectations, although it also takes into account the US dollar’s exchange rate and the general commodity-price trend.

An alternative to objective measurement is to rely on gut feel, but gut feel is notoriously unreliable in such matters because it is, by definition, influenced by personal biases. For example, it will be influenced by “projection bias”. This is the assumption that if you perceive things in a certain way, then most other people will perceive them in the same way. Projection bias plays a big part in a lot of gold market analysis. The market analyst will observe central bank or government actions that from his/her perspective are blatantly counter-productive, and go on to assume, often wrongly, that most market participants will view the actions in the same way.

Another alternative is to assume that gold’s fundamentals are always bullish and therefore that any large or lengthy price decline must be the result of a grand price-suppression scheme. Given its absurdity it’s amazing how popular this line of thinking has become in the gold market. Then again, it’s a line of thinking that has been aggressively promoted over the past two decades and has a certain emotional appeal.

Due to the effects of market sentiment the gold price occasionally will diverge from its ‘true fundamentals’ (as indicated by the GTFM) for up to a few months, but ALL substantial upward and downward trends in the gold price over the past 15 years have been consistent with the fundamental backdrop.

Does this invalidate the idea that manipulation happens in the gold market?

Of course not. Every experienced and knowledgeable trader/investor knows that all financial markets have always been subject to manipulation and always will be subject to manipulation. It does, however, invalidate the idea that there has been a successful long-term gold-price-suppression program.

The current situation (as at the end of last week) is that gold’s true fundamentals, as indicated by the GTFM, have been bearish for the past 10 weeks. Also, the true fundamentals have spent more time in bearish territory than bullish territory since the second half of last September. Refer to the following chart comparison of the GTFM and the US$ gold price for details.

Now, considering the fundamental backdrop it seems that the gold price has held up remarkably well over the past several months, but that conclusion only emerges if your sole measuring stick is the US$. When performance relative to the other senior currency (the euro) and the world’s most important equity index (the S&P500) are taken into account it becomes clear that the gold market has been weak. Here are the relevant charts.

The fundamental backdrop is continually shifting and potentially could turn gold-bullish within the next few weeks. It just isn’t bullish right now. Also, there could be a strong rally in the US$ gold price in the face of neutral-bearish fundamentals. If so, we would be dealing with a US$ bear market as opposed to a gold bull market.

In a gold bull market the ‘value’ of an ounce of gold rises relative to the major equity indices and both senior currencies. For this to happen the true fundamentals would have to be decisively bullish most of the time.

The rising interest-rate trend in the US isn’t new and isn’t related to the Fed’s so-called “policy normalisation” program. However, it has only just started to matter.

That the rising interest-rate trend isn’t new and isn’t related to the Fed’s rate-hiking efforts is clearly illustrated by the following chart. This chart shows that the US 2-year T-Note yield began trending upward in 2011 — more than 6 years ago and more than 4 years prior to the Fed’s first rate hike.

As we go further out in duration we find later beginnings to the rising-yield trend. This is evidenced by the following three charts, the first of which shows that the 5-year yield bottomed in mid-2012, the second of which shows that the 10-year yield double-bottomed in mid-2012 and mid-2016, and the third of which shows that the 30-year yield continued to make lower lows until mid-2016. But even in the case of the 30-year yield the rising trend is now more than 18 months old.

Given that US interest rates have been rising for more than 6 years at the short end and more than 18 months at the long end, why has the trend suddenly begun to draw a lot of attention in the mainstream press?

The answer is: because rising yields on credit instruments have begun to put downward pressure on equity prices. The stock market is capable of ignoring rising interest rates for long periods, as has been demonstrated by the market action of the past few years. However, if a rising interest-rate trend persists for long enough it transforms, as far as the stock market is concerned, from an irrelevance to the most important thing.

The way that interest rates gradually turned upward over several years despite the relentless downward pressure applied by the central bank suggests that we are dealing with the end of a very long-term decline. In other words, there’s a good chance that we are now in the early stages of a 1-2 decade (or longer) rising interest-rate trend. But how could that be, when debt levels are very high and the economy-wide savings rate is very low?

Under the current monetary regime, major upward trends in interest rates are not driven by the desire to consume more in the present (the desire to save less) or by rapidly-increasing demand for borrowed money to invest in productive enterprises. That, in essence, is a big part of the problem — interest-rate trends do not reflect what they should reflect. Instead, major upward trends in interest rates are driven primarily by rising inflation expectations, or, to put it more aptly, by declining confidence in money.

Of particular relevance, under the current monetary regime it is not only possible for a large, general increase in the desire to save to be accompanied by rising interest rates, it is highly probable that when a large rise in interest rates happens it will be accompanied by a general desire to save more. It’s just that the desire for greater savings won’t manifest itself as a greater desire to hold cash. It will, instead, manifest itself as a desire to hold more of something with near-cash-like liquidity that is not subject to arbitrary devaluation by central banks and governments. Gold is the most obvious example.